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ABSTRACT
This study employs a historical/critical approach to 
analyze the response of the Clinton Administration to the 
Haiti situation during 1993. The relationship between 
contemporary presidential crisis communication and the 
agenda-setting and agenda-extension functions of the press 
is especially considered. Specifically, this study employs 
a frame analysis which compares the frame generated by the 
Clinton Administration with that used by the press, 
represented by New York Times and the Washington Post. The 
importance of this study lies in its timeliness; President 
Clinton is the first atomic-age President not to have the 
Cold War meta-narrative to use in legitimating 
international crises. Prior studies in presidential crisis 
rhetoric found that the President receives broad and 
consistent support during times of crisis. This study 
found that the press advanced an oppositional frame that 
stressed a domestic focus, while the frame used by the 
Clinton Administration stressed a foreign policy focus.
The frames were found to limit the options of the Clinton 
Administration when dealing with the Haitian crisis, even 
during the most crucial time of the crisis. Thus this 
study discovered evidence that President/press interaction 




In October 1991, President Jean Bertrand Aristide of 
Haiti was forcefully removed from office following a c o u p  
d'6tat led by Haiti's military leader, General Raoul 
Cedras. In response to this event, George Bush issued 
Executive Order 12775, which officially elevated the 
situation in Haiti to the level of a "national emergency" 
for the United States. The Bush Administration immediately 
called for economic sanctions, and in cooperation with the 
United Nations (U.N.) and the Organization of American 
States (OAS) initiated an embargo that would last 
throughout Bush's term as President.
In January 1993, Bill Clinton was sworn in as
President and inherited Bush's Haitian policy. Throughout
his candidacy, Clinton had derided the Bush
Administration's policy on Haiti. Yet upon taking office
Clinton essentially left Bush's policies in place, made 
them his own, and modified them in the ensuing months. The 
press did not let this apparent campaign reversal go 
unnoticed. Throughout 1993, the situation in Haiti 
remained unstable, and several key events occurred to which 
the President and the press responded. On 19 February 
1993, the freighter Neptune sank, leaving over 800 Haitians 
dead. On 13 March 1993, the Haitian military arrested a 
soldier after he had been granted political asylum by the 
United States. On 15 March 1993 President Aristide visited
1
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President Clinton in Washington. On 3 July 1993, the 
Haitian leaders signed the Governors Island agreement that 
set a specific time for President Aristide's return to 
Haiti. Finally, on 11 October 1993, U.S. and Canadian 
military engineers and trainers were not allowed to land in 
Port-au-Prince.
Although these events prompted criticism of the 
Clinton Administration, they were also used by the Clinton 
Administration to justify increased action. The press 
focus was primarily upon the legal battle ensuing over the 
constitutionality of the Clinton Administration's 
repatriation policy, and upon the general plight of Haitian 
refugees. The Administration's focus was bifurcated: one, 
the return of President Aristide and democracy to Haiti; 
and two, the prevention of a humanitarian tragedy in the 
form of a massive refugee flotilla from Haiti. These 
competing foci produced different discourses about Haiti 
and the broad divergence of the contending frames through 
which the President and the press viewed the situation even 
after significant action had been taken by the chief 
executive. Therefore, this study employs a comparative 
frame analysis to answer the following questions: one, how 
did the Clinton Administration frame the situation in 
Haiti; two, how did the press, responding to President 
Clinton, frame the situation; and three, at what time, if
3
at all, did these frames converge to present a unified 
contextual whole?
Rationale for Investigation 
This study seeks to better understand the interaction 
of press and presidential discourse in the context of 
crisis formation. With the Cold War arguably over, 
President Clinton is the first atomic-age President unable 
to draw upon the Cold War meta-narrative. This raises the 
issue of how a President can now frame an international 
event as a crisis. In the past it would have been 
relatively easy for an American President to use Haiti as a 
stalking horse for the Soviet Union, thereby justifying 
almost any level of action/involvement. In the post-Cold 
War environment President Clinton appeared unable to do 
this. He seemed to have lost the authority of unilateral 
definition, and his assessments were constantly scrutinized 
and challenged by the national media. As the following 
pages will suggest, this study occurs at a crucial period 
in the history of presidential studies. The very nature of 
how Presidents must now frame international events has 
changed with the demise of the Soviet Union. Thus this 
study examines the beginning of the creation of a new and 




Many speech communication researchers view crises as 
rhetorical creations of the executive branch of government. 
Although the declaration of crisis may be unilateral, all 
subsequent discourse is both coded and rule-governed. 
Theodore Windt argued that a crisis is announced by the 
President as such, and that the situation demands that he 
"act decisively."1 By announcing the crisis the President 
asks for his decision to be supported, not for debate upon 
what should be done. According to Windt, so long as the 
crisis is not one of a military attack upon the United 
States, it is to be considered a political event 
"rhetorically created by the president. . . . "J However,
the President is not free to do as he pleases when 
discursively responding to a crisis. His rhetorical 
options are limited by "precedent, tradition, and 
expediency."1 The discourse of crisis is shaped by the 
political culture that authorizes it.
Jim A. Kuypers, Marilyn J. Young, and Michael K.
Launer argued that international crisis situations may 
begin with no stable means for interpreting the discursive 
surroundings, and that one of the purposes of presidential 
utterances is the creation of a stable contextual frame 
from which to interpret the event.4 As Windt suggested, 
presidential speeches announcing a crisis "begin with an 
assertion of the President's control of the facts of the
situation and an acknowledgement that the New Facts which 
occasion the speech constitute a New Situation— a crisis 
for the United States.H*
Windt suggested three basic lines of arguments that 
distinguish presidential crisis rhetoric from other types 
of presidential utterances.6 First, there is the 
obligatory statement of facts. Second, there is the 
establishment of a "melodrama" between good (the U.S.) and 
evil (traditionally the Soviets). Third, the policy 
announced by the President and the asked for support are 
framed as moral acts. Although this structure may hold 
true for post-World War II Presidents up to Bush, President 
Clinton was unable to frame his responses to crises in this 
manner due to ending of the Cold War. The "Evil Empire," 
as Ronald Reagan put it, no longer exists. So, how to 
frame crisis situations?
Outside of military attack, the situation does not 
create the crisis, the President's response does. The 
President's perception of the situation, and the rhetoric 
he uses to describe it, have the potential to elevate the 
situation to the status of crisis. D. Ray Heisey argued 
that the President must build certain images of the 
"enemy," or must make links with values embedded within 
American culture and history if he is successfully to 
mitigate a crisis.7 In short, "leader[s] must find the 
acceptable images of political reality suitable for his/her
6
p e o p l e . S i n c e  the dawn of the atomic-age, all Presidents 
have been able to call upon the topos of good (the United 
States) vs. evil (the Soviet Union). Yet with culmination 
of the Cold War the Soviet Union is (at least at this 
writing) in financial and social ruins: the "Evil Empire" 
is no more. The destruction of the Soviet Union meant the 
concomitant destruction of the Cold War meta-narrative.
This is politically unfortunate for Clinton; he must 
respond to potential crisis situations without the benefit 
of this action legitimating meta-narrative; and, if we 
grant Windt's stages of presidential crisis rhetoric as 
necessary criteria, it follows that President Clinton will 
be unable to define a crisis unilaterally, at least without 
first redefining how four generations of Americans view the 
enemy.
The Agenda-Setting and Aaenda-Extension Functions of the 
Press
Scholars of mass communication are not certain whether 
to call Agenda-Setting a function, a theory, or a 
hypothesis.4 Its relevance here, regardless of its status, 
is to help explain how the press interacts with 
presidential discourse during crisis situations. Bernard
C. Cohen made an early observation that the press "may not 
be very successful in telling its readers what to think, 
but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what 
to think about."11 If Cohen's statement is accepted as 
accurate, then it behooves us to consider presidential
7
crisis rhetoric in relation to the press, not because the 
press represents public opinion, but because it is a good 
indication of the issues and ideas that informed voters and 
opinion leaders will be talking about. Thus the President 
will be aware of the issues, ideas, and responses that 
circulate in the press; not because they represent popular 
opinion, but because they are a good indicator of that 
which still needs to be addressed in his policy, or that he 
should be talking about.
Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw argued that 
voters learn about an issue "in direct proportion" to the 
attention given that issue by the press; voters tend to 
share what the media defined as important." Further, they 
asserted that the mass media provide voters with the "major 
primary sources of national political information."12 This 
is commensurate with the results of a study by Sheldon 
Gilberg, Chaim Eyal, Maxwell E. McCombs and D. Nichols 
which concluded that the press has the potential to set our 
government's agenda, even at the highest levels." Michael 
B. Salwen suggested that policy makers "will address issues 
only when these issues are perceived as crises by the 
publ ic.1,14
Viewed as a Fourth Estate, the mass media shapes not 
only what the public "perceives" as "political reality," 
but also how political elites understand what voters and 
opinion leaders are thinking about. Thus a conversation
8
develops among 'the press, its sources, and the public 
audience that determines "what is accepted as the public 
agenda."14
Gilberg et al asserted that the President is in a 
"strategic position to influence the agenda" of the press 
because he is the major source of news at the national 
level.16 Although their study found that the press had a 
significant influence upon President Carter's second State 
of the Union address, they were unable to determine whether 
Carter's address influenced subsequent press issues. 
However, a subsequent study by McCombs, Gilbert and Eyal 
found evidence of "presidential influence on subsequent 
press coverage."17 The implications of this for the study 
of presidential crisis rhetoric should be clear, 
particularly in light of the degree to which the public 
rely upon the press for information, especially national 
and international events. These "unobtrusive issues" are 
not part of an individual's common experience, therefore 
the "news media exercise a near monopoly as sources of 
information and orientation."1* Although the President 
surely knows more, the media tell him what we. the public, 
know.
Agenda-extension occurs when the media move beyond the 
strict reporting of facts, and it is to this concern that 
we now turn. During the decade of the eighties, mass media 
and communication researchers using agenda-setting theory
9
began to discover an evaluative component to media news. 
They postulated that the media do more than tell us what to 
think about, they also tell us how to think about it.
These studies suggested another aspect of agenda-setting as 
it relates to the public evaluation of Presidents; this 
aspect is described as "priming." These studies also 
suggested a germane issue for this study; they postulated 
that media provide the contextual cues "by which to 
evaluate the subject matter" under consideration.|y In 
short, the media often "frame" an issue so that it will be 
interpreted in a specific manner.
Framing involves the relationship between qualitative 
aspects of news coverage— contextual cues— and how the 
public interprets the news. William Gamson asserted that a 
"frame is a central organizing idea for making sense of 
relevant events and suggesting what is at issue."20 Facts 
remain neutral until framed, thus how the press frames an 
issue or event invariably affects public understanding of 
that issue or event. Indeed, Gamson argued that facts 
"take on their meaning by being embedded in a frame or 
story line that organizes them and gives them coherence, 
selecting certain ones to emphasize while ignoring 
others. "2I
Method
I answer my previously stated research questions 
through a comparative framing analysis of the Clinton
Administration's public discursive responses to the Haiti 
situation during 1993. The Washington Post and the New 
York Times (as papers of record) will be used to provide 
the press response to the event. There are three specific 
questions this study answers: one, how did the Clinton 
Administration frame the situation in Haiti; two, how did 
the press, responding to President Clinton, frame the 
situation; and three, at what time, if at all, did these 
frames converge to present a unified contextual whole? 
Specifically, I trace the press/President conversations 
revolving around President Clinton's formal, public 
statements about Haiti. The remainder of this study is 
composed of six chapters. Chapter two is a review of 
relevant literature on presidential crisis rhetoric. 
Chapter three is a review of relevant literature on agenda 
setting and agenda-extension theory. Chapter four is an 
outline of this study's method. Chapter five is the 
analysis of relevant texts from January 1993 through June 
1993. Chapter six is the analysis of relevant texts from 
July 1993 through December 1993. Chapter seven concludes 
this study with a discussion of this study's findings and 
the implications for future studies in presidential crisis 
rhetoric.
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PRESIDENTIAL CRISIS RHETORIC: REVIEW OF 
RELEVANT LITERATUT*^
This chapter reviews the scholarly literature most
relevant for this study. The categories reviewed are: one,
studies of the origin of Cold War rhetoric; and two,
studies of presidential crisis rhetoric (the definitional
and inventional properties). In addition, this chapter
discusses the meaning and significance of these studies for
the present work. Thus, it discusses the chief
methodological and theoretical issues in presidential
crisis rhetoric. In particular, it considers the Cold War
itself as a meta-narrative and framing device for
presidential crisis rhetoric. Conversely it discusses the
changes in the inventional stature of such rhetoric as a
result of the end of the Cold War. Finally, it reviews the
limitations of the scholarly literature and the ways in
which the present study may extend our knowledge of
presidential communication.
Studies in the Origin of the Cold War 
The Cold War meta-narrative1 has permeated into every 
corner of U.S. foreign policy decisions. Its power, its 
inventional resources, predate the Cold War itself. Robert 
L. Ivie, in "Images of Savagery in American Justifications 
for War," pointed out that there existed prior to the 
ending of the Cold War a "contest of force vs. freedom, 
irrationality vs. rationality, and aggression vs. defense 
[that permeates) the substance and style of the call-to-
13
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arms throughout American history.”2 Cold War rhetoric
draws upon this tradition; thus, Presidents have been able
to construct arguments appealing for public support using
the values and cultural myths felt deeply by the American
people. Usually this strategy involved the indirect
construction of an image of the enemy through the use of
contrasting references: the enemy as "coercive, irrational,
and aggressive," attempting to "subjugate a freedom-loving,
rational, and pacific victim.”1 For example, the
opposition of force vs. freedom is exemplified by President
Johnson's 28 July 1965 news conference concerning American
involvement with Vietnam. Johnson stated:
we insist and we will always insist that the 
people of South Viet-Nam [sic] shall have the 
right of choice, the right to shape their own 
destiny in free elections in the South or 
throughout all viet-Nam under international 
supervision, and they shall not have any 
government imposed upon them by force and terror 
so long as we can prevent it.4
Although just one example, the history of how Presidents
characterize the enemies of the United States, argues Ivie,
is replete with such references.
In Political Communication. Craig Allen Smith has 
written on the genesis of Cold War rhetoric. He suggested 
that Cold War rhetoric developed from three separate lines 
of foreign policy thought arising immediately after World 
War II.' The first is a rhetoric of cooperation. Some 
politicians "envisioned a world of good and peaceful 
nations subject to . . . wars caused by . . . outlaws like
15
Hitler and wars caused by conflicting interests."6 These 
politicians envisioned many of the world's future conflicts 
being avoided through the establishment of an international 
peace keeping force. The second type of rhetoric is a 
rhetoric of red fascism. Politicians operating from this 
perspective "explained Soviet expansion with the rhetoric 
used previously to explain German and Italian fascists."7 
Consequently, the Soviets were cast in the light of a 
totalitarian police state that was bent upon world 
conquest. Having just experienced almost a decade of this 
type of rhetoric, the American public was well familiar 
with the arguments and characterizations used. The third 
type of rhetoric is a rhetoric of power politics. This 
rhetoric rejected the "cooperationist and red fascist 
notions of moral and immoral nations. . . .  [It instead] 
depicted Soviet expansion as a powerful nation filling a 
power vacuum."" These three rhetorical strategies were 
combined in the Truman Doctrine. with the announcement of 
this new policy, an American foreign policy of containment 
was established that has carried the country into the 
1990s.
It is a well known American cultural fact that, 
following World War II, a forty-five year Cold War ensued; 
with each passing year the collective weight of superpower 
experiences made it easier for Presidents to construct 
foreign policy arguments and take action while concurrently
making it more difficult to break the cycle. Martin J.
Medhurst, in "Rhetoric and Cold War: A Strategic Approach,
commented upon the force that such experience has for
American Presidents. Since the end of World War II,
Soviet-American political interactions have comprised an
ever growing history from which politicians of both sides
have drawn arguments, described situations, and predicted
the outcomes of Superpower struggles. As Medhurst stated,
history "'teaches' us how to negotiate with the Soviets.
Past 'lessons' constrain the form such negotiations may
take."*' Medhurst illustrated the enormous dimensions of
the Cold War meta-narrative:
Cold War, like its "hot" counterpart, is a 
contest. It is a contest between competing 
systems as represented, for example, by the 
Soviet Union and the United States.
The currency of Cold War combat . . .  is 
rhetorical discourse: discourse intentionally 
designed to achieve a particular goal with one o 
more specific audience. Cold War weapons are 
words, images, symbolic actions, and, on 
occasion, physical actions undertaken by covert 
means. Hl
In "Metaphor and the Rhetorical Invention of Cold War 
'Idealists,'" Robert L. Ivie suggested that the primary 
inventional resource of Cold War rhetoric lay in its 
"prevailing image of the Soviet threat."11 He summed well 
in "Cold War Motives and the Rhetorical Metaphor: A 
Framework of Criticism" how Cold War rhetoric was used by 
the U.S. government to characterize the Soviet Union: "The 
nation's adversary is characterized as a mortal threat to
17
freedom, a germ infecting the body politic, a plague upon 
the liberty of humankind, and a barbarian intent upon 
destroying civilization."12
Studies of Presidential Crisis Rhetoric
Serious research on presidential crisis rhetoric began 
with the work of Theodore O. Windt, especially after the 
197 3 publication of "The Presidency and Speeches on 
International Crises: Repeating the Rhetorical Past."1'
Since then, crisis rhetoric research has been characterized 
by epistemic controversies over the definition of the term 
"crisis rhetoric," and the relationship between objective 
situation and rhetorical construction in the birth of a 
crisis.
Just what is crisis rhetoric, however? According to 
Amos Kiewe, in The Modern Presidency and Crisis Rhetoric, 
crises involve the perception of "immediacy and urgency," 
as well as the public expectation of "strong leadership 
qualities."14 Many rhetorical critics view crises largely 
or wholly as rhetorical creations. Windt, for instance, 
argued that a crisis is announced by the President as such, 
and that the situation demands that he "act decisively."1'
By announcing the crisis the President asks for his 
decision to be supported, not for debate upon what should 
be done. Thus, crisis rhetoric is a rhetoric that excludes 
discussion. It reserves epistemic questions for the 
President alone. According to Windt, so long as the crisis
18
is not one of a military attack upon the United States, it 
is to be considered a "political event rhetorically created 
by the President. . . .1,16 However, the President is not
free to do as he pleases when discursively responding to a 
crisis. His rhetorical options are limited by "precedent, 
tradition, and expediency."17
Windt has suggested three basic lines of arguments 
that distinguish presidential crisis rhetoric from other 
types of presidential utterances.1* First, there is the 
obligatory statement of facts. Second, there is the 
establishment of a "melodrama" between good {the U.S.) and 
evil (traditionally the Soviets). Third, the policy 
announced by the President and the asked for support are 
framed as moral acts. In the sense that these can be 
framed as normative acts, they are then what everybody 
already believes to be true. In announcing these lines of 
arguments, Windt relied upon an analysis of Kennedy's 
response to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba and upon 
Nixon's announcement to send American and South Vietnamese 
forces into Cambodia.
I follow this general line of reasoning in this 
study. My principal focus is upon those rhetorical 
resources— sites, epistemic status, suppression of various 
political voices--available for crisis formation and how 
those forces interact with a particular President's 
approach to dealing with crises in the post-Cold War world.
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The constructed nature of presidential crisis rhetoric is 
thus stressed in this study. As Amos Kiewe suggested, 
crisis rhetoric "occurs when the President chooses to speak 
on an issue of critical dimensions, whether to promote or 
to minimize the perception of a crisis."19 In short, a 
crisis— except in cases of military attacks--are initiated 
when the President chooses to address a situation as a 
crisis. It can be argued that Presidents would want to 
control the definitions of crises; when others first do so, 
then Presidents may try to downplay the significance.
This, too, points to the constructed nature of crisis 
situations.
Some scholars have argued that crisis responses are 
not constrained by previous utterances to the same degree; 
hence, the degree of construction by the President varies 
from crisis to crisis. Indeed, the basic elements in any 
rhetorical situation--exigence, audience, and constraints—  
act in such a manner to necessitate a variable range of 
responses from the rhetor; in this case, the President 
announcing a crisis situation.20 For example, Jim A.
Kuypers, Marilyn J. Young, and Michael K. Launer, in "Of 
Mighty Mice and Meek Men: Contextual Reconstruction of the 
Shootdown of Iran Air 655," argued for understanding crises 
as situationally bound, and as such delimited by context 
(the discursive and material surroundings) acting upon 
text, and text upon context, within a limited period of
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time.31 This is to say, an interanimation of text and 
context occurs. From this point of view, argue Kuypers et 
al. text and context are naturally interacting and evolving 
elements within any rhetorical situation. Indeed, these 
researchers found that crisis situations involve a rather 
violent mix of text/context interaction, often with a 
demand for quick interpretation from the public. This view 
supports a reading of crises that views an exigence as 
highly unstable and mutable. Thus a conception of a 
rhetorical situation as presupposing a fixed nature or 
interpretive pattern— a genre perhaps— is discarded for a 
more fluid understanding of situational constraints.21 One 
of the major findings of Kuypers et al suggested that 
international crisis situations may begin with no stable 
means for interpreting the discursive surroundings, and 
that one of the purposes of the presidential text is the 
creation of a stable contextual frame through which to 
understand the event.
The invention of a stable contextual frame may take 
some period of time, yet it is the most important criterion 
for a "fitting response" to the situation. As Windt 
asserted, presidential speeches announcing a crisis "begin 
with an assertion of the President's control of the facts 
of the situation and an acknowledgement that the New Facts 
which occasion the speech constitute a New Situation— a 
crisis for the United States."21 Yet this is not to say
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that the first utterances of the President create the 
crisis, nor that it establishes a stable frame. First 
utterances are first characterizations; they set the tone. 
As Windt argued in Presidents and Protesters, situations 
•'rarely create crises. Rather, Presidents' perceptions of 
situations and the rhetoric used to describe them mark 
events as crises."24 Marilyn J. Young, in "When the shoe 
is on the Other Foot: The Reagan Administration's Treatment 
of the Shootdown of Iran Air 655," extended this line of 
thought further by suggesting that as utterances interact 
with context and antecedent texts, a stability within the 
situation may occur. As the stability increases, the 
President will experience both increased freedom to pursue 
the present course of action and increased limits upon what 
other options he may enact.
Some scholars have argued that a President's initial 
response is the most crucial factor in the genesis of 
rhetorical crises. This response may provide the 
definition of the event. In his study, "Corrupt Rhetoric: 
President Ford and the Mavaouez Affair," Dan F. Hahn 
examined the Ford administration's initial and subsequent 
descriptions of the Mavaauez affair. Hahn argued that the 
Administration's descriptions acted to define the event in 
a way that legitimated U.S. actions by shutting out any 
other views of the event. The terminology used by Ford, 
according to Hahn, "was corrupted by a false description of
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the situation."2' For example, by describing the capture
of the Havaauez by the Cambodians as an act of "piracy,"
even though the ship was within the territorial waters of
Cambodia, the Ford administration was offering a specific
interpretation of the act. This definition, and others
offered by the Ford administration, acted to justify future
actions; in this case, U.S. forces attacking Cambodian
soldiers in order to recapture the vessel. Hahn found
evidence for the interpretive power of the President's
initial statements:
[The] president's definition . . . provides the
"terministic screen" through which the population 
views the event, while at the same time providing 
him with a "terministic compulsion" to follow the 
implications of the terminology to their logical 
conclusions.2t>
Ford's initial utterances on the taking of the Havaauez by 
the Cambodian government set the stage for future actions. 
By calling it "piracy" Ford legitimated certain actions 
while he delimited other options--negotiated compromise, 
for instance: the U.S. does not negotiate with pirates.
This view of the President's role in defining the 
situation is commensurate with that expressed by David C. 
Klope in "Defusing a Foreign Policy Crisis: Myth and 
Victimage in Reagan's 1983 Lebanon/Grenada Address," Klope 
argued that the major function of the President's response 
to a perceived crisis is to redefine the situation in terms 
that the public can understand or identify with. He 
asserted that the manner in which this
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identification/redefinition occurs is often through 
"configuring the situation in terms of socially-sanctioned 
myths."27 By analyzing Ronald Reagan's response to the 
Beirut bombing and the invasion of Grenada, Klope 
discovered that both crises were actually the negative 
public perception of the events, and thus the President was 
forced to respond in an attempt to mitigate this negative 
perception. Reagan used socially accepted American myths 
to ground his response and ameliorate the ambiguity.
Reagan was thus able to bring order to the previously 
disordered events.
Generic Classifications of Crisis Rhetoric 
The constructed nature of international crisis 
situations is agreed upon by most scholars of presidential 
crisis rhetoric.2K However, even though scholars may agree 
upon the constructed nature, they are not in agreement upon 
the types of responses that a President makes when 
responding to the perception of a crisis. Thus many 
studies explore a topology of presidential responses. For 
instance, in "Consummatory Versus Justificatory Crisis 
Rhetoric," Richard A. Cherwitz and Kenneth S. Zagacki 
viewed crises as purposeful rhetorical constructions: 
"events become crises, not because of unique sets of 
situational exigencies, but by virtue of discourse used to 
describe them."217 They saw rhetoric as playing a 
"paramount role in defining, shaping and responding to
24
international crises."*0 in short, discourse is both 
constrained by and frames the response to the situation.
In their analysis of presidential responses to five crises, 
Cherwitz and Zagacki provided an example of a typological 
study by distinguishing between consummatory and 
justificatory responses.
A consummatory response is marked by discourse that 
initially constitutes the government's official reply to a 
perceived crisis event. As examples of consummatory 
replies Cherwitz and Zagacki used Reagan's response to the 
Soviet shootdown of KAL 007 and Jimmy Carter's reply to the 
seizure of American hostages in Iran. They posited that 
consummatory discourse is "circumspect," and stresses the 
importance of proceeding with "caution" and "patience."11 
This type of discourse calls for the perpetrators to carry 
out certain (U.S. prescribed) actions to close the crisis. 
Consummatory discourse is illocutionary in nature; it 
demands, it seeks to effect a change or induce action. 
Justificatory discourse, on the other hand, is discourse 
that is part of a larger, overt military retaliation by the 
U.S. Cherwitz and Zagacki provided for examples Lyndon 
Johnson's statement after the Gulf of Tonkin retaliation, 
John Kennedy's statement after the deployment of Soviet 
missiles on Cuba, and Gerald Ford's response to the seizure 
of the U.S.S. Havaauez. In each of these cases the 
President justified U.S. action taken in response to the
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act of a foreign power. These responses, and justificatory 
discourse as a whole, are characterized by their 
irrevocable nature; they are "direct and decisive," and 
announce concrete, definitive military action taken in 
response to the actions of foreign nations.32
According to Cherwitz and Zagacki, both types of 
discourse are epideictic in nature; they seek to identify 
and blame adversaries, while concurrently praising U.S. 
actions. However, consummatory discourse takes on forensic 
elements since it makes "considerable and concerted efforts 
. . . to present a prima facie case for [the perpetrator's]
guilt to the American public and the world. . . . "H
Justificatory discourse is deliberative in nature: the 
"official military responses of the U.S. government . . .
are explicated and defended."34
Not all writers agree with the conception of crisis as 
rhetorically constructed. In "The Function of Epideictic 
and Deliberative Strategies in Presidential Crisis 
Rhetoric," Bonnie J. Dow drew a distinction between crises 
as a result of events and crises as a result of 
presidential definition. Dow differentiated between 
presidential crisis rhetoric designed to provide communal 
understanding (epideictic) and that rhetoric designed for 
gaining policy approval (deliberative). The former is that 
which responds to events, and the latter is that which 
creates or justifies events. Dow argued that epideictic
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responses function to prevent disparate interpretations of 
the situation and to "promote continuity, restore communal 
feeling, and . . . reconcile the audience to a new
situation.",s Deliberative strategies, on the other hand, 
are those used to demonstrate that the policy being enacted 
in response to a crisis is "expedient, reasoned and 
prudent."w
Limitations
There is an underlying tension within the above 
studies and others that have crisis rhetoric as their 
controlling principle. Carole Blair and Davis W. Houck, in 
"Richard Nixon and the Personalization of Crisis," have 
characterized two major weaknesses in the present state of 
research in presidential crisis rhetoric. They suggested 
that many crisis rhetoric studies fall into one of two 
camps of "ambivalences." These ambivalences concern the 
generic quality or the situatedness of the rhetoric under 
consideration.,7 Blair and Houck asserted that many 
studies often make generic claims and then undermine those 
very claims. Furthermore, these studies often attempt not 
to draw the line between a crisis and non-crisis event.
They cited studies by Pratt, Windt, Cherwitz and Zagacki, 
and Dow as example of generic ambivalence. Drawing upon 
the work of Thomas C. Conley, Blair and Houck stated that 
"the particularity of rhetorical events renders their 
containment in generic categories problematic."1K
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The other view of crisis rhetoric concerns its 
situated character, and that many critics seem to want to 
delimit the scope of inquiry to international situations 
only. Richard A. Cherwitz39 and Klope were cited here.
The ambiguous nature of "situatedness" concerns rhetorical 
situation as opposed to rhetorical invention. Two problems 
emerge when crisis rhetoric is viewed as related to 
situation. First, crisis rhetoric may be applicable to 
"circumstance other than international discord" ;4t> and 
second, "motivation for 'crisis rhetoric' [may be] more 
closely related to . . . presidents' desire to maintain
political popularity than to the international events 
themselves."41 Likewise, two problems emerge when crisis 
rhetoric is viewed as rhetorical invention. First, 
Presidents may be viewed as constructing a crisis. As 
Cherwitz stated, "presidential discourse may construct an 
image of crisis, often regardless of the situational 
characteristics spawning such discourse."43 The second 
problem concerns presidential utterances that respond to a 
"pre-existing crisis." Blair and Houck cited Dow's 
analysis of Reagan's response to the shootdown of KAL 007 
as providing an example of this type of situation. The 
main concern then, is between viewing crisis rhetoric as 
constructing the perception of crisis and crisis rhetoric 
viewed as a response to an event already perceived by some 
as a crisis.41
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Blair and Houck argued that the distinction cannot be 
proven, nor is it a necessary distinction to understand the 
nature of crisis rhetoric. They put forward a conception 
of genre that necessitates a rethinking of how we view 
crisis rhetoric. Following the literary critic Adena 
Rosemarin, Blair and Houck suggested that genre should be 
viewed as a classifying statement, not as a class of 
discourse:
The critic posits a genre characterization as 
hypothetical, reads a particular work in terms of 
that characterization, and concludes with claims 
about what that work "is like" when it is read in 
terms of the hypothesized genre.44
The purpose is insight, not classification. It is a top-
down approach that emphasizes the "recontextualization of
the speech" in order to elicit insight.4S In short, Blair
and Houck would have critics of crisis rhetoric ask, "What
is the speech like if it is read as a crisis speech?"46
This approach, however, even while seeming to skirt the
genre and situatedness issues, does lead to other abuses.
It encourages the removal of rhetoric from the realm of the
world in which it is practiced, and views it as a stable
entity susceptible to outside imposition of theoretical
schemata .47
Yet even those studies attempting a more practical 
grounding of the theory used in a particular analysis may 
fall into the trap of over-determinizing their typologies. 
For example, Dow cited the shootdown of KAL 007 as an
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example of President Reagan using epideictic crisis 
rhetoric in response to an event "already seen as serious, 
even critical. . . . "4* Yet with this interpretation we
theoretically retrogress to a view of rhetorical situations 
being deterministic. Dow argued that the Reagan 
Administration's response to the shootdown is epideictic 
because there was press coverage prior to the 
Administration's response; this coverage therefore acts to 
frame the event as a crisis before the President can 
respond. Yet Secretary of State G. Schultz responded to 
the shootdown on 1 September 1983, only hours after the 
event, and President Reagan issued a statement the same day 
stating the shootdown was an "appalling and wanton misdeed 
. . . inexplicable to civilized people everywhere."41*
These utterances helped to initially set the tone for the 
Administration's response, well before the press made it an 
issue, or even had reported it. Indeed, the Reagan 
Administration used the shootdown to create a crisis; and 
the excoriation of the Soviet Union was the focus; the loss 
of American lives was not an issue for the Administration 
as Dow maintains. Thus, classificatory schema— epideictic, 
deliberative— may have over-determined the event to the 
point that interactions of text and context were 
overlooked.
Many of the studies reviewed in this chapter have 
elements that support Windt's contention about the nature
30
of presidential crisis rhetoric. Although some (Dow; 
Cherwitz and Zagacki; and Klope, for example) have argued 
from a limited, micro-analysis and have sought to identify 
generic elements,50 they have also pointed to the 
discursively constructed nature of presidential crises.
For example: Klope found that crises are based in part upon 
negative public perception of events; the President must 
then respond in order to reconstruct this perception. 
Cherwitz and Zagacki contended that crisis rhetoric is 
either consummatory or justificatory, yet regardless of 
which is used to classify the discourse, crisis rhetoric is 
both constrained by and is a response to the situation; it 
frames it as a crisis. Kiewe argued that a crisis is 
constructed as a true crisis by the President's response to 
an event. Dow argued that presidential crisis rhetoric is 
of two types: that responding to events (epideictic) and 
that which creates or justifies events (deliberative).
However, some of these studies suggest disturbing 
contradictions due to micro-managing theoretical 
constraints pertaining to the examination of presidential 
responses to a particular crisis. By listing strategies 
employed— epideictic, deliberative, justificatory, 
consummatory, etc.— some researchers have maximized the 
theoretical discrimination of situational constraints (they 
have, in fact, been guilty of over-determinizing the 
rhetorical situation; i.e., they have imposed a
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theoretically generated and rigid framework upon a fluid 
event). A case in point concerning the theoretical 
contradictions occurs when we examine the generic 
classifications espoused by Dow and cherwitz and Zagacki 
when examining Reagan's response to the Soviet shootdown of 
KAL 007.
Cherwitz and Zagacki labeled Reagan's response to the 
shootdown of KAL 007 as "consummatory." This type of 
discourse demands an action from the adversaries in order 
to bring the crisis to a close. It is epideictic because 
it identifies and blames adversaries while concurrently 
praising U.S. actions. It is forensic because it presents 
a case to the public for accepting the President's 
definition of the situation and to approve the action 
taken. Dow, on the other hand, labeled Reagan's response 
to the shootdown of KAL 007 as "epideictic." For Dow, this 
type of discourse is designed to provide communal 
understanding of an event. It is a response to an event 
already perceived bv the public as a crisis. Micro- 
managing definitions led these two studies of the same 
event to come to two oppositional conclusions. Although it 
has previously been mentioned that Dow is grossly mistaken 
in her chronology of events, the point remains: 
theoretically driven analyses lead to over-determination of 
the situational elements. Although the above theoretical 
"types" were constructed for the purpose of analysis, the
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above authors have supposed a stable and knowledgeable 
public audience and that there exists a  finite set of 
rhetorical functions corresponding to their constructed 
types. This could lead to a limited view of the range of 
possible communication practices.
Public Knowledge as Resource and Constraint 
A more useful approach appears in the literature on 
public knowledge. Young and Launer, in "KAL 007 and the 
Superpowers: An International Argument," defined public 
knowledge as "the accumulated wisdom of the people" that 
"serves as the authoritative ground for political 
discourse. In an atmosphere of crisis, the public would 
rely upon this "accumulated knowledge to define the 
situation. . . . "H Lloyd Bitzer, in "Rhetoric and Public
Knowledge," defined a public as a group of persons "united 
in interests, aspirations, traditions, and experiences."''
As a public, these people possess "a fund of truths, 
principles and values which could only characterize a 
p u b l i c . T h e s e  attributes may include "principles of 
public life to which we submit as conditions of living 
together; shared interests and aspirations . . . [and] the
accumulated wisdom proffered by our cultural pasts.""
Such may be called public knowledge. The public and its 
knowledge act to authorize discourse emanating from rhetors 
who are acting as spokeperson for the public; in our case, 
the President. Although authorization is not always
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needed, many acts occur within a crisis context, and thus 
require authorization, for "authorization is needed when a 
proposed act or message might seriously affect the well 
being of others . . .  or when a person or group claims to 
represent, or stand in for, another person or group."46
Reagan's response to the KAL 007 shootdown does 
provides insight into the historical/cultural significance 
of public knowledge. In "Reagan and Mitterrand Respond to 
International Crisis: Creating Versus Transcending 
Appearances," D. Ray Heisey argued that presidential 
responses to crises are culturally based and historically 
mandated.” Heisey asserted that the President must build 
certain images of the "enemy," or must make links with 
values embedded within American culture and history if he 
is to successfully mitigate a crisis. In short, "leader[s] 
must find the acceptable images of political reality 
suitable for his/her people.,,', Since the dawn of the 
Atomic Age, all Presidents have been able to call upon the 
topos of good (the United States) vs. evil (the Soviet 
Union). Yet with the culmination of the Cold War the 
Soviet Union is in financial and social ruins: the "evil 
empire," as Ronald Reagan put it, is no more. With the 
destruction of the Soviet Union comes the concomitant 
destruction of the Cold War meta-narrative.4y This is 
politically unfortunate for Clinton; he must respond to
potential crisis situations without the benefit of this 
action legitimating meta-narrative.
Mark A. Pollock, in "The Battle for the Past: George
Bush and the Gulf Crisis," examined George Bush's rhetoric
following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and provides some
insight into the beginnings of post-Cold War crisis
rhetoric.60 Although Pollock believed the study of crises
to be a generic endeavor, he did provide insight into the
effects of history upon the inventional resources used by
the President. Although Pollock did not state that his
study emphasizes that Bush was operating in the post-Cold
War era, it nevertheless provided us with an example of the
move away from constructing crises in the manner described
by windt. Pollock wrote that Bush
quickly characterized the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait as constituting a new and critical 
situation . . . .  He made repeated references to 
his efforts to build an international consensus 
against Iraq. This stress on a search for a 
peaceful solution fits the pattern of contrasting 
American good will with the actions provoking the 
crisis. [This also] framed the crisis as a clear 
moral issue, transcending the interests of 
particular nations. [However,] the collapse of 
the Soviet bloc precluded Bush's use of an 
ideological call to arms against communism as a 
way to transform the crisis into an ideological 
conflict between good and evil.61
Bush was able to frame the event successfully because 
he was able to develop an "augmented historical 
narrative,,w that drew upon pre-World War II visions of the 
enemy. In this case, argued Pollock, Bush drew upon 
America's collective memory about 1938 Munich. The residue
of the Cold War meta-narrative and this vision legitimated
decisive military action. Pollock rightly pointed out that
the 1938 Munich agreement has "great symbolic power"
because it is a historical event that has assumed a
rhetorical character. In "Rhetorical Histories and Arms
Negotiations," Thomas Kane described such transformation as
rhetorical events. A rhetorical event is an historical
event that has become rhetorical because it
either violates or affirms in some dramatic way 
those things a culture believes about itself as a 
collective public. [It becomes] meaningful less 
from what really happened than [from] the 
collective set of assumptions and perceptions . .
. that have been handed down from previous 
discourse, arguments, experiences and 
interpretations. . . .*’
Young and Launer have provided additional insight into
this area. They argued that crisis may be immediate, as
with the shootdown of Korean Airlines Flight 007, or they
may slowly evolve, presenting rhetors with the opportunity
to respond to the budding rhetorical situation.64 In
short, they have developed a more subtle analysis than the
"either/or" categorizations of Dow, and Cherwitz and
Zagacki. They have also provided insight into the relation
of the presidential message and the American public:
In clear cases of crisis, the context— and, 
hence, the [president's] reaction— is less 
ambiguous. When national interests are not so 
directly involved, however, the context is more 
dubious and conflicting perceptions may weaken 
the parameters of the rhetorical situation. In 
these instances, the public seeks additional 
guidance.*'
Furthermore, when the public seeks additional information 
from the President, seemingly demands it, and it is 
provided, the overall situation again changes. For with 
each new round of information disclosures the amount and 
primacy of information that constitutes public knowledge 
changes, and with this change comes a change in context. A 
crisis atmosphere disrupts the usual stability of public 
knowledge; a state of "flux" ensues. The epistemic status 
of crisis, by its very transitional nature, generates new 
knowledge; it subverts or contests old knowledge about the 
situation
Extensions by Present Study 
With the Cold War arguably over, it seems that 
President Clinton is the first atomic-age President who 
cannot draw upon the continuing Cold War to support his 
foreign policy actions. The means available to the 
President for framing an international event as important 
are no longer obvious. The Cold War has been a common 
component of American culture since the announcement of the 
Truman Doctrine in 1947. Throughout the years following 
World War II, each President has used the inventional 
resources of this word oriented contest in order to justify 
foreign policy decisions. As Robert L. Scott has written, 
standing "up to the USSR has been a mainstay in the conduct 
of U.S. foreign affairs since the end of World War II."67 
Yet standing up to the Soviets is not the only concern.
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Presidents of the U.S. have stood up in a specific manner. 
Their discourse against the Soviets has had a distinct 
quality, and its nature has permeated U.S. foreign policy 
for the past forty-five years. Scott pointed out that 
"U.S. foreign policy generally has been monitored by the 
rhetoric of the Cold War."6*
A transformation in Superpower Cold War rhetoric began 
shortly after Mikhail Gorbachev launched his policies of 
perestroika and alastnost. As the Soviets seemed to move 
away from the depiction of the enemy that America was 
accustomed to, President "Reagan was able . . .  to preserve 
domestic unity largely because he transferred the evil 
empire imagery from Russia to Nicaragua, Libya, and 
Iran."M If we follow this line of reasoning, then Bush 
may be seen as having worked with the residue of the Cold 
War imagery in his foreign policy actions, most notably, 
the Panama invasion and Operation Desert storm. Thus the 
meta-narrative of the Cold War was carried into the 1990s, 
but it was beginning to unravel. By the time Clinton took 
office, the Cold War meta-narrative was no more.
This study seeks to identify some of the resources 
that may be used by the President to frame an international 
event as a crisis situation in the post-Cold War world. 
Theoretically speaking, the American public views an 
international event as important whenever the President is 
able to frame it as a crisis. Thus, the rhetoric a
President employs to address and create crises is different 
than that used to address non-crisis situations. As Amos 
Kiewe states, crisis rhetoric "is distinct from non-crisis 
rhetoric to the extent that it characterizes a unique and 
dynamic process. "70
Although the studies thus far reviewed suggest 
interesting strategies for classifying presidential crisis 
rhetoric, their most trenchant contribution comes from 
their implied support for an interpretation of crises as 
rhetorical constructions. Windt's components of crisis 
formation are illustrative of this view, yet his structure 
is premised upon the Cold War meta-narrative— some level of 
melodrama must be initiated in order for crisis rhetoric to 
work. The above mentioned studies support this contention 
as well. This study, however, advances the proposition 
that the Soviets are not necessary for the creation of a 
melodrama that capitalizes upon the topos of good versus 
evil. The Soviets have been used conveniently for the past 
45 years to fill the "evil" half of the oppositionally 
structured mythic form, "good versus evil." All that is 
necessary for this form to work is something to fill the 
"evil" role. As Pollock stated, the "enemy need not be 
communism--fascism served as well in World War II. But in 
communism's absence, an ideological substitute must be 
found."71 Bush successfully did this during the Gulf
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Vet Clinton was not successful with Haiti (or with any
of his foreign policy crises; e.g., Somalia, Bosnia, and
North Korea}. So, something other than an event and the
President's response must account for a successful crisis
formation. As Martin J. Medhurst argued in "Eisenhower,
Little Rock, and the Rhetoric of Crisis," crisis rhetoric
is different with each President; it is, indeed, part of a
President's rhetorical biography.71 Medhurst argued for
the examination of crisis rhetoric as part of the
President's rhetorical biography; thus the discourse moves
away from a generic classification to a more personal
investigation. Indeed, Medhurst put forth a powerful
argument that Presidents develop their own normative
response to a crisis situation. Eisenhower was shown to
have had a well developed, five step strategy: one, he
attempted to prevent situations from maturing into crises;
two, if a crisis developed, he consulted widely; three, he
waited for crises to peak before acting; four, while
waiting, he told "opponents" that he was ready to take
action, but conveyed that there was still time to
negotiate; and five, when it was time to act, he did so
with overwhelming force. Medhurst persuasively argued:
crises, by definition, bring into play matters of 
personal values, political philosophy, strategic 
theory, and psychological predisposition, not to 
mention the peculiar exigencies of the historical 
moment.74
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In "An Analysis of Three Crisis Speeches," James W.
Pratt examined the crisis rhetoric of Presidents
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson and found that the three
Presidents used a variety of strategies in responding to
the crises. This lends support for this study's view of
crises as defying generic classification; furthermore,
Pratt's inquiry suggested presidential style is a factor in
the handling of crises:
[It] appears that the speaking characteristics of 
the president involved and the specific nature 
for the crisis setting combine to determine the 
type of speech which will result and that this 
contention is more important than the simple 
presence or absence of the crisis.7'
This study take the position that the study of 
presidential crisis rhetoric should not primarily approach 
an event as an example of crisis (Cherwitz and Zagacki), or 
examine a speech/text through a genre of crisis (Blair and 
Houck), or suggest a situation is a crisis (Dow). Rather 
this study suggests that researchers would be more 
productive of knowledge by examining the interplay of 
various texts and contexts that act to alter the situation 
and public perception of the situation. Thus, criticism of 
presidential crisis rhetoric should be a blend of 
discursive and material conditions. Questions that might 
be asked are many. For example: How are the perceptions of 
crises formulated? How are contexts/situations developed 
so that a "fitting" utterance may be created to 
successfully bring a crisis to resolution?
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We must now consider the initial situation, the 
President's response, and presidential style. These three 
elements are conveyed to the public via the press, thus it 
follows that we should ask what role the printed press 
plays in crisis development. It seems logical that the 
press plays a considerable role in disseminating the 
message of the President to the American public and 
international audiences. It is also true that Presidents 
"can depend on tremendous public support for whatever 
policy they pursue in situations they deem 'critica1.'"7ft 
Yet Clinton was unable to marshal this support, even though 
he continually stressed the importance of the situation in 
Haiti. Since the public receives its information from the 
press, it follows that the role of the press in the 
development of this crisis needs to be examined. What 
role, if any, did the press play in keeping a crisis from 
formulating in Haiti?
Although the structure suggested by Windt may hold 
true for post-World War II Presidents up to Bush, President 
Clinton is unable to frame his responses to crises in this 
manner due to ending of the Cold War. The "Evil Empire" no 
longer exists. In its absence exists an inventional vacuum 
where once existed the Cold War meta-narrative; Presidents 
must now rethink ways of framing their crisis responses. 
This study asserts that in this time of flux. President 
Clinton will have been unable to frame successfully his
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utterances about Haiti in such a manner that the public and 
the press accepted it as true. Thus the press will report 
the President's response, but in the post-Cold War 
confusion advance its own conception of the situation.
This study thus contributes to the literature concerning 
presidential crisis rhetoric in three ways. First, it 
advances a little studied notion of crisis rhetoric as an 
interanimation of text and context within situational 
constraints. Second, it examines crisis rhetoric occurring 
in the wake of the Cold War. Finally, it examines the role 
of the printed press in presidential crisis rhetoric.
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AGENDA-BETTING AND AGENDA-EXTEN8XON:
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
Because presidential communication is mediated
communication for the vast majority of American citizens,
any study of presidential discourse must deal with the
media. The print media have long functioned as
presidential conduit, interpreter, and adversary.
Accordingly, this chapter examines the relevant research
literature concerning the role of the press in American
democracy, and the agenda-setting and agenda-extension
functions of the press in contemporary presidential
politics. The chapter concludes with a brief assessment of
the meaning of this research for the present study.
The Role of Print Media in a Democracy 
The Press "takes on the form and coloration of the 
social and political structures within which it operates .
. . [and] it reflects a system of social control whereby
the relations of individuals and institutions are 
adjusted.*" For America, this claim has come to mean a 
free and democratic press, a press concerned with 
democratic ideals. Originally, the press in America 
operated quite differently. Early American newspapers were 
a small, cottage affair that actually began as a sideline 
for printers. The largest papers in the country were read 
by a few thousand people at most, and this was the norm 
until the rise of the penny papers in the 1830s. These 
early presses did not need to be objective in the sense
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that we use the term today, for they had a limited, 
partisan audience of readers: Whigs, Democrats,
Republicans, French, German, etc. Even at the onset of the 
20th century the presses were not entirely objective.
Joseph Pulitzer made his fame and fortune on 
sensationalistic stories printed using yellow headlines; 
today we call this type of reporting yellow journalism.
Too, William Randolph Hearst competed with Pulit2er for 
readership. He took a strong stand concerning 
American/Spanish relations that eventually helped "inform*' 
the citizenry that we needed to go to war after the U.S.S. 
Maine blew up.
The late 19th and early 20th century papers were 
primarily weekly editions; the major source of news was 
still local and face to face. These papers, however, still 
reflected the viewpoint of individual owners, not a 
contemporary objective viewpoint. For example, Benjamin 
Flowers published the Arena. a weekly protest magazine; 
Samuel McClure published McClure's Magazine. These and 
other weekly papers and magazines were used to call
attention to certain social conditions that existed in the
country at that time. In short, objective reporting did 
not often exist. The purpose was sensational stories that 
sold papers. Neil Postman called attention to this facet
of the media in this country. Postman posited that the
real business of newspapers is entertainment, not real news
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for citizens. He argued that the dominant culture which 
the papers reflect is not democracy but capitalism, and 
that the news is a product in the entertainment industry in 
competition for the entertainment dollar with magazines, 
television, fast food, toys, sports, etc.2
Today, the press in America is viewed as having 
operated under a Libertarian perspective, a perspective 
which grew out of the Enlightenment. Humans were viewed as 
rational, enlightened beings who could discern between 
truth and falsehood. The press was conceived as "a partner 
in the search for truth.” and was used to provide the 
public with the necessary information to "make up their own 
minds as to policy."’ This position stressed minimal or no 
government control, and it is through this perspective that 
we have come to view the press as a Fourth Estate in this 
country. The primary characteristic of this perspective is 
one that rests upon a concept of language as a transparent 
vehicle of thought. With the first concerns over press 
ownership--influence by the source or control by the 
source— we find a concomitant weakening of libertarian 
theory.
Social Responsibility Theory
We see the concerns about source control emerge by the 
mid-1920s, when the media of this country had come to be 
dominated by a few wealthy and powerful people. This may 
in part be explained through economic necessity, yet the
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potential for abuses remain. Shortly after World War II,
the Commission on Freedom of the Press, the so-called
Hutchins Commission, took up the issue of press ownership
and responsibility. The report of the commission, entitled
"A Free and Responsible Press,'* represented the growing
trend in American media toward a theory and practice of the
press advocating social responsibility. The basic premise
of the commission was that "the power and near monopoly
position of the media impose on them an obligation to be
socially responsible. . . . "4 The idea behind the
commission's report, according to Louis Day, underpins a
contemporary notion of social r e s p o n s i b i l i t y T h i s  idea
is summed by Theodore Peterson:
Freedom carries concomitant obligations; and the 
press, which enjoys a privileged position under 
our government, is obliged to be responsible to 
society for carrying out certain essential 
functions of mass communication in contemporary 
society.*
It is to this responsibility that we now turn.
"The public's right to know" is a common phrase today. 
It represents the perspective underpinning the social 
responsibility theory of the media. It demonstrates the 
strong movement away from Libertarian theory in that it 
underscores the common person's right to know and the 
editor's moral responsibility to ensure that the 
requirements for the public's knowing occur. There are six 
basic functions of the press under social responsibility 
theory: one, provide service to the political system by
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providing information, discussion, and debate; two, help to 
enlighten the general public so that it might self-govern; 
three, act as a defender of civil rights by assuming a role 
as government watchdog; four, act as a conduit through 
which the economic sector might be served by bringing 
together buyers and sellers through advertisements; five, 
provide entertainment; and six, maintain financial 
independence so that reporting will not be influenced by 
special interests.7
Whereas Libertarian theory rests upon a negative 
conception of liberty and press freedom ("freedom from"; 
that is, freedom from government control and censorship), 
social responsibility theory rests upon a positive notion 
of liberty and freedom of the press: "freedom for" 
"achieving the goals defined by its ethical sense and 
society's needs. . . . The Commission's report and
subsequent emendations speak to the complex interplay of 
three aspects of contemporary media: one, communication 
technology; two, economic pressures; and three, societal 
change. Social responsibility theory attempts to come to 
grips with the problems of the press by taking into account 
all three of these important considerations.
Practically speaking, freedom for achieving certain 
societal goals necessitates that certain requirements be 
set for those who make up the media in this country. The 
Commission, anticipating this need, listed these standards
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for press performance. First, the press must provide "a 
truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the 
day's events in a context which gives them meaning.
Second, the press must serve as a "forum for the exchange 
of comment and criticism.1,10 Third, the press must project 
"a representative picture of the constituent groups in 
society."11 Fourth, the press must assume responsibility 
for "the presentation and clarification of the goals and 
values of the society" in which it operates.12 Finally, 
the press must provide "full access to the day's 
intelligence.”11 It is the first of these responsibilities 
that I intend to highlight when discussing agenda-setting 
theory.
The above accoutrements of social responsibility 
theory underpin the functions of the press as defined by 
communication and political science scholars. Doris A. 
Graber has maintained that there exist four basic functions 
of the press: one, surveillance; two, interpretation; 
three, socialization; and four, manipulation. Surveillance 
corresponds to the "information and news providing function 
of mass communication."14 Interpretation corresponds to 
what Dominic A. Infante, Andrew S. Rancer, and Deanna F. 
Womack have called correlation, "how the mass media select, 
interpret, and criticize the information they present to 
the public.1"' Socialization "involves the learning of 
basic values and orientations that prepare individuals to
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fit into their cultural milieu."16 Finally, manipulation 
refers to "the deliberate manipulation of the political 
process."17 This final function reported by Graber 
corresponds to what Infante et al called mobilization: "the 
ability of the media to promote national interests and 
certain behaviors, especially during times of national 
crisis.
Yet Graber's conception of manipulation is more 
complicated than that espoused by Infante et al. It posits 
that the media maintians an agenda; her conception suggests 
an active role for the media in shaping the news. 
Manipulation, for Graber, involves two distinct forms. The 
first of these involves writing "stories that expose 
misconduct in government and produce reforms."1' The 
second involves presenting "sensational information that 
attracts large media audiences and enhances profits."71’ I 
am primarily concerned with the first of these in this 
study. By deciding what needs to be changed or fixed in 
our society, the press has distinctly moved away from a 
traditional notion of objective news reporting. However, 
this mode of operating stills falls within the realm of 
social responsibility theory. We must remember, however, 
that the "mass media are an important influence on politics 
because they regularly and rapidly present politically 
crucial information to huge audiences."21 Like Graber, I 
maintain that agenda-setting/building is a "widely used
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strategy for manipulating politics. . . . "22 If this 
thought is kept paramount, then we must examine the agenda- 
setting role of the press.
The Agenda-Setting Function of the Press
Scholars of mass communication are not certain whether 
to call agenda-setting a function, a theory, or a 
hypothesis.23 Whatever its true designation, as Infante et 
al pointed out, "the concept has received considerable 
attention from mass communication theorists.,,M Indeed, as 
a theory, it affirms that the media "do have a great deal 
of influence" upon political decision making, and that the 
media are especially influential in telling the general 
population what to think about.23 Its relevance here, 
regardless of its status, is to help explain how the press 
interacts with presidential discourse during crisis 
situations. Bernard C. Cohen made an early observation 
that the press "may not be very successful in telling its 
readers what to think, but it is stunningly successful in 
telling its readers what to think about."26 Agenda-setting 
researchers following Cohen have used similar phraseology 
to describe the agenda-setting function of the press.
In "The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media,"
Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw found that voters 
learn about an issue "in direct proportion" to the 
attention given that issue by the press.27 The question 
central to their study was whether or not the key issues in
58
a political campaign, as reported by the general public, 
correlated with actual media content. They found that 
voters tended to share what the media defined as important. 
Moreover, they asserted that the mass media provide voters 
with the "major primary sources of national political 
information."2* This is commensurate with the results of a 
study by Sheldon Gilbert, Chaim Eyal, Maxwell E. McCombs 
and D. Nichols that asserted that the press has the 
potential to set our government's agenda, even at the 
highest levels.2'* Michael B. Salwen, in "News Media and 
Public opinion: Benign Agenda-Setters? Opinion Molders?
Or Simply Irrelevant?," took the above position to the 
extreme, and suggested that policy makers "will address 
issues only when these issues are perceived as crises by 
the p u b l i c . H o w e v e r ,  if everyday issues can be elevated 
to the status of major importance by frequency of 
occurrence in the media, then how much more important the 
role of the press becomes when examining those events the 
President deems as crisis events. If Cohen's assertion of 
the power of the media to establish the relevance of 
particular issues and thus control the width of public 
discussion, if not the content, is true, then it behooves 
scholars to consider presidential crisis rhetoric in 
relation to the press, not because the press represents 
public opinion, but because it is a good indication of the 
issues and ideas that informed voters and opinion leaders
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will be talking about. Thus, the President will be aware 
of the issues, ideas, and responses that circulate in the 
press; not because they represent popular opinion, but 
because they are a good indicator of that which still needs 
to be addressed in his policy, or which he should be 
talking about.51
The contribution of the press in this regard are
highlighted by McCombs and Shaw in "Agenda-Setting and the
Political Process":
As a Fourth Estate, the press is an independent 
force whose dialogue with other elements of 
society produces the agenda of issues considered 
by political elites and voters. Witness the 
major role of the elite press as a source of 
information among major decision makers. Through 
its winnowing of the day's happenings to find the 
major events, concerns, and issues, the press 
inadvertently plays an agenda-setting influence 
role.52
Thus it follows that the mass media shape not only what the 
public "perceives" as "political reality," but also how 
political elites understand what voters and opinion leaders 
are thinking about- A relationship therefore develops 
between the press, its sources, and the public audience 
that determines "what is accepted as the public agenda."" 
Moreover, Roy L. Behr and Shanto Iyengar, in "Television 
News, Real-World Cues, and Changes in the Public Agenda," 
provided us with evidence that suggests this relationship 
is unidirectional; that is to say, press content affects 
public concern, but public concern does not affect that 
which the news focuses upon.54
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Gilbert et al in "The State of the Union Address and 
the Press Agenda," asserted that the President is in a 
"strategic position to influence the agenda" of the press 
because he is the major source of news at the national 
level.” However, they found that the press had a 
significant influence upon President Carter's second state 
of the Union address, but could not determine if Carter's 
address influenced subsequent press issues.
Notwithstanding, a subsequent study by McCombs and Gilbert, 
"News Influence on Our Pictures of the World," found 
evidence of "presidential influence on subsequent press 
coverage" of an event.1* The implications of this for the 
study of presidential crisis rhetoric suggests that the 
President does have an influence upon the content of news 
items, but that the press may also influence the issues the 
President discusses and how they are discussed. These 
influences take on more importance when we consider the 
degree to which the public rely upon the press for 
information, especially national and international events. 
These "unobtrusive issues" (i.e., not affecting the day to 
day community involvement) are not part of an individual's 
common experience, therefore the "news media exercise a 
near monopoly as sources of information and orientation."’' 
Although the President surely knows more, the media tell 
him what we. the public, know.
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From Agenda-Setting to Agenda-Extension: 
Consideration of Priming and Framing
The basic theme expressed by the studies listed above 
is cogently summed by Judith F. Trent and Robert V. 
Friedenburg: "the media set public priorities just by 
paying attention to some issues while ignoring others.
They determine what issues are important and in this way 
play an important role in structuring our social 
reality."3* Yet the media also move beyond the strict 
reporting of facts, and it is to this concern that we now 
turn. During the decade of the eighties, mass media and 
communication researchers using agenda-setting theory began 
to discover an evaluative component to media news. They 
postulated that the media do more than tell us what to 
think about, they also tell us how to think about it.
These studies suggested another aspect of agenda-setting as 
it relates to the public evaluation of Presidents; this 
aspect is described as "priming." These studies also 
suggested a germane issue for this study; they postulated 
that media provide the contextual cues "by which to 
evaluate the subject matter" under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . I n  
short, the media often "frame" an issue so that it will be 
interpreted in a specific manner.
According to Graber, this type of "manipulative 
journalism raises philosophical, ethical, and news policy 
questions."*1 This manipulative aspect to media functions 
is called agenda-building by Graber. Graber defined
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agenda-building as the "process whereby news stories 
influence how people perceive and evaluate issues and 
policies."41 This clearly moves beyond agenda-setting. It 
involves the influencing of public opinion. I call it 
agenda-extension to distinguish it from the agenda-building 
theory discussed by Michael B. Salwen, as well as Roger W. 
Cobb and Charles L. Elder.42 Anne Johnston has written 
that recent work in agenda-setting research has uncovered 
this agenda-extension process.41 The public becomes 
"primed" to evaluate, the President for example, by how 
well he handles the issue covered by the press. The more 
the press covers an issue, the more the public will 
evaluate the President's success or failure in relation to 
the content of media coverage. The public, then, become 
"primed" to "evaluate the president . . .  by his apparent 
success in dealing with this issue."44 Another way the 
media participate in policy making is through muckraking. 
Journalists try to focus the public eye upon those aspects 
of society that, in the journalists's opinion, need change. 
It is a "sensational exposes of corruption usually 
involving high status individuals."45 The press may also 
"manipulate the political scene by creating a climate for 
political action."4* It is at this point that agenda- 
extension helps to explain the influence of the press in 
policy making.
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In "News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public 
Opinion: A Study of Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing," 
Shanto Iyengar and Adam Simon have studied the effects of 
network news coverage during the Gulf War that provides an 
example of the differences among agenda-setting, priming, 
and framing. They defined priming as the "ability of news 
programs to affect the criteria by which political leaders 
are judged."47 Specifically, priming involves the 
correlation among patterns of news coverage and the manner 
in which the public evaluates the performance of 
politicians. These effects are strongest in the area of 
performance, and weakest in the area of affecting judgment 
on personality. This aspect of news coverage is intimately 
linked with agenda-setting because the "more prominent an 
issue in the national information stream, the greater its 
weight in political judgments."44 In analyzing the news 
coverage of the Gulf War, Iyengar and Simon found that the 
"amount of coverage accorded to the Gulf's situation and 
the proportion of respondents nominating it as the nation's 
most important problem were highly correlated" (agenda- 
setting) In terms of the role that priming played they 
found foreign policy "performance assessments tended to 
override economic assessments in their impact on . . .
ratings of George Bush during the Gulf crisis. . . .,,su
These findings are significant in that they show 
dramatic shifts in the criteria used to evaluate the
President during times of crisis and increased coverage of 
an event. Before the Gulf crisis, Americans were 
overwhelmingly concerned with domestic issues (the economy 
and crime); after the Gulf War Americans evaluated 
President Bush more with general foreign policy 
considerations than with his domestic performance. These 
findings lend support to the studies on crisis rhetoric 
discussed in the previous chapter by highlighting the 
relationship between issues the President announces as 
important and the perceived importance of those 
issues/events the American people think are important. 
Iyengar and Simon spoke to this point: "Print and broadcast 
news coverage of world events involving the use of U.S. 
military force have propagated the world view and policy 
preferences of the incumbent administrations."51 This may 
in part be due to the lack of available information from 
sources other than the Administration during crisis events, 
but Iyengar and Simon suggested that this practice "of 
'official7 journalism . . . ensures that the public's and
the Presidents' understanding of . . , international crisis
would be congruent."52
According to Iyengar and Kinder, in "More than Meets 
the Eye: TV News, Priming, and Public Evaluations of the 
President," priming works because "by calling attention to 
some aspects of national life while ignoring others, 
network news programs determine the standards by which
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presidents are judged."*1 Iyengar and Kinder drew from 
basic psychological theory to explain how this works. They 
argued that public attention is highly selective. In 
addition, the public relies upon information that is most 
easily accessible. Judgments about political matters, or 
the performance of a President, is in part due to what 
standards come to individuals' minds, but are also due to 
those "considerations that are, for whatever reason and 
however briefly, accessible,'*44 In terms of presidential 
performance, news coverage that implies a President's 
responsibility for a problem at the national level 
encourages viewers to attach more importance to his 
performance on that particular problem when evaluating his 
overall performance as President. Iyengar and Kinder 
suggested that this "effect appears to be stronger for 
problems that are relative newcomers to the American 
political agenda, problems for which the public's 
understanding is still in formation."” Thus in situations 
of crisis, where public knowledge is in flux and pre­
knowledge is constantly being injected into the public's 
evaluative consciousness, the effects of priming could be 
considerable. As the public's need for information 
increases, and media provide focused coverage upon a 
particular event, evaluation of the President's performance 
during the event comes under greater scrutiny than is 
otherwise expected. During the Cold War Presidents were
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able to frame an event using the Cold War meta-narrative. 
Since Clinton is unable to use the narrative to give events 
coherence, salience, and direction, he may experience 
greater difficulty in framing at a time when media power is 
undiminished.
Framing
Johnston stated that news stories not only provide 
their audiences with the important subjects to think about, 
but they also provide "contextual cues or frames in which 
to evaluate those s u b j e c t s . I s s u e s  are often "framed" 
by station managers, producers, or editors by how they tell 
the story of the issue. This type of agenda-extension was 
found to be operating during the Watergate Hearings. In 
"The Media and Watergate," Gladys Engel Lang and Kurt Lang 
demonstrated that agenda-extension begins when media gate­
keepers decide to publish a particular s t o r y . A l t h o u g h  
this is the first step in all news reporting, the move 
toward agenda-extension occurs when a second step is taken, 
the decision concerning how much attention to give to the 
story. As pointed out by Graber, it is at this "point 
where ordinary agenda-setting activities can most readily 
turn into deliberate agenda-building [agenda-extension]
By continually focusing upon an issue, the media may thrust 
it into the forefront of national thought. And, at the 
point when an issue emerges, its media context becomes 
crucially important. Lang and Lang noted that the
67
Watergate coverage was first put into the framework of the 
election campaign, thus leading the public to think of it 
as part and parcel of partisan politics. But as soon as 
the media switched contextual frames, moving from the 
framework of the 1972 presidential campaign to the 
framework of continual Washington corruption, the Nation 
became obsessed.
In their analysis of the Gulf war coverage, Iyengar
and Simon provided an example of framing effects.
[CJontent data (showing that network news 
coverage was preoccupied with military affairs 
and highly event oriented) and survey data are 
coupled to show that respondents reporting higher 
rates of exposure to television news expressed 
greater support for a military as opposed to a 
diplomatic response to the crisis, because the 
news media framed the events in the Gulf 
episodically as a series of military actions.1''
Framing thus involves the relationship between qualitative
aspects of news coverage— contextual cues— and how the
public interprets the news. In "News as Framing: Comments
on Graber," William Gamson asserted that a "frame is a
central organizing idea for making sense of relevant events
and suggesting what is at issue."60 He noted that facts
remain neutral until framed. Indeed, Gamson argued that
facts "take on their meaning by being embedded in a frame
or story line that organizes them and gives them coherence,
selecting certain ones to emphasize while ignoring
others."ftl
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Although it can be successfully argued that providing
contextual cues for interpretation is a necessary part of
media responsibility, when the media place its own,
partisan context, over that of the people or government the
potential for public manipulation increases. Graber, in
"Framing Election Mews Broadcasts: News Context and its
Impact on the 1984 Presidential Election," conducted a
content analysis of television news coverage of the 1984
presidential campaign.M Her focus was upon how the news
was framed. She found that there was a ratio of 3 to 1 of
bad over good news for the U.S. during this period. This
news primarily focused upon foreign policy and economic
concerns. Graber posited that this overwhelming bad-news
coverage should have derailed Reagan's reelection bid but
did not. The networks had framed the news so to stress the
bad aspects of American news; they also primed the
population to evaluate President Reagan's performance on
foreign policy and economic considerations. Taking the
context in which the news is reported as a frame leads us
to consider the probability of frames being potentially
broad in their inclusion of possibilities. Graber noted: 
various media effects are modulated by the 
sensitivity of audiences to particular issues, 
and that effects vary with background, 
demographic characteristics, and experiences of 
individual audience members.61
Reagan was able to overcome the negative effects of priming
because there were good stories mixed in with the bad that
had a "leavening" effect. Graber, like Iyengar and Simon,
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also noted that priming effects are linked with policy and 
not personality.
Day, discussing the first of the requirements of the 
press (providing "a truthful, comprehensive, and 
intelligent account of the day's events in a context which 
gives them meaning”), suggested that reporters must 
"clearly distinguish between fact and opinion."64 
Furthermore, news stories must be put into "perspective" by 
providing "relevant background."6' These journalistic 
norms described by Day include social responsibility, 
objectivity, fairness, and truth.66 Yet agenda-extension 
suggests that something other than these idealized norms 
are operating. Instead of a Fourth Estate, the media seem 
to be part of a partisan effort at persuading the public to 
accept the media's interpretation as truth. According to 
Mitchell Stephens, objectivity involves both impartiality 
and the reflection of the "world as it is, without bias or 
distortion of any sort."67 In short, the news as a true 
image of the world. A laudable goal, but difficult to put 
into practice. Yet by framing an issue the media has a 
decision to make: one, frame it according to the needs of 
the readers; two, frame it according to the needs of the 
media; or three, frame so as to accurately impart the 
meaning of those speaking/writing upon it. The last of 
these choices seems to adhere best to the requirements of a 
socially responsible press.
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According to Day, media practitioners should "strive 
to keep their personal preferences and opinions out of news 
stories. . . . [They should be] concerned with facts and
impartiality in the presentation of those facts."** Self- 
reflective writing should help to assure this. Yet this 
goal is often ignored for various reasons (economic, 
political, institutional). Be that as it may, by not 
striving to be objective, by establishing an agenda, the 
press steps out of its socially mandated role of a 
responsible Fourth Estate, and instead assumes its own 
political persona in opposition to the elected government 
and the will of the people. In so doing, it removes itself 
from the confines of the norms of social responsibility and 
sets itself up as an independent self-advocate.
Implications for the Present Study
This chapter has provided a brief review of the role 
of the press in American society and has provided a review 
of relevant agenda-setting theory literature. The 
literature in agenda-setting theory has demonstrated the 
force of Cohen's statement: the power of the media to 
establish the relevance of particular issues and thus 
control the width of public discussion and content is 
great. This chapter also highlighted those studies 
examining agenda-extension. This function of the press 
primes readers to evaluate Presidents in light of a 
specific issue that the press has focused upon. Agenda-
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extension also includes framing, the central organizing 
principle of continued news coverage; in short, how the 
press organizes the context through which the public will 
view the news.
It is the potential power of framing that concerns the 
present study. This study posits that in the vacuum 
created by the ending of the Cold War meta-narrative, the 
press, picking up on Clinton's inability to quickly and 
effectively frame the Haiti crisis, began to frame it in 
their own manner. As Gamson suggested, by "analyzing news 
content in termB of the frames presented, the manifest- 
latent distinction is partially bridged."1* This is to say 
that some facts are emphasized by certain frames and others 
are not; it is this presence or absence of certain facts
that may reveal the implicit aspects of the news coverage.
Notes
1. Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur 
Schramm, Four Theories of the Press (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1956): 1-2.
2. Neil Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public 
Discourse in the Age of Show Business (New York: Viking, 
1985). For a summary of the history of the evolution of 
the media see, Mitchell Stephens, A History of News: From 
the Drum to the Satellite (New York: Viking Penguin, 1988).
3. Siebert, et al 3.
4. Siebert, et al 5.
5. Louis A. Day, Ethics in Media Communication 
(Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1991)
35.
6. Siebert et al 74.
72
7. Siebert, et al 74.
8. Siebert, et al 94.
9. Siebert, et al 87.
10. Siebert, et el 89.
11. Siebert, al 91.
12. siebert. et al 91.
13 . Siebert, et al 91.
14. Dominic A. Infante, Andrew S. Rancer, and Deanna 
F. Womack, Building Communication Theory. 2nd ed. 
(Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc., 1993) 
397.
15. Infante et al 398.
16. Graber, Mass Media 11 .
17 . Graber, Mass Media 12 .
18 . Infante et al 399.
19. Graber, Mass Media 12 .
20. Graber, Mass Media 12 .
21. Graber, Mass Media 29.
22 . Graber, Mass Media 277 .
23. Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L- Shaw consider it 
a function. See "The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass 
Media," Public Opinion Quarterly 36 (1972): 176-187.
McCombs has spent most of his career supporting this 
assertion, and I borrow freely from his ideas in this area. 
Also see W. J. Severin and J. W. Tankard, Communication 
Theories. 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1988). For a 
detailed explanation of agenda-setting as theory, see R. D. 
Wimmer and J. R. Dominic, Mass Media Research. 2nd ed. 
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1987).
24. Infante, Rancer, and Womack 399.
25. Judith S. Trent and Robert V. Friedenberg, 
Political Campaign Communication: Principles and Practices. 
2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1991) 107.
73
26. Bernard c. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) 13.
27. McCombs and Shaw 177.
28. McCombs and Shaw 185.
29. Sheldon Gilbert, Chaim Eyal, Maxwell E. McCombs,
and D. Nichols, "The State of the Union Address and the 
Press Agenda,” Journalism Quarterly 57 (1980): 584-588.
30. Michael B. Salwen, "News Media and Public Opinion: 
Benign Agenda-Setters? Opinion Molders? Or Simply 
Irrelevant?," The Florida Communication Journal 18.2 
(1990): 17.
31. There have been numerous detailed studies of the 
relationship of the press and Presidents during periods of 
crises. These studies tend to be descriptive, analyzing 
how the press reports crises, whether or not the press 
supports a particular President's policy decisions and the 
like. Thus they compliment my study, but do not seek to 
discover how the press functions in concert with the 
President to construct rhetorically crisis situations. For 
three excellent studies see, Brigitte Lebens Nacos, The 
Press. Presidents, and Crises (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1990); Dan Nimmo and James E. Combs, 
Niahtlv Horrors (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 
1985); and Montague Kern, Patricia Levering, and Ralph 
Levering, The Kennedy Crises (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1983).
32. Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, "Agenda- 
Setting and the Political Process," The Emergence of 
American Political Issues: The Agenda-Setting Function of 
the Press, eds. Donald L. Shaw and Maxwell E. McCombs (St. 
Paul: West publishing Co., 1977) 151.
33. McCombs and Shaw, "Agenda-Setting and the 
Political Process" 152.
34. Roy L. Behr and Shanto Iyenger, "Television News, 
Real-World Cues, and Changes in the Public Agenda," PubIic 
Opinion Quarterly 49 (1985): 38-57.
35. Gilbert, et al 585.
36. Maxwell E. McCombs, Sheldon Gilbert, and C. H. 
Eyal, The State of the Union Address and the Press Agenda:
A Replication. paper presented at the annual meeting of 
the international Communication Association, Boston, 1983. 
Results reported in Maxwell E. McCombs and Sheldon Gilbert,
74
"News Influence on our Pictures of the World,*' Perspectives 
on Media Effects, eds. Jennings Bryant and Dolf Zillman 
(Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
Publishers, 1986) 14.
37. McCombs and Gilbert 11.
38. Trent and Friedenburg 108.
39. Trent and Friedenburg 109.
40. Graber, Mass Media 278.
41. Graber, Mass Media 287.
42. Michael B. Salwen, drawing from the work of Roger 
W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, describes agenda-building as 
a way that explains how the "public can participate in the 
democratic process in a limited way by influencing national 
agendas. This theory essentially stresses grass-roots 
genesis of political ideas and change. See Michael B.
Salwen, "News Media and Public Opinion: Benign Agenda-
Setters? Opinion Molders? Or Simply Irrelevant?" The 
Florida Communication Journal 18.2 (1990): 16-23; see also, 
Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, Participation in 
American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983).
43. Anne Johnston, "Trends in Political Communication: 
A Selective Review of Research in the 1980s." New 
Directions in Political Communication: A Resource Book, 
eds. David L. Swanson and Dan Nimmo (Newbury Park: Sage 
Publications, 1990) 329-362.
44. Johnston 337.
45. Graber, Mass Media 281.
46. Graber, Mass Media 287.
47. Shanto Iyengar and Adam Simon, "News Coverage of 
the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion: A Study of Agenda- 
setting, Priming, and Framing," Communication Research 20.3 
(1993): 368.
48. Iyengar and Shanto 368.
49. Iyengar and Shanto 375-376. They found r=.85.
This is a very high degree of correlation. Not to belittle 
their results, it must be mentioned, however, that America 
was at war. It makes sense that the majority of Americans 
would consider an event involving the lives of American
soldiers as being among the nation's most important 
problems.
50. Iyengar and Shanto 376.
51. Iyengar and Shanto 381.
52. Iyengar and Shanto 382.
53. Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder, "More than 
Meets the Eye: TV News, Priming, and Public Evaluations of 
the President,** Public Communication Behavior, vol. l, ed. 
George Comstock (Orlando: Academic Press, Inc, 1986) 136.
54. Iyengar and Kinder 139.
55. Iyenger and Kinder 162.
56. Johnston 337.
57. Gladys Engel bang and Kurt Lang, "The Media and 
Watergate," Media Power in Politics ed. Doris A. Graber 
(Washington: CQ Press, 1984) 202-209.
58. Graber, Mass Media 288.
59. Iyengar and Simon 365. Original in Italics.
60. William A.  Gamson, "News as Framing: Comments on 
Graber," American Behavioral Scientist 33 (1989): 157.
61. Gamson 157.
62. Doris A. Graber, "Framing Election News 
Broadcasts: News Context and its Impact on the 1984 
Presidential Election," Social Science Quarterly 68 (1987) 
552-568.







CONTRIBUTORY STUDIES AMD METHODOLOGY
Contests over the symbolic construction of events are 
waged throughout American society. The matter of whose 
interpretation of the world will prevail is a matter of 
great importance, particularly for individuals and 
institutions whose authority to act depends upon consensus. 
In a mass mediated world, consent must be "engineered," and 
the creation and nurturing of constituencies of like-minded 
persons are viewed as being logically prior to political 
action. From a rhetorical point of view, a constituency 
may be little more than an audience with a common view of 
particular social events. Although we have traditionally 
viewed constituencies as groups naturally connected around 
a base of material interest, our view may be usefully 
expanded to include groups formed as the result of 
successful symbolic construction either by a political 
actor or by the press. In a pluralistic society such as 
the United States, almost no interpretation of events goes 
uncontested, yet symbolic victory over competing 
interpretations is very important to the American 
presidency, an institution that represents the people as a 
whole and depends very heavily upon persuasion to do its 
work.
In a heavily mediated society such as ours, the 
President's characterization of events is frequently 
contested; rival symbolic constructions enter the political
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arena, and this contestation is usual, even expected. This 
study is about the construction, contestation, and 
resolution of a particular contest, the Haitian crisis. 
Accordingly, I seek to answer three specific questions: 
one, how did the Clinton Administration frame the situation 
in Haiti; two, how did the press, responding to President 
Clinton, frame the situation; and three, at what time, if 
at all, did these frames converge to present a unified 
contextual whole?
In order to answer these questions, this chapter 
proceeds in four stages: first, a definition of terms is 
provided {key concepts are rhetorical situation, 
administrative rhetoric, and crisis rhetoric); second, a 
conception of "framing" as a rhetorical process for both 
the President and the media is discussed; three, a 
tentative theory of press and presidential roles is 
discussed; and four, an exposition of the scope, 
procedures, and materials of this study is provided.
Definition of Terms: Rhetorical Situations, 
Administrative Rhetoric, and Crises
Rhetorical Situations
Bitzer's classic definition of a rhetorical situation
entails:
a complex of persons, events, objects, and 
relations presenting an actual or potential 
exigency which can be completely or partially 
removed if discourse, introduced into the 
situation, can so constrain human decision or 
action as to bring about the significant 
modification of the exigency.1
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For Bitzer, an '‘exigence is an imperfection marked by some 
degree of urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something 
to be corrected.*'2 The audience consists of those 
individuals capable of modifying the exigence. Constraints 
influence both audience and rhetor(s), and are composed of 
"persons, events, objects, relations, rules, principles, 
facts, laws, images, interests, emotions, arguments, and 
conventions."’ The above concepts— exigency, audience, and 
constraints— are interanimated. The three taken together 
require some type of discourse to fuel their interaction 
and possible modification. The discourse, or utterance in 
Bitzer's terminology, "participates naturally in the 
situation, is in many instances necessary to the completion 
of situational activity, and by means of its participation 
with situation obtains its meaning and its rhetorical 
character."4
I feel an important distinction in a situational 
perspective may be drawn between the concepts of 
"situation" and "context." Context, a necessary component 
of human communication, is both more and less than the 
historical facts surrounding a rhetorical situation. I 
argue for an understanding of context as, in part, 
constituted by the various interpretive communities that 
will apprehend a text. In this vein, Bateson's definition 
of context proves illuminating: "a collective term for all 
of those events which tell the organism among what set of
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alternatives he must make his next choice.*'5 Thus, 
contexts have the potential of having broad influences upon 
our understanding of any particular text. In 
contradistinction, rhetorical situations are not to be 
understood at a general level, but rather are entered into 
through the rhetor/text's interaction with audience, 
exigency, and constraints. Contexts help shape the general 
level of interpretive precision that produces a text (and 
its subsequent interpretation); it is this text that enters 
into the rhetorical situation. Rhetorical situations are a 
part of the larger context; they "come into existence, then 
either mature and decay or mature and persist. . . ,
Situations grow and come to maturity; they evolve to just 
the time when a rhetorical discourse would be most 
f i t t i n g . C o n t e x t s  allow for the general interpretation 
of utterances; rhetorical situations provide moments for a 
"fitting" utterance through which modification of an 
exigence may be achieved. For example, consider the Iran 
Air 655 shootdown in 1986. The larger contexts that could 
have influenced texts entering into the rhetorical 
situation included the upcoming U.S. presidential race, the 
Iran/Iraq war, and the historical/cultural understandings 
of Americans concerning our role in the world. The 
rhetorical situation, on the other hand, is modified by 
utterances that are shaped by these contexts. The
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utterance, however, can have a bearing upon which contexts
subsequently wax or wane in influence.
Administrative Rhetoric: Conflation of Role and Text
Many communication scholars view the modern presidency
as a rhetorical presidency.7 This view of the presidency
is justified on three grounds: one, the President sets
goals and provides solutions for the nation's problems;
two, the mass media dramatize the content of what
Presidents say, thus moving the emphasis away from what
Presidents do to what they say: and three, continual
campaigning* by Presidents encourages an emphasis upon
presidential image and personality, while de-emphasizing
issue exploration. As Denton and Woodward stated:
the presidency is an office, a role, a persona, 
constructing a position of power, myth, legend, 
and persuasion. Everything a president does or 
says has implications and communicates 
"something." Every act, word, or phrase becomes 
calculated and measured for a response.4
What a President or his representatives say, then, is
a text of sorts. Speech communication scholars have
traditionally associated the term "text" with "rhetor"; I
prefer to think of rhetor and text in broader terms. A
rhetor can range from a single individual to a collectivity
of individuals speaking on behalf of an organization,
institution, or presidential administration.11 A text can
consist of several discrete elements/utterances if the set
of such elements was conceived as a unified whole (e.g., an
advertising campaign) or if all the set members aim to
81
achieve a common purpose. Such a construct does not deny 
the possibility for members of a collectivity to speak as 
individuals. It does, however, recognize the tendency of 
such collectivities to speak with a single voice and 
permits the analysis of those voices as a collective whole. 
Furthermore, such a conception recognizes that the 
discourse situated within rhetorical situations are complex 
episodes: "a conception wherein the entire constellation of 
rhetoric surrounding a specific event is treated as the 
rhetorical text.'*11 The term "text" in this study refers 
specifically to the discourse produced by the Clinton 
Administration concerning the situation in Haiti during 
1993. This "administrative rhetoric" possesses two 
interacting dimensions. One dimension accounts for the 
relatively entrenched and stable aspects of administrative 
systems everywhere, while the other accounts for the 
"personalities" of various presidential administrations.^
A traditional view of presidential roles, based upon 
the duties described by the Constitution, highlights the 
stable form of administrative systems. Edward S. Corwin 
described five roles: chief of state, chief executive, 
chief diplomate, commander-in-chief, and chief 
legislator.11 Clinton Rossiter described five additional, 
extra-Constitutional roles that have developed since 
Corwin's listing: chief of party, protector of peace, 
manager of prosperity, world leader, and voice of the
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people.14 These generally agreed upon roles constitute 
"ideas about what people expect to do in certain situations 
as well as what others expect them to do in certain 
situations,,,li They combine presidential and public 
perception about what a particular role entails. Yet each 
President's administration adopts its own role(s) to enact. 
For instance, the Reagan Administration viewed itself as 
working for peace throughout the world, a variation of 
protector of the peace. This irenic role in international 
affairs shaped the manner in which the Administration could 
respond to various situations.16 Roles adopted by 
Administrations act to constrain and foster presidential 
discourse.
Murray Edelman's early work analyzing the
"role-taking" characteristic of Administrations is
illuminating here:
Factual premises alone are certainly not 
sufficient to explain administrative decisional 
choices; but factual premises in conjunction with 
observable role-taking are: for the role both 
specifies the value premises operative in a 
particular instance of decision-making and 
establishes a probability that these same value 
premises will be operative in future 
decision-making in the same policy area.17
It is the role-taking action that is of importance to this
essay. The Reagan presidency, for example, had
consistently referred to its peacekeeping role in foreign
affairs, especially during the Iran-Iraq war. Throughout
this conflict, the United States had stressed its role as a
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neutral third party acting in the capacity of peace-broker. 
This stance in the international arena was a vital one for 
the Reagan presidency, and it had been used repeatedly to 
justify various policy decisions.
To be sure, the nature of the threat to the United
States posed by the Iran-Iraq war was never truly clear in
the mind of the American public; nor was it explained
clearly by the Reagan Administration. Yet this very
ambiguity acted to enhance the image the government hoped
to project. The rhetorical potency of ambiguity is
explained by Edelman:
Only an intangible threat permits this kind of 
administrative role-taking. In the measure that 
a threat is clearly observable and subject to 
systematic study, perceptions of its character 
and of techniques for dealing with it converge. 
Polarization and exaggeration become less 
feasible.18
In addition, the government's political response to events 
in the Gulf also highlighted the way that role-taking 
affects presidential administrations. For example, 
President Reagan used his Administration's role as defender 
of Democracy to justify the United States' invasion of 
Grenada, and President Bush used his Administration's role 
as world peace-keeper to help justify our early involvement 
in Kuwait and the Gulf war. By the roles he has 
highlighted, each President has attempted to "personalize*' 
his Administration.
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It is in this sense, then, that this study uses the 
term "administrative rhetoric" to refer to specific 
governance styles employed by presidential administrations. 
Through rhetorical grounding of particular actions or 
policies, each Administration will of necessity project the 
image that it has chosen to highlight and will adopt public 
roles that are integral to that image. Thus, 
administrative texts do not necessarily advance procedural 
aspects of an Administration; rather, such texts may 
function to create and to maintain the roles chosen by a 
political leader as part of his or her constituted 
identity.
Thus we can begin to see the possible interaction
between administrative text, context, rhetorical
situations, and crisis formation. Kuypers et al
demonstrated that crisis situations may begin with no
stable means for interpreting the discursive surroundings
and that one of the purposes of the administrative text is
the creation of a stable contextual frame. Its appearance
requires substantial interaction of text and context.
Branham and Pearce highlighted this reflexivity:
Every communicative act is a text that derives 
meaning from the context of expectations and 
constraints in which it is experienced. At the 
same time, contexts are defined, invoked, and 
altered by texts. Particular communicative acts 
simultaneously depend upon and reconstruct 
existing contexts.19
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In order for a text to modify an exigency 
successfully, it must "fit" not only the particular 
situation into which it enters, but also the context in 
which it is situated. In fact, the creation of a stable 
context of meaning may be the first step for the successful 
modification of an exigency that occurs in a situation 
composed of multiple contexts. Thus an administrative text 
(e.g., President Clinton's first utterances about the Haiti 
situation upon taking office) will act to set the 
interpretive stage in a crisis drama. These first 
utterances will draw upon the role(s) that the 
Administration has adopted as well. In President Clinton's 
case, these first utterances will also be acting to 
establish the role(s) his Administration will enact. This 
corresponds well with Theodore Windt's first stage of 
crisis formation— the obligatory statement of facts.
Because they involve interanimation of text and 
context, are rooted in situations, constrain presidential 
utterances, and draw upon earlier presidential utterances, 
international crises may be viewed as rhetorical 
constructions. Crisis rhetoric occurs when a President 
chooses to speak on an issue, whether to promote it as a 
crisis or downplay its perceived significance as a crisis. 
Thus Presidents act to control the definition of 
international events. The exigence that the President 
chooses to address— material condition, the President's
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credibility, the President's popularity, the perception of 
crisis itself— is part of the crisis itself and is thus 
highly unstable and alterable. The President acts to 
define the context through which the event is viewed.
Crises may develop rapidly, as with the KAL 007 and 
Airbus shootdowns, or they may slowly evolve, as with 
Haiti. Either way, text and context interplay alter the 
situation, eventually providing appropriate moments for 
"fitting" utterances that can bring the perception of 
crisis to an end. Utterances in response to crisis 
situations {or the perception thereof) are historically 
mandated and culturally based. They draw upon public 
knowledge; the President's text and the press, however, act 
as providers of pre-knowledge. Eventually, portions of 
this pre-knowledge will evolve into public knowledge. Yet 
the public's perception of the situation and the initial 
presidential utterances are viewed through the public's 
initial knowledge held in general; the historical and 
cultural knowledge. With no Cold War meta-narrative, 
however, public knowledge concerning international crisis 
situations is in flux. The absence of this meta-narrative 
makes the rhetorical construction of crisis problematic.
The situation in Haiti provides an excellent 
opportunity to analyze the interaction of these elements. 
The situation was inherited by President Clinton upon 
taking office, and he issued definitive statements early in
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his term that served to define the situation. The 
situation exhibited several key events that acted to 
provide opportunities for fitting utterances. Utterances 
might have been crafted that would have modified the 
situation. Yet by the end of 1993, the presidential 
discourse was inadequate for the situation, and the 
situation appeared worse than when President Clinton had 
taken office. Therefore, this particular situation 
provides us with an example of a rhetorical situation that 
matured and persisted. To fully understand the rhetorical 
dynamics involved with this situation, I examine the 
initial situation, the President's response, and the 
framing of Clinton's response by the national press.
Framing
Robert M. Entman stated that to frame is to take "some 
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient 
in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a 
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item 
described."20 Frames define problems, diagnose causes, 
make moral judgments, and suggest remedies. They operate 
by making some information more salient than other 
information; therefore they "highlight some features of 
reality while omitting others."21 Frames are located in 
the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture 
at large.
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This power of frames to shape the manner in which the
public interprets certain issues and situations is
highlighted in a study by Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A.
Brody, and Philip E. Tetlock. For these researchers, who
used mandatory testing for HIV as the controlled frame, the
results were instructive:
[The effect] of framing is to prime values 
differentially, establishing the salience of the 
one or the other. [A] majority of the public 
supports the rights of persons with AIDS when the 
issue is framed to accentuate civil liberties 
considerations— and supports . . . mandatory
testing when the issue is framed to accentuate 
public health considerations.23
The power of framing is great, especially considering the
pervasiveness of the mass media in the country. It becomes
even more powerful when concerning international events,
because of the limited, first hand access Americans have to
foreign affairs information. For example, Entman and Page
found that during the prewar stage of the debate about U.S.
policy toward Iraq that the media frame had only two
remedies for the situation: war now or sanctions now and
war later.2' Any "critique transcending the remedies
inside the [media] frame breached the bounds of acceptable
discourse, hence was unlikely to influence policy."34
In "Framing Analysis: An Approach to News Discourse," 
Zhongdang Pan and Gerald M. Kosicki advanced one way of 
using frame analysis for the analysis of news stories.”
They suggested that each news story will have a theme that 
"functions as the central organizing idea" of the story.”
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Themes provide readers with signifying elements that prompt 
them to comprehend a news story in a particular manner.
The signifying elements of themes are "structurally located 
lexical choices of codes constructed toy following certain 
shared rules and conventions."77 These codes and lexical 
choices are the tools that news makers use to construct 
news discourse and the psychological stimuli the audience 
processes when reading the news. For Pan and Kosicki, 
themes function as frames, and the signifying elements 
within themes may be likened to framing devices. In 
examining a single news story about a pro-life rally in 
Wichita, Kansas, Pan and Kosicki advanced four framing 
devices that helped to establish the presence of a 
particular frame within a news story: syntactical 
structure, script structure, thematic structure, and 
rhetorical structure.
At the syntactical level of analysis one looks for 
stable patterns of arrangement of words and phrases into 
sentences; headlines and lead sentences are particularly 
important. At the script level one looks for how news 
stories are conceived of as stories. This involves an 
action or event orientation; the five W's and one H of 
journalism. At the thematic level one looks for elements 
of causality within the news item. Often this causality is 
implied by presenting "actions in a context in which one 
may be seen as an antecedent and another as a
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consequence."2* Thematic structure consists of a summary—  
the headline, lead, or conclusion— and a main body of 
text— the evidence: events and sources. At the rhetorical 
level one looks for any of five rhetorical framing devices: 
metaphors, exemplars, catchphrase, depictions, and visual 
images.
For Pan and Kosicki, the framing of news stories is 
reduced to lexical choices made by the journalists--words 
in a vocabulary. The words chosen by a news reporter 
reveal the way that reporter categorizes that which he or 
she is reporting upon. Word choice often "signifies the 
presence of a particular frame."w For example, Pan and 
Kosicki cited the descriptions of Saddam Hussein given by 
American reporters during the Gulf war. Hussein was 
described as the "Iraqi dictator," a description that 
placed him in the same category, in the minds of Americans, 
as Hitler, Stalin, and perhaps Manuel Noriega. If, on the 
other hand, one were to describe him as the "Iraqi leader," 
"Iraqi President," or the "Iraqi Commander-in-Chief," the 
connotations would be quite different. The lexical choices 
made within the various framing devices--syntactic, script, 
thematic, rhetorical— act to frame the news story to 
engender a dominant reading of that story.
Pan and Kosicki conducted an empirical analysis of 
news stories that took place on a micro-level of analysis;
i.e., they examined each sentence of a news story for the
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lexical choices made at each of the four framing levels. 
They sought to "describe the varying functions between the 
identified structural and lexical features of news stories 
and the predictable mental representations of the story on 
the part of audiences."10 In their brief analysis of a 
single news story, Pan and Kosicki found that the story 
framed the pro-life rally in confrontational terms.
Sentence by sentence they proceeded through each of the 
four levels of analysis and found aggregate evidence that 
supported the confrontational theme. They pointed out that 
framing analysis allows researchers to provide information 
about how an issue is discussed in the news and "how the 
ways of talking about the issue [is] related to the 
evolution of the issue in political debates."’1 However, 
given the nature of their study— a single news story— it 
would appear that making such inferences would be difficult 
at best. Moreover, if one were to cover numerous stories 
over a period of time, attempting to discern the 
relationship of the issue and frame relationship, one would 
surely find the micro-level of Pan and Kosicki's analysis 
belaboring to the point of impossibility.
To overcome the limitations of a micro-analysis, and 
validly make generalizations concerning a frame's influence 
upon political debates, one must find a way of identifying 
frames at a more general level of analysis. In "Framing 
U.S. Coverage of International News: Contrasts in
Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents” Robert M. 
Entman comparatively analyzed the narratives within news 
stories about the KAL and Iran Air shootdowns.13 Entman 
chose these particular incidents because they could have 
been reported upon in a similar fashion; thus any 
differences in the information that comprised the frames 
would be easier to detect. For Entman, "frames reside in 
the specific properties of the news narrative that 
encourage those perceiving and thinking about events to 
develop particular understandings of them."” The specific 
properties reside in the narrative accounts of events and 
are comprised of keywords, metaphors, concepts, symbols, 
and visual images. Accordingly, frames are fashioned by 
particular words and phrases that consistently appear 
within a narrative and "convey thematically consonant 
meanings across . . . time."14 Thus, framing makes some
ideas more salient than others, while making some ideas 
virtually invisible to an audience.
For Entman, the initial framing process is set in 
motion by the interaction of sources and journalists. Once 
initiated, the established frame guides audience and 
journalist thinking. Entman called these type of frames 
"event-specific schema." Once in place, event-specific 
schema encourage journalists to "perceive, process, and 
report all further information about the event in ways 
supporting the basic interpretation encoded in the
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schema."1'’ In his study of the coverage of the two 
shootdowns, Entman used news items appearing in Time. 
Newsweek. CBS Evening News, the Washington Post, and the 
New York Times. The results are instructive. Entman found 
that the KAL shootdown was framed as a moral outrage 
whereas the Iran Air shootdown was framed as a technical 
problem. This was accomplished in several ways. For 
example, during the two week period following the KAL 
shootdown the New York Times printed 286 stories and the 
Washington Post printed 169 stories. During the two week 
period following the shootdown of Iran Air 655 the New York 
Times printed 102 stories and the Washington Post printed 
82 stories. Thus the frame— actual coverage in this case—  
helped to determine the importance of the event.
For another example, during the two week period 
following the KAL shootdown the New York Times used the 
term "attack" 99 times and the Washington Post used the 
term "attack" 66 times. However, during the two week 
period following the shootdown of Iran Air 655 the New York 
Times used the term "attack" only 30 times and the 
Washington Post used the term attack 24 times. These, and 
other findings reported by Entman, demonstrated how frames 
represent dominant event-specific schema. They have the 
capacity to obscure contrary information that may be 
presented in a particular case. On this point Entman found 
that "for those stories in which a single frame thoroughly
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pervades the text, stray contrary opinions . . . are likely
to possess such low salience as to be of little practical 
use to most audience members."** So, although it was 
perfectly acceptable for political elites to describe the 
KAL shootdown as a brutal attack, it was far less likely 
for them to describe it in terms of a tragedy; the frame 
had been set, the Soviets were evil and at fault. To think 
of the shootdown in terms of tragedy runs against the frame 
and would mitigate the culpability of the Soviets.
Entman focused upon those frames considered 
politically important. This is to say, those elements 
within frames that would be most likely to "promote a 
common, majority response to the news events as measured in 
public opinion polls."17 According to Entman, the process 
of framing is a reciprocal process between political elites 
and journalists. In established frames political elites 
often find it difficult, if not foolhardy, to resist the 
frame's pervasive influence; however, in the development of 
new event-specific schemata elites have great influence in 
establishing the initial frames. This is particularly true 
with breaking foreign affairs items. This supports the 
conclusions of the literature on crisis rhetoric which 
point out the "rally-'round-the-president" stance of the 
press during times of crisis.
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Role of News Media 
Since 1947, all presidential responses to perceived 
crisis events have been uttered under the constraining and 
growing influence of the Cold War meta-narrative, if the 
Cold War meta-narrative is seen as a frame. After so long, 
the removal of this frame might lead to confusion about how 
to view the role of the U.S. in international situations. 
Presidents throughout this period have also enjoyed some 
degree of cooperation from the press during times of 
crises. In The Press. Presidents, and Crises. Brigitte 
Lebens Nacos analyzed the relationship of the press and 
Presidents during six crisis periods.1" Her study spanned 
domestic and foreign crises, serious (Cuban Missile) to 
"middle-level" (Reagan assassination attempt), four 
different Presidents (Kennedy, Johnson, Carter, and Reagan, 
and a twenty-one year period. Nacos argued that during 
periods of crisis the media abandoned an adversarial role 
with the President and as a result, "news coverage during 
crises periods reflects the tendency of political actors to 
support a crisis-managing President or, at least, to 
refrain from expressing criticism."1*
The results of Nacos' work are important to the 
present study; with the loss of the Cold War meta-narrative 
Presidents might now be forced to compete with the press 
over how to frame international crisis situations.4(1 Nacos 
found "distinctive patterns" in the manner in which the
press covered the various crises. First, no fundamental 
changes were revealed in the way that newspapers covered 
crisis episodes between 1962 and 1983. Second, a strong 
relationship exists between editorial positions and the 
content of political news coverage. This suggests that 
editors exert a greater degree of control over news items 
during times of crises. Nacos highlighted the consistency 
of coverage by the national press during the studied 
period:
news coverage reflected a rally-'round-the- 
president reaction by domestic political actors 
and/or an unwillingness to criticize the 
president's crisis-related policies. [However, 
in] those instances [in] which presidential 
policies related to an upcoming crisis were 
articulated, the coverage of pre-crisis periods 
revealed the conflicting views one would expect 
in American politics.41
This same pattern was found during the crises of the
Kennedy administration by Montague Kern, Patricia W.
Levering, and Ralph B. Levering. In The Kennedy Crises:
The Press. the Presidency. and Foreign Policy. Kern et al
analyzed six foreign and domestic policy crises, and
discovered certain limitations upon the President's control
over the facts:
[Despite] the strong impact of presidential 
leadership on press treatment of crisis issues, 
the overall generalization emerges that the 
president dominates press coverage primarily in 
situations where competing interpretations of 
events are not being espoused bv others whom the 
journalists consider important. 7
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Presidents thus have enjoyed some degree of 
cooperation from the press during times of crises. At 
least in part this has been a result of the legitimating 
influence of presidential authority and the perennial 
influence of the Cold War meta-narrative. During pre­
crisis periods of discussion about a particular policy (the 
days and weeks before the Iran Airbus shootdown, for 
example) there exists a general level of debate over the 
Administration's policies. This discussion period would 
end once a given President spoke out definitively in 
response to a situation perceived as a crisis. The ending 
of the Cold War, however, seems to have changed this. The 
Cold War meta-narrative and the role(s) it created and 
legitimated for the President depended upon the "degree of 
anxiety the myth [of Soviet evil rationalized and], the 
intensity with which the particular expectation that forms 
the central premise [are] held."*-1 The meta-narrative 
acted to frame or contextualize a President's utterances in 
crisis situations. With the ending of the Cold War, the 
public no longer automatically co-contextualizes 
presidential utterances in response to a perceived crisis. 
In this vacuum, then, a space exists available for the 
variable framing of presidential utterances in response to 
international crisis situations. Prior to completing this 
study, I entertain an initial expectation that the press 
remained in contention with President Clinton over the
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definition of the situation in Haiti, over periods of 
relative calm, and even during those times crisis seems 
most apparent (the two ferry incidents; the arrest of the 
Haitian soldier granted political asylum in the U.S.; and 
the October Port-Au-Prince incident).
The general hypothesis undergirding this study 
suggests that President Clinton's assumed role in Haiti and 
his utterances will not coincide with how the press framed 
his utterances. This is to say, Clinton will provide the 
American public with a particular frame through which to 
interpret the event (trying to establish a stable 
contextual frame to legitimate his actions) and the press 
will provide a competing frame for the public to evaluate 
Clinton's actions. This leads to a prolonged continuation 
of the situation in Haiti because there exists no stable 
frame through which to view the utterances and proposed 
actions of the President. I am not implying that the press 
is ignoring its norms of objectivity; however, the media 
may be objective but still frame in such a manner that 
prevents readers from making a "balanced assessment" of a 
particular event.44
Procedures and Materials
The press facilitates public perception of the context 
in which a particular situation resides. In the past, the 
Cold War meta-narrative has helped to establish this 
context in foreign affairs; it was common, public
knowledge. Now the way the press frames international 
events takes on an even greater importance, and may even 
contend against the President's frame. For this study, 
then, I perform a comparative analysis of the rival frames 
used by the Clinton Administration and the printed press 
when discussing Haiti. Specifically, I analyze how the 
Clinton Administration framed the situation in Haiti and 
how the press framed the situation as a response to the 
administrative text. For the administrative text I examine 
those comments given by President Clinton and his 
Administration officials between 14 January of 1993 and 20 
December 199 3, the first and last comments by President 
Clinton during 1993.4* I examine two major daily papers, 
the Washington Post and the New York Times during a ten day 
period following each of President Clinton's public 
statements.46 The analysis proceeds in two sections:
January through June and July through December. Period one 
covers the Clinton Administration's first statements about 
Haiti and ends just prior to the July signing of the 
Governors Island agreement. The second period begins with 
the July signing of the Governors Island agreement that set 
the date for Aristide's return to Haiti, and ends in the 
period following the October incident in Port-Au-Prince. 
These times were selected because they reflect those 
periods during the crisis in which the majority of 
Administrative utterances upon Haiti were made.
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I proceed by analyzing the administrative text for 
narratives-47 In this I follow Entman and look for the 
various framing devices that may have been used by the 
Clinton Administration: keywords, metaphors, concepts, and 
symbols. Having accomplished this, I next repeat the 
analysis on news stories and editorials contained in the 
New York Times and the Washington Post. Having done this I 
then answer the following questions: one, how did the 
Clinton Administration frame the situation in Haiti; two, 
how did the press, responding to President Clinton, frame 
the situation; and three, at what time, if at all, did 
these frames converge to present a unified contextual 
whole?
In summation, this chapter has reviewed the relevant 
concepts of rhetorical situation, administrative rhetoric, 
and their relationship with crises. Framing as a 
rhetorical process was also discussed. This study posits 
that Administrative utterances interact with the rhetorical 
situation and affects the manner in which the public 
perceives a crisis. The press plays a role in the 
transmission of presidential utterances. Since 1947, most, 
if not all, international crises have been framed by U.S. 
Presidents with the Cold War meta-narrative; once 
presidential utterances enacted this frame, dissenting 
voices were made virtually unnoticeable. With the Cold War 
over, it would seem logical that initial presidential
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utterances would have a more difficult time developing new 
event-specific schema. This study, then, is about the 
interaction of the President and the press in framing the 
crisis situation in Haiti.
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Presidential Press Conferences (New York: Praeger, 1990).
46. I analyze all relevant news items in the political 
sections of the New York Times and the Washington Post. 
These generally appear in section A. These news items 
included editorials. Excluded were stories appearing in 
other sections of the paper such as the magazine section, 
travel, sports, etc. These two papers were chosen because 
they "are the foremost leaders and agenda setters for the 
rest of the print and electronic news media and that they 
influence the news judgment of other news organizations 
heavily. These newspapers are most widely read by the 
Washington community of political elites and are recognized 
as intragovernmental means of communication" (Nacos 12).
See too, Michael Baruch Grossman and Martha Joynt Kumar, 
Portraying the President (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1981); Ben H. Bagdikian, The Effete 
Conspiracy (New York: Harper & Row, 197 2); and Kern, et 
al., who describe the New York Times and the Washington 
Post as "politically significant papers that had 
substantial national impact [during the Kennedy 
administration and today). (13) I am especially indebted 
to the excellent study by Nacos for insight into delimiting 
the nature of the news items employed for analysis.
47. These include all written, verbatim Clinton 
administration texts produced from January 1993 through 
December 1993. Since the focus in this study is domestic, 
the sources used were the Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents and documents procured from the 
White House, Office of the Press Secretary: Available from 
ciinton@Marist [Internet] /.data/politics/pres.Clinton.
CLINTON INHERITS A CRISIS: ANALYSIS, PART ONE
This chapter is divided into three sections: first, a 
short synopsis of the Bush Administration's response to the 
situation in Haiti is presented; second, the various 
responses of the New York Times. Washington Post, and of 
the Clinton Administration from 14 January 1993 through 3 0 
June 1993 are detailed; and third, a discussion of the 
framing devices used by the press and the Administration is 
provided.
Over time the Administration and the press developed 
interpretive frames that allowed for very different 
assessments of the events in Haiti. Both the Bush and 
Clinton Administrations framed the Haitian situation 
essentially as a foreign policy problem. In their eyes the 
primary goal of any expenditure of resource or military 
intervention was the stabilization of the democratically- 
elected Haitian government as an independent political 
entity. The press, on the other hand, ultimately framed 
the Haitian situation as a domestic problem. It saw the 
U.S. role in terms of an obligation to idealized norms of 
freedom of immigration and the legalities of the 
Administration's policy of direct returns. Thus this 
chapter will provide a chronological exposition of 
executive policy, a policy shadowed by the growth of a 
press critique. This critique ultimately became so clearly
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divergent as to constitute a fully articulated counter­
policy.
Synopsis of President Bush's Policy
Early on 4 October 1991, President George Bush began
an exchange with reporters concerning the overthrow of
President Jean Bertrand Aristide of Haiti. The President
stated that the United States was "interested in the
restoration of the democratically elected government of
Haiti," but refused to say more until a press conference
scheduled for later that day.1 At this subsequent
conference, President Bush was asked if he would be willing
to use military force to restore democracy. He replied
that he was reluctant to do this and that the U.S. would
wait and see how the Organization of American States (OAS)
responded to the coup. The President's response was
detached, and there did not seem to be any reason to
believe a crisis for the U.S. had developed.
On this same day President Bush issued Executive order
12775 which declared a United States trade embargo on
Haiti. The wording of the order stands in stark contrast
to the President's earlier statements:
I, George Bush, President of the United States of 
America, find that the grave events that have 
occurred in the Republic of Haiti to disrupt the 
legitimate exercise of power by the 
democratically elected government of the country 
constitute an unusual threat to the national 
security, foreign policy, and economy of the 
United States, and hereby declare a national 
emergency to deal with the threat.’
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On 28 October 1991 President Bush issued a second executive 
order in regard to Haiti. Through Order 12779, the 
President stated that the events in Haiti continued to 
constitute a threat to the United States, and he further 
tightened the economic embargo imposed upon Haiti. This 
remained the status quo until 13 April 1992, when President 
Bush sent a message to Congress. This missive provided 
detailed reasons for the continued economic sanctions 
against Haiti. Furthermore, the connection between the 
Bush policy and the OAS efforts to restore democracy were 
strengthened; and, for the first time, the situation was 
called a crisis by the Administration. President Bush had 
made it clear that during this declared state of "national 
emergency" for the United States his policy was to wait and 
see what the OAS and the United Nations (U.N.) would 
accomplish.
On 24 May 1992 President Bush issued executive order 
12324 which authorized U.S. Coast Guard vessels to 
repatriate Haitians, bound for the United States, who had 
not been granted asylum through our embassy in Haiti. The 
President justified this action, citing the large number of 
Haitians, over 34,000 since 30 September 1991, who had 
attempted to leave the island nation for the United States; 
Bush called it "a dangerous and unmanageable situation."* 
This policy of direct return was designed to keep Haitians 
safe; indeed, according to President Bush, "the safety of
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the Haitians is best assured by remaining in their country. 
We urge any Haitians who fear persecution to avail 
themselves of our service at our Embassy in Port-au- 
Prince. 1,4
During a press conference three days later on 27 May
1992 the President was asked about the recent influx of
Haitian immigrants and his policy of repatriation:
[This] policy seems to run contrary to what 
America has stood for over the past couple 
hundred years, in that Americans opened their 
arms to all ethnic groups and different classes 
who sought to free themselves . . . from
oppression in their homelands.'
President Bush uses this question to set up an important
component in his policy: Haitian refugees are primarily
economic refugees, not political. Indeed, the President
stated, "I am convinced that the people in Haiti are not
being physically oppressed.,,ft President Bush stated quite
clearly that the U.S. government had every legal right to
screen people coming into the country, and that the country
was not bound to "have an open policy where everybody in
economic deprivation around the world can come to the
United States."7 The next day, on 28 May 1992, the
President issued a statement that denied vessels trading
with Haiti the use of United States ports. President Bush
also clarified his policy, stating that the sanctions were
directed at coup leaders, not the Haitian poor; and he
announced that the embassy at Port-au-Prince had expanded
operations for processing political refugees.
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President Bush made no other formal statements 
concerning Haiti until 30 September 1992, when he sent a 
message to Congress about the current state of affairs in 
Haiti." In this communique the President continued the 
state of emergency sanctions; it is noted as well that 
these sanctions were made in conjunction with the OAS. 
Further, President Bush noted, the OAS had "repudiated" and 
"vigorously condemned" Aristide's overthrow. The President 
continued, stating that "the crisis between the United 
States and Haiti . . . has not been resolved."*'
During a press conference on 23 October 1992,
President Bush was confronted by a member of the press who
insisted that over 40% of those seeking asylum at Port-au-
Prince were found by state department officials to be
politically oppressed. The President challenged the
reporter, and stated that he would "like to see that
documentation" because political refugees would not be
turned back. President Bush put an end to future
ungrounded speculations when he drew upon his authority as
President and stated:
I must have different information than you, but 
I've got pretty good information as President of 
the United States that these people are not being 
persecuted when they go to file their claims for 
asylum.1(1
The situation with Haiti remained static during the 
remainder of President Bush's term. The Bush 
Administration had initiated a Haitian policy that would
act to set the frame through which President Clinton would 
initially have to address the situation. Clearly this was 
a foreign policy issue, and one in which the United States 
was a partner, not the leader. Furthermore, the policy of 
direct returns was framed as a humanitarian act, thereby 
foregoing legal definitions for moral ones. As frames, 
President Bush's utterances about Haiti would act as a 
constraint upon President Clinton's utterances about the 
same situation. The Bush Administration did accomplish 
several important policy steps. By declaring a national 
emergency for the U.S., President Bush enacted Emergency 
Presidential Powers which would legally enable him to take 
extreme measures against the Haitian coup leaders. Bush 
initiated a policy of direct repatriation on the high seas 
This policy was justified in part as a measure to save 
unwanted loss of human life, and by stating that the vast 
majority of Haitian refugees were economic, not political 
refugees. This implied that the current in-Haiti 
processing was adequate. The President also initiated a 
trade embargo with Haiti; this included a ban on vessels 
trading with Haiti from using U.S. ports. President Bush 
also made it quite clear that the sanctions were directed 
at the coup leaders, not the Haitian poor (for example, 
petroleum products, food stuffs, humanitarian aid, and the 
like were excluded in the ban). For pro-active measures 
the Bush Administration had expanded the Port-au-Prince
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embassy refugee processing facilities. Finally, President 
Bush had made an important component of his policy the 
continuing U.S. cooperation with the U.N. and OAS.
President Clinton Inherits A Crisis 
When Bill Clinton assumed the Presidency he inherited 
Bush's Haitian policy and the emerging press questions 
about the repatriation of refugees. Candidate Clinton had 
promised a policy different from that of President Bush, 
but throughout the many months following his ascension to 
the presidency it became increasingly clear that the Bush 
policy remained in force." The Clinton Administration 
issued its first statements on the Haitian situation on 14 
January 1995. One is directed to the people of Haiti and 
the other to the people of the United States. In these 
similar statements, President-elect Clinton made clear how 
his Administration would view the situation in Haiti, and 
he made his first utterances upon what had become an 
important on-going situation for the United States. In 
short, he was beginning the process of framing the event in 
terms which his Administration wished it to be seen. The 
President made clear what his goals in this situation would 
be: **My major goals are the restoration of democracy in 
Haiti, the saving of human lives and the establishment of a 
system for fair treatment of refugees."12 These goals were 
to be accomplished through a "political settlement" of the 
crisis. Moreover, the political means would involve
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"intensive negotiations," with various parties— U.N., OAS, 
President Aristide, and the coup leaders— "working 
together," engaging in "important negotiations" to bring 
about the political settlement that would change the "human 
rights" conditions in Haiti, ultimately leading to 
President Aristide's return. President-elect Clinton made 
it clear that his Administration would be a team player
with the U.N. and OAS.
Despite these announced changes, President Clinton 
would remain strongly influenced by the policy he had 
inherited from the Bush Administration. Although candidate 
Clinton had promised to end the Bush policy of direct 
repatriations, President-elect Clinton announced that the 
practice would temporarily continue: "the practice of 
direct return of those who depart Haiti by boat will be
continued. I will end the practice of direct return when I
am fully confident I can do so in a way that does not 
contribute to a humanitarian tragedy."11 Along with the 
continuation of direct return President-elect Clinton 
announced four concrete actions that he would initiate as 
an extension to the Bush policy, in effect, making the 
policy his own: first, the rapidity with which refugee 
processing within Haiti occurs would be increased; two, 
processing centers would be created outside of Port-au- 
Prince; three, more Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) officers would be posted to Haiti; and four, the U.S.
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would encourage expanded U.N. and OAS human rights 
monitoring inside of Haiti. Clinton closed his statement 
by saying that these new actions would "maintain [U.S.] 
humanitarian obligations to refugees while taking all 
practical steps necessary to protect against tragic loss of 
life. "I4
With this statement President-elect Clinton had 
initiated his Administration's frame for viewing the 
crisis. The President-elect announced the situation as a 
"crisis" in his announcement's title, but then made clear 
that the action to bring the crisis to closure would be a 
"process" of "collaborative effort" aimed at restoring 
democracy. The initial frame that President-elect Clinton 
tried to set was one of calm, deliberate negotiations being 
carried out by rational parties on both sides. Although 
the practice of direct returns would continue, it was 
linked with humanitarian concerns: prevention of 
unwarranted loss of life that the dangerous sea voyage 
could bring about. Further, the humanitarian actions of 
the Administration were highlighted by its efforts to 
ensure fair and safe refugee processing within Haiti, and 
other "measures" that would be "actively explored."
This position was reiterated by George Stephanopoulos 
during a 1 February 1993 press briefing. When told by a 
reporter that the Haiti situation had "hit a new roadblock 
in negotiated solutions . . ."n due to 300 HIV infected
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Haitians on Guantanamo Bay going on a hunger strike to gain 
entry into the U.S., Stephanopoulos replied: "The 
President's position remains the same. He wants to make 
sure that we continue to do everything we can to reach a 
negotiated settlement, to bring democracy back to Haiti."16 
The Initial Press Response
The press response to administrative utterances did
relate the information conveyed by the Administration, but
it also showed the beginnings of a contending frame. For
example, the Clinton Administration had highlighted its
sense of urgency and quickened pace of negotiations; in
short, they seemed to be attempting to instill new energy
into the negotiation process. During the week following
President-elect Clinton's initial statements, the New York
Times did reinforce this impression. The paper stated that
there had been signs of "energetic work" and that the
Clinton Administration had "strenuously promoted a plan" to
bring in U.N./OAS observers.17 Additionally, the paper
related that the "pace of diplomacy to find a political
settlement appears to be quickening."l*
Beginnings of an Oppositional Frame: Direct Returns 
Questioned
Although the sense of optimism was relayed, both the 
New York Times and the Washington Post highlighted 
Clinton's apparent about-face from his previous stance on 
ending the Bush Administration's policy of direct returns. 
Although the press did relate the Clinton Administration's
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reasons for continuing the policy, it also offered its own, 
oppositional assessment. For example, the New York Times 
stated:
His official explanation for reversing himself is 
to avoid the humanitarian catastrophe of capsized 
boats and overcrowded camps. But Mr. Clinton's 
real worry appears to be political fallout in 
Florida in reaction to a flood of poor, black 
Haitian refugees.19
The Washington Post reported President Clinton's official
explanation for keeping the policy of direct returns in
place— to avert a humanitarian tragedy— yet it, too, made
it into a political as opposed to humanitarian decision: "A
political settlement of the crisis [in Haiti] . . .  is
viewed as essential by the Clinton administration to halt
the threat of a mass exodus of boat people to Florida. . .
. "'?l1 This same position, highlighting the imagined concern
with South Florida politicians is again conveyed:
The specter of hordes of Haitian boat people 
wading ashore in South Florida has driven 
President Clinton to reverse campaign promises 
and erect a virtual Coast Guard blockade of 
Haiti, leading to charges that his approach, like 
that of his predecessor, is racist and 
inhumane.21
This same motive is argued by the editorial writers at the 
Washington Post. Their assessment of the major 
breakthrough in negotiations which allowed for human rights 
monitors into Haiti was not generous. At bottom the 
Washington Post saw base political motives: "The aim is to 
lower the level of general bullying, warm the atmosphere in 
which negotiations could restore normal politics and, not
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least, reduce the number of Haitians driven to seek refuge 
in Florida."22 This line of reasoning was further apparent 
in the Washington Post report which stressed that "since 
the election, Clinton has bowed to 'political pressure' to 
stop a deluge of Haitians from reaching Florida."23 
Whether true or not, neither the Washington Post or the New 
York Times ever discussed the ramifications of accelerated 
mass migration into already burdened South Florida; 
furthermore, the danger of tens-of-thousands of Haitians at 
sea in shoddy boats was virtually ignored. The press was 
introducing its own frame. The restoration of democracy in 
Haiti was not the primary issue; instead, the policy of 
direct returns was focused upon. The frame was asserting a 
domestic focused interpretation of President Clinton's 
policy; direct returns was being forced into a legal, as 
opposed to humanitarian frame. The continuation of direct 
returns was framed as a domestic, political campaign 
promise that has been broken.
The press opposition to direct returns took for 
granted the right of all departing Haitians to asylum in 
the U.S.; thus President Clinton's decision to continue 
direct returns was called an "unconscionable about face" 
and "repellent"; or, in the case of the Washington Post, 
"racist and inhumane." Moreover, the press rarely 
differentiated between economic and political refugees as 
both the Bush and Clinton Administration had made a point
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of doing. For example, the New York Times reported that 
Clinton had announced that "he would return the boat people 
without giving them a chance to apply for asylum."24 And 
they also implied that all Haitians fleeing did so for 
political reasons. For instance: "an atmosphere of harsh 
repression that has contributed to an exodus of refugees 
and posed a potential immigration crisis. . . .”2S Despite
Haiti's status as the poorest country in the Western 
hemisphere, the press consistently advanced political 
oppression as the primary motive for immigration. For 
example, "critics of the plan charged that Clinton is 
acting exactly as President Bush has in denying Haitians 
who fear for their lives a way to escape political 
oppression."2" And another example, this strong editorial 
implication: "The outpouring of refugees from Haiti will 
continue as long as the country remains in the grip of 
anarchy and violence, with no public authority other than 
undisciplined soldiers."27 By so doing, the press 
undermined President Clinton's claim of humanitarian 
motives undergirding his policy of direct returns.
When economic conditions are mentioned, they appear 
less salient than the political repression within the 
country; for we have already learned the real cause of the 
fleeing boat people: political repression. Thus, the 
traditional and patriotic view of immigrating to the United 
States dominates even when economic concerns are included
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with political oppression: "Haiti, already the poorest
nation in the hemisphere, has seen its economy crumble and
political repression grow since Aristide's overthrow."3*1
The economy is only secondary or perhaps a symptom of
political repression.
The primacy of the theme of political oppression is
perhaps most stridently presented in the Washington Post
which described conditions of violence and then failed to
provide sources or direct quotes; in short, hearsay is
provided for establishing the validity of political
conditions:
Soldiers and police arrested at least 10 
protesters in breaking up Thursday's 
demonstration [in support of Aristide by
students] at the medical school, and troops 
clubbed students and teachers about the head in 
dispersing protesters at the high school.
Journalists and newspaper vendors have been 
threatened, beaten and arrested in the past two 
weeks, and radio stations were warned that news
must be presented in ways that will 'not have a
harmful effect.'"31'
The Administration Restates its Position
President Clinton received his first formal question
about Haiti on 5 February 1993: "— is it time to strengthen
pressure on Haiti? Do you think we should have stronger
action. . . . ",l1 His response echoes those of George Bush:
"I am committed to restoring democracy to Haiti. I am
doing my best to work through the U.N. and the OAS. . .
. ",l At this same time, President Clinton used such terms
as "determination" and "push ahead" to characterize his
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Administration's diplomatic efforts. The President also
refined his argument for diplomatic efforts by highlighting
the underlying reasoning for his initiatives: "We have to
be able to restore democracy in a way that convinces
everybody that their human rights will be respected and . .
. protected.1,52 If this route were to fail, the President
promised to embark upon an even "more vigorous course"
toward the restoration of democracy. On 10 February 1993
President Clinton was asked about his "naval blockade" of
Haiti, and about his criticism of the Bush policy in light
of its similarity to his own. The President's response is
an instructive one:
My policy is not the same as President Bush's 
policy because I'm trying to bring democracy 
back, because I am committed to putting more 
resources there to process people who want to be 
political refugees. . . ."
Although a reporter asserted that the embargo would hurt
"the people at the bottom" instead of the coup leaders, the
President consistently justified his actions, and called
them a necessary measure to secure the safety of the
Haitian people who attempted the dangerous sea crossing.
The President declared the likely inundation a potential
"human tragedy of monumental proportions."14 The President
challenged the reporter, and asked if the embargo were
lifted, "then what incentives does the government have to
change?"-'-' For the first time, too, the President made
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mention of broken past promises of the Federal government 
to help South Florida.
Press Opposition to the Blockade and Direct Returns
This exchange about a "naval blockade" provides a good 
example of specific naming of actions used by the press.
In actuality, there were only 17 Coast Guard vessels and 5 
Navy boats. They were stationed outside of Haitian waters 
and only intercepted boats filled with Haitians heading for 
the U.S. This action hardly constitutes a blockade, which 
is internationally considered an act of war restricting all 
commerce and people from entering or leaving a particular 
area. Yet the press referred to ships' presence as a 
blockade. For example, the Washington Post, reporting on 
the deployment of U.S. ships to intercept and return 
fleeing Haitians, began the news story this way: "the 
United States plans to surround Haiti with Navy and Coast 
Guard vessels and planes, mounting a virtual blockade to 
stop a potential surge of refugees fleeing the island, Adm. 
J. William Kime, commandant of the Coast Guard said today." 
After this statement, an Administration official, Admiral 
J. William Kime, was quoted as saying that the 
"interdiction policy is not a blockade. . . . "  However, 
after Kime's comments on the interdiction have been 
relayed, advocates for Haitian refugees are cited: "'People 
should have the freedom to flee repression. They're 
putting a barricade around Haiti. . . .' 'Whether it's an
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encirclement: or a white picket fence, a blockade is a 
blockade . . . Blockades are acts of war. ,,,3A Although the
Administration's position is reported, clearly other 
descriptions dominate and have their saliency increased by 
the placement and consistency of use. This interpretation 
is consistently advanced, too. The Rev. Antoine Adrien, 
Aristide's highest ranking in-Haiti representative, is 
reported by the Washington Post as having called the 
interdiction policy a “floating Berlin wall."17 In a later 
story the Washington Post reported Harold H. Koh, the "Yale 
Law School professor . . . representing Haitians who claim
they are political refugees" as saying the Administration 
had established a "floating Berlin Wall."1* Although the 
Clinton Administration consistently referred to the policy 
as one of interdiction and direct returns, the press 
consistently reported it, except when quoting 
Administration officials, as "forced repatriation," "forced 
return," and "blockade."
The Clinton Administration is also accused by the 
press of harming the poor in Haiti through the continuation 
of the embargo, and not the "people at the top" of the 
country. For example, the Washington Post made what might 
be considered an indictment against the Administration:
"The embargo imposed by the OAS in October 1991, a U.S. 
initiative, added to impoverishment but did little to 
weaken the resolve of the current rulers to remain in
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power. "1<* The Admin istrat ion contended that if the 
sanctions are lifted there would be no incentive for the 
present rulers to restore democracy. However, this 
reasoning was virtually ignored by the press. By 16 
February 1993, a Washington Post editorial called for the 
lifting of the embargo: "It is also time to start trimming 
back an economic embargo whose principal impact has been 
not on the elements of power and privilege in Haiti but on 
an already-impoverished mass population."4"
Throughout the first eight weeks after President 
Clinton assumed office, the press maintained that the 
policy of direct returns was illegal. This case was still 
under review with the United States Supreme Court, but the 
press consistently reported it as being illegal. Their 
basis for reporting this rests primarily upon candidate 
Clinton's statements during the 1992 presidential race that 
Bush's policy of direct returns was illegal. For example, 
on 15 January 199 3 the Washington Post reported that "The 
Bush policy is 'no less legal now that it has been endorsed 
by Clinton than it was when it was announced by Bush'"41 
An editorial states: "To discourage Haitian refugees. 
President-elect Clinton has embraced a Bush Administration 
policy that, among its other defects, appears to be grossly 
illegal."42 The New York Times presented this general 
interpretation as well, and characterized "the forcible 
return of potential refugees as illegal. . . .”4’
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Candidate Clinton's utterances of calling Bush's policy 
"illegal" and "immoral" were frequently reported. Indeed, 
on this same issue, in early March the Washington Post 
highlighted candidate Clinton's campaign pledge to end 
Bush's policy; it seems that the constant assertion of the 
illegality of the policy rested upon two earlier events. 
One, candidate Clinton called it illegal during the 1992 
presidential race: "After Assailing Interdiction Program as 
Illegal During Campaign, Clinton Has Adopted It."44 Two, a 
U.S. Court of Appeals had said it was illegal. It seemed 
not to matter that the order to revise the policy was 
granted a stay by the U.S. Supreme Court until it could be 
reviewed there. A New York Times editorial stated that 
forcing "desperate refugees back into the face of danger 
betrays American values and mocks U.S. and international 
law."4' Against these assertions, the positive steps taken 
by the Administration to provide asylum hearings in Haiti 
were seldom detailed. The Administration's humanitarian 
commitment and arguments were seldom discussed, nor was the 
fact that the U.S. government is not compelled by any law 
to grant asylum hearings outside of the United States. The 
latter was mentioned once by the Washington Post.4*
In the span of many months, the press had advanced a 
legal conception of Clinton's policy of direct returns. In 
a 4 March 1993 editorial, the New York Times stated the 
President Clinton had "asked the Supreme Court to find that
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[Bush's] policy legal or, better still, to rule that courts 
can't order the President to obey a treaty and immigration 
law."47 The editorial continues, stating that at present 
"the U.S. is legally bound not to return a fleeing Haitian 
without deciding eligibility for asylum."4*
Consolidation of the Press Frame
Despite steady criticism of the Administration's 
policies on Haiti, the sinking of the ferry Neptune on 18 
February 1993 prompted little criticism from the press.
The ship was a regularly scheduled mode of transportation 
used between Haitian ports, and was not carrying a cargo 
load of America bound immigrants. However, the New York 
Times did publish several full length feature stories on 
the sinking and these stories did contain framing elements 
that implied ultimate responsibility for the sinking on 
Clinton and Bush Administration policies. For example, on
19 February 1993 it was reported that the Neptune had not
sailed for several weeks "largely because the owners feared 
Haitians trying to reach the United States would hijack the 
vessel."4' Hijacking was of real concern of the owners, 
however, because boats "seized on the seas by the Coast 
Guard are routinely destroyed and their passengers returned 
to land."'" The press had also implied that the ferry was 
overcrowded because road conditions were intolerable and 
there was no fuel for small aircraft; thus Haitians, of 
necessity, must use the ferry. The bad conditions and
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shortages of fuel were a direct result of the U.S. led
embargo. This connection was forcefully argued in a 20
February 199 3 New York Times report:
The roads connecting Jeremie and Port-au-Prince 
are in terrible condition, and few busses run 
because of fuel shortages caused by an embargo 
imposed after the overthrow of the Rev. Jean- 
Bertrand Aristide.51
Contrary to this report, however, no embargo on petroleum
products existed at that time.52 By 21 February 1993 this
ferry sinking grew from being reported as "one of the
world's worst ferry disasters. . ."V1 to being reported as
wone of the world's worst maritime disasters.”54
By this time, four weeks into the Clinton
Administration, the press had consolidated its frame. What
follows is a characteristic example of this description:
Since a military coup in September of 1991 
overthrew the nation's President, the Rev. Jean- 
Bertrand Aristide, more than 40,000 Haitians have 
attempted to flee to the United States, almost 
all of them attempting the 600-mile journey in 
rickety boats.
In recent weeks, the Coast Guard has 
maintained a blockade off Haiti to prevent a 
greater sea-borne exodus that was first inspired 
by the hope that the Clinton administration might 
ease limits on claims for political asylum.5'
The framing elements emphasize the domestic nature of the
situation. The internal situation in Haiti is political,
not economic; therefore, all Haitians wishing to flee are
political refugees that must be granted asylum in the U.S.
The policy of direct returns is thus illegal; the motives
for the policy are not humanitarian, but political. The
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Administration reneged on its promise of eliminating the 
policy and caved in to the political pressure from South 
Florida officials.
On 2 March 1993 the spectre of a continuity with the
Bush policy was again raised when a reporter asked
President Clinton if he had any "second thoughts about
[his] criticism of George Bush's Haiti policy," especially
given the Clinton Administration's Supreme Court appeal to
keep the policy of direct returns operational.56 The
President's reply was standard, "I still think there's a
big difference between what we're doing in Haiti and what
they [the Bush Administration] were doing in Haiti."5' Of
note here, however, is that the President assigned what he
believed to be a new dimension to the Haitian situation,
but which is in fact what we have already seen to be the
very justification that George Bush used for his policy:
Something that was never brought up before but is 
now painfully apparent is that if we did what the 
plaintiffs in the court case want [ending of the 
repatriation policy], we would be consigning a 
very large number of Haitians . . .  to some sort 
of death warrant. . . .  I mean, if you look at .
. . the number of people who did not even try to
come to the United States in a much shorter trip 
recently [the Neptune sinking]. . . .5*
On 2 March 1993, the day the Administration went to 
court over the legality of direct returns, the 
Administration also detailed the exact progress made with 
the Haiti situation. In a formal statement issued to the 
press, George Stephanopoulos reiterated the
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Administration's belief that the policy of direct returns
was directly linked with President Clinton's belief that it
will avert a "humanitarian tragedy." This statement also
related the forward moving progress of the negotiations,
and the Administration's "series of initiatives to promote
human rights and democratization in Haiti. . . . The
quickened pace of negotiations and the improvements made
upon the Bush policy were again highlighted that same day
by Stephanopoulos during a press briefing. Although the
press did raise the issue of Clinton's campaign pledge to
end the direct return policy of Bush, Stephanopoulos
consistently presented items that flow from the
Administration's earliest utterances upon Haiti:
[The] President has significantly changed U.S. 
policy toward Haiti in the last several months.
He has reinvigorated the process toward peace and 
democracy. He has supported the efforts of the 
U.N. and the OAS to negotiate, and a U.N. and an 
OAS civilian monitoring team has been deployed in 
Haiti. And we hope that this will create an 
atmosphere that's conducive to respect for human 
rights and political dialogue.
At the same time, he's moving the negotiating 
process forward. He's invited President Aristide 
for a meeting . . . .  He's directed U.S. 
officials to significantly increase the capacity 
to review asylum cases. He sent a monitoring 
team to Haiti and he's directed the State 
Department to send a technical mission. . .
He's made it easier for Haitians outside of Port- 
au-Prince to apply for refugee status and U.S. 
resettlement and to enhance the safety of the 
repatriation process for the returnees. We've 
made the capacity for asylum cases— we've reduced 
it from about two months to about a week in 
Haiti.60
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As the Administration contended, this represented a 
"significant change in policy." The Administration 
consistently stressed that it was "moving the negotiating 
process forward." The policy of direct returns was linked 
with the President's ability to conduct foreign policy and 
with the averting of a "humanitarian disaster."
By this time the contrasting frames of the press and 
the Administration were fully operational. The New York 
Times was characterizing those being returned without 
asylum hearings as "political refugees" in the thousands.61 
Moreover, around this time we see the implied rights of 
boat people to enter this country being asserted. A 2 
March 1993 New York Times article relays a blatant 
description: "'What Haiti needs is an underground railroad. 
For many people that railroad was the boats, and we have 
shut that off.'1,62 Along these same lines the press once 
again brought up the issue of the HIV infected Haitians 
being detained at Guantanamo Bay. Having brought up the 
current court case on this issue, the New York Times 
reported a contrast of pictures of the refugee camp. 
Beginning with Haitian advocates' descriptions, the paper 
defined the camp as a "pen for pigs," a "prison camp, 
surrounded by razor wire and guarded by the military." 
Although the New York Times reported that the 
Administration described the camp as a "humanitarian 
mission camp with a church, beauty salon, television set
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and weight-lifting room," it undermined the humanitarian 
claims with a sarcastic quote: "People with problems cannot 
exercise."63 These amenities were made to seem sinister 
through another gratuitous quote that "likened the 
Government's emphasis on the camp's perquisites to 
'bragging about the orchestra at Buchenwald. '1,64 This 
human interest aspect to the situation in Haiti was begun 
by the Washington Post as early as 11 February 1993. The 
camp was then described as "a grim barbed-wire encampment" 
and "prison-like conditions." Too, the story suggested 
that those "detained . . . lived in flimsy, leaky
barracks, among rodents and scorpions, in part because of a 
legal battle over their fate that is wending [sic] its way 
through the U.S. courts."65 The Washington Post does not 
make specific mention about what constitutes the other 
"part" of the reason for the Haitians' detention. However, 
the paper does report a quote from an INS official that 
makes the point for them: "Asked what would keep the 
Haitians at Guantanamo even after the ban [on HIV infected 
immigrants] is lifted, Austin [the INS official] said, 
'Maybe because as a policy matter you don't want to bring 
them here. '1,66
Although the press had reported the changes that 
President Clinton had made in the Haiti policy since taking 
office, it was still President Bush's policy as this 
headline suggests: "White House Again Defends Bush's Policy
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on Haitians."*7 Another, "Same Haiti Policy, Still
Illegal." Indeed, the focus upon only two aspects of the
Clinton Administration's policy acted to minimize the
positive changes that the new Administration had made. The
press had already developed, intentionally or not, a
standardized version of events. Reporting that President
Clinton met with only a limited numbers of reporters
instead of having a large press conference during President
Aristide's visit, the Washington Post reported:
That had the effect of shielding Clinton from 
questions about his Haiti policy, in which he has 
continued the Bush administration policy of 
forcibly returning refugees on the high seas and 
kept the HIV-positive Haitians confined at 
Guantanamo Bay despite a campaign pledge to lift 
the ban.6*
Moreover, the press was beginning to assert its own 
opinion as to the pace with which the Clinton 
Administration was moving. Although the Administration had 
been consistent and up front in highlighting the changes 
and rapidity with which it had been engaging in a political 
settlement, the press was beginning to feature elements 
that suggested a slowing of the pace. For instance, on 2 
March 1993 the New York Times ran a story entitled,
"Despite Plans, U.S. Refugee Processing in Haiti Is Said to 
Lag.,,<w In March 1993 the Haitian military arrested a man 
who had been granted political asylum by the United States. 
Asked what action he would take, the President replied that 
he was "upset," and that it was a "serious" matter, and
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that he believed "very strongly" that the Haitian 
Government should release the man. This incident was 
minor, and the Haitian soldier was released after only 
three days. But it was used by the press to make a 
statement against Clinton's policy of direct returns. The 
New York Times reported on 14 March 1993 that critics of 
President Clinton's policy "see the arrest as a test of 
President Clinton's willingness to revise a Haitian refugee 
policy that he attacked as cruel in the Presidential 
campaign but then continued after taking office. By 
forcibly returning all fleeing Haitians, critics say, the 
Clinton Administration puts those in real danger at 
risk."7" Too, the press belittled the Administration's 
concern of a mass boat departure by including a quote from 
a expert on asylum: "'As it stands now, our policy makers 
are immobilized by a theoretical fear that any form of 
generosity will result in a large-scale departure of 
Haitian boat people.'"71
Aristide's Visit and the Continuation of the Press Frame 
On 13 March 1993 the President once again reiterated 
his commitment to restoring Aristide to power. He also 
reiterated the Administration's conception of Haiti's 
problems: "I am committed to the restoration of democracy 
in Haiti. It is the only thing that will fully resolve the 
economic problems and the enormous social dislocation and 
the enormous numbers of people who are willing to risk
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their lives to leave the island. . . .1,72 The President
also touched upon the pace with which the negotiations were 
moving saying that the Administration would take a "more 
active role" and that the U.S. was committed to working 
with the U.N. and OAS, and that the United States would not 
be "dictating policy."
Presidents Clinton and Aristide met at the White House 
on 16 March 1993. During this visit, the President and 
State department officials were united in presenting a 
platform upon which to view the situation in Haiti and 
future U.S. action. The President reiterated his personal 
commitment to the restoration of democracy in Haiti. The 
President also issued a strong statement to the leaders of 
Haiti which was designed to "make it clear in the strongest 
possible terms" that the illegal government would not be 
tolerated indefinitely. Moreover, President Clinton 
stressed that he wanted to "push forward" and "step up 
dramatically the pace of negotiation. . . ."” These
comments were in keeping with prior administrative 
utterances upon Haiti. The President also restated his 
concern with a date certain: "It is a very grave thing for 
the United States alone to be setting a date certain in an 
endeavor that involves the United Nations and the 
Organization of the American States."74 In an exchange 
with reporters, both Presidents were provided the 
opportunity to answer questions about policy designed to
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return President Aristide to power. During this time, 
President Clinton announced that "stronger measures" would 
be taken by the Administration if democracy was not 
restored. Further, he implied that he would not rule out 
tougher sanctions, but that the diplomatic initiatives 
being undertaken by the U.N. and OAS should be allowed to 
take effect first. It is at this time also that President 
Aristide made a public call for a non-violent return to 
power, thereby formally eliminating at this time any 
opportunity for U.S. military intervention.7'
During this period the Administration reemphasized its 
concern with the economic, as opposed to political, 
situation in Haiti. The President linked the restoration 
of democracy in Haiti with "a program of genuine economic 
progress."76 On this same day, during a background 
briefing with senior Administration officials, the concern 
with pace and the restoration of democracy in Haiti was 
again stressed: "it was an excellent meeting in the sense 
that both presidents saw this as a partnership, that we're 
beginning a process here of pushing the negotiation much 
more seriously, much more vigorously within the context of 
a U.N.-OAS international approach. . . .',77 Definitive
statements were also made by the Administration concerning 
the request by the press for a "date-certain" being set for 
President Aristide's return: "President Clinton indicated 
to President Aristide that he did not think it was
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advisable for the United States to be setting any 
particular date-certain. This is a U.N.-OAS-led 
negotiation, the timing of a new government in Haiti and 
President Aristide's return will be set by that 
negotiation.*’7* That the Administration's plan had 
President Aristide's public and formal approval was 
demonstrated when President Aristide was asked if the 
Administration's plan was satisfactory to him. He replied 
simply: "Totally."71*
However, news items during this period continued the 
framing of events in the same manner as before. The arrest 
of the soldier granted asylum was used to highlight the 
press perceived problems with the policy of direct returns. 
Although both the Clinton Administration and President 
Aristide were in agreement about U.S.-Aristide roles in the 
restoration of democracy in Haiti, the press advanced a 
different frame through which to view the various events.
On the day of the meeting between Presidents Clinton and 
Aristide, the Hew York Times ran a story that highlighted a 
conception that ran oppositional to the "vigorous pace" 
maintained by the Administration: Aristide was reported as 
being "perhaps" and "maybe" disappointed "with the pace of 
diplomatic activity intended to return him to the 
presidency of Haiti."*0 Along these same lines, the New 
York Times headline and by-line read: "Haitian is Offered 
Clinton's Support on an End to Exile: But No Deadline is
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Cited: In Pledging to Restore Aristide, U.S. Avoids Strong 
Steps, Fearing New Violence."®1 Yet a thorough search of 
White house documents and the WCPD revealed no 
administrative utterances suggesting a fear of provoking 
violence by coup-leaders; in fact, senior level 
administrative officials were remarkably candid in 
describing the potential of a "win-win" situation for all 
parties. Moreover, we see the media obsession with a 
"date-certain" for Aristide's return: "But Mr. Clinton 
refused to set a deadline by which Washington would demand 
Father Aristide's return to power as President."82 Yet the 
reason for not setting a "date-certain" is not provided. 
During this period of time the New York Times also made it 
clear that it still viewed all refugees coming from Haiti 
as political refugees: "The administration angered many 
Haitians when Mr. Clinton reversed his campaign pledge to 
allow political refugees asylum."83
From the Aristide visit forward, the Administration 
moved through a period of relative calm with respect to the 
situation in Haiti. Throughout April 1993, the President 
and his Administration continued the framing devices they 
had used during the previous months. The situation in 
Haiti was a foreign policy issue; direct returns was a 
humanitarian policy; the Haitian refugees were primarily 
economic, not political; and the restoration of democracy 
was predicated upon President Aristide's return.
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On 13 April 1993, George Stephanopoulos was asked 
about the possibility of sending U.S. troops into Haiti.84 
Stephanopoulos replied that the U.S. was not considering 
sending U.S. troops, but as President Clinton had stated 
earlier, the U.S. would participate in a limited way in the 
professionalization of Haiti's military and police force 
once the U.N. and OAS had worked out an agreement for 
Aristide's return. Stephanopoulos concludes his remarks on 
Haiti by reaffirming the Administration's commitment to a 
negotiated settlement and the belief that the negotiations 
would be successful.8' Just six days later Stephanopoulos 
was again asked about the possibility of sending U.S. 
troops into Haiti. He reiterated the Administration's 
position that U.S. troops would not be sent; however, the 
Administration was still "prepared to help assist the 
professionalization of the Haitian military after an 
agreement [had been reached to return Aristide}."86
By late April 1993 the press was still questioning the 
efficacy of the Administration's policy. Indeed, during 
one press conference the President was told that his 
diplomatic initiative was "on the verge of collapse" and 
perhaps nothing short of miliary intervention could help.87 
However, the President disagreed, stating that this is not 
what he has been told, and that the diplomatic process was 
working. This position was echoed by Dee Dee Myers in an 
29 April 1993 press briefing; "On Haiti, I think we're
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still committed toward restoring democracy in Haiti, to
restoring President Aristide. I think that process is
ongoing and I think we are making progress there."®* This
articulation of optimism and progress was continued
throughout the month of May as well.*9
Progress, however, is often made by prompting others
to move, and on 3 June 1993 President Clinton found it
necessary to adjust his policy by issuing proclamation 6569
which bans from entry into the United States any Haitian
National felt to be actively working to impede the progress
of the negotiations. Moreover, on 4 June 1993 the
President hinted at the "possibility of creating a
worldwide sanctions program against Haiti. ,,9° This is also
the first time that the President had explicitly linked the
restoration of democracy to a larger United States concern:
One of the cornerstones of our foreign policy is 
to support the global march toward democracy and 
to stand by the world's new democracies. The 
promotion of democracy, which not only reflects 
our values but also increases our security, is 
especially important in our own hemisphere.91
The President's statement stressed once again the
Administration's view of the negotiation process.
Sanctions did not indicate a setback, but were viewed as
strong messages in the ongoing political dialogue. For
Clinton, while progress was still being made on some
fronts, those parties in Haiti who were not willing to
negotiate must now suffer specific sanctions. These
sanctions were surgical in nature; they were designed to
138
target specifically the top Haitian leaders. As an unnamed
senior Administration official stated: "we've gone after
the top leadership in the de facto regime and in the top of
the Army."92 Furthermore, the sanctions were a specific
tool used to keep the progress moving in the negotiations
to return President Aristide to power: the "sanctions are a
tactic. They're a tool to try to accomplish a goal. And
our goal here is a negotiated solution.,,,J The importance
of the perception of a continuation of progress is imparted
by the Administration later in this background briefing.
After stating that the sanctions are just a tactic to keep
the pace of negotiations moving, the senior Administration
official makes it clear what is meant:
I think we feel very, very comfortable that we've 
moved this thing very rapidly, and when we hit a 
snag you're seeing the determination not to allow 
it to stall out. This is a sign that the 
administration intends to keep this thing moving.
We're talking moving as rapidly as we possibly 
can. And I don't mean that— I don't want to see 
some story saying, therefore I was evasive and 
it's going to be slow.*4
The press response to these increased sanctions was 
ambivalent at first. On the one hand, the surgical nature 
of the new sanctions pleased the press; on the other hand, 
the possibility of imposing further sanctions, including 
oil, was not acceptable. After detailing that U.S. 
Administration officials had made the announcement about 
increased sanctions and the possibility of a U.N./OAS oil 
embargo, the Washington Post reported the following: "But
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yesterday's announcement was aimed at punishing 
individuals, not the general Haitian population widely seen 
as paying the highest price since the OAS imposed sanctions 
after Aristide's ouster."9* Indeed, the press seemed bent 
toward proclaiming the harmful effects of the sanctions 
upon Haiti's poor, and the inconsequential effects upon the 
leaders: "The OAS sanctions were widely criticized as 
punishing the poorest Haitians--many of whom are supporters 
of Aristide--while being ineffectual in swaying the 
military. "96
The press response to the Administration's continuing
negotiation is reflected in little but passing coverage.
However, on 3 June 1993, the New York Times reported that
the President in May had acknowledged that his policy in
Haiti had failed:
Referring to the Haitian military's rejection 
last month of an America-backed United Nations 
plan to deploy an international peace force 
there, Mr. Clinton acknowledged that his policy 
had failed. . . .
Mr. Clinton's Haitian policy is still unclear. 
Mr. Clinton has continued the Bush administration 
policy of forceable [sic] repatriation of 
Haitians seeking political asylum.97
This new line of reasoning--a failed policy evidenced only
by a single failure/event— surfaced again in the New York
Times on 5 June 1993: "In a tacit acknowledgement that its
diplomacy has failed to restore Haiti's democratically
elected government, the Clinton Administration today
imposed sanctions. . . .,,w Yet nowhere in the
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administrative responses is this angle taken. It was made 
quite clear by administrative officials, and President 
Clinton, that the tactic of increased sanctions was only 
that, a tactic to keep the negotiation process moving 
forward.
In early June the Administration was ordered by a 
Federal Court to release the Haitians held in Guantanamo.
In a 9 June 1993 press briefing. Dee Dee Myers stated that 
the Administration would comply with the judge's order. On 
17 June 1993, Clinton publicly commented upon the 
possibility of a multinational peace-keeping force in 
Haiti; he stressed that "President Aristide rejected it and 
the de facto government rejected it. . . .,,w The
President also stressed that he personally believed it 
would be necessary due to the amount of distrust between 
the parties. President Clinton also mentioned the 
possibility of an oil embargo to help force the pace of 
negotiations.
On 30 June 1993, the President issued Executive Order 
No. 12775 which effectively blocked Haitian Nationals from 
using U.S. based funds and materials to aid the de facto 
regime in Haiti; it also prohibited: "the sale or supply, 
by United States persons, of from the United States, or 
using U .S .-registered vessel or aircraft, of petroleum or 
petroleum products or arms and related materials of all 
types. . . ."11,1 The President stressed that the measures
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were taken in response to the United Nation's Security 
Council's call, and that they were representative of the 
United States' commitment to the restoration of President 
that Aristide and Democracy to Haiti. On 3 July 1993, an 
accord was signed by the military leaders of Haiti and 
President Aristide setting a date for his return to Haiti.
Summary
Two very different narratives emerged during the first 
half of 1993. The Clinton Administration narrative about 
Haiti had its genesis in the Bush Administration policy.
The Bush policy had set the stage in several important 
respects. First, it stressed cooperation with the U.N. and 
OAS; the United States would work with, but not lead the 
negotiations for President Aristide's return. Second, 
President Bush began the policy of direct returns. This 
policy was founded upon a humanitarian component. Returns 
were made to prevent massive loss of Haitian lives through 
a mass relocation via unseaworthy boats. Third, the Bush 
Administration had maintained that the Haitian refugees 
were primarily economic, not political in nature. Finally, 
the Bush Administration began the expansion of asylum 
screening in Port-au-Prince.
The Clinton Administration's Changes
When Bill Clinton took office, he inherited the Bush 
Administration policy on Haiti. The President quickly 
announced his own policy on the matter; in effect.
142
President Clinton adopted the previous Administration's 
policy, modified it, and made it his own. In his first 
formal utterance concerning Haiti, made as President-elect, 
Bill Clinton outlined three broad goals of his Haitian 
policy. First, he was committed to the restoration of 
democracy. Throughout the first half of 1993 it became 
apparent that this was a complex goal. The restoration of 
democracy was predicated upon a working partnership with 
the U.N. and OAS. The Administration was committed to a 
negotiated solution to the problems facing Haiti. The U.S. 
was a team player, not the leader here. Negotiations were 
to be carried out in such a manner that everyone— President 
Aristide and the coup leaders— would be convinced that 
human rights would be respected. This aspect of policy 
hinged upon the deployment of a U.N./OAS human rights 
monitoring team in Haiti. The Clinton Administration 
relayed the impression that negotiations were "moving 
forward" and that the "pace" was "quickening" through 
"heightened negotiations." The impression of movement was 
important to maintain because negotiated settlements take 
time.
Second, the Clinton Administration seemed to have a 
sincere commitment to saving human lives. This reasoning 
directly underpinned the continuation of the original Bush 
policy of direct returns. The President made this policy 
his own. He was committed to avoiding a "humanitarian
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tragedy" and the "tragic loss of life" that was sure to 
follow if there were a massive flotilla of refugees leaving 
Haiti. It was apparent that such a flotilla would leave 
once Bill Clinton took office, thus he made Bush's policy 
his own in an effort to stem the tide.
Third, the Clinton Administration was committed to 
fair treatment for political refugees. In-Haiti refugee 
processing was accelerated; application processing time 
went from eight weeks to one. The President opened 
processing centers outside of Port-au-Prince, thereby 
making it easier for potential refugees to apply for 
asylum. The President also increased the number of INS 
officers in Haiti. The placement of the U.N./OAS human 
rights monitoring team helped to provide an atmosphere in 
which potential refugees would not fear for their safety 
when applying for asylum.
The Press Framing of Administrative Utterances
The narrative of the press was quite different. The 
papers combined seven elements that acted to underpin their 
narrative of the situation. First, they continually 
highlighted alleged "roadblocks" in the Administration's 
push for a negotiated settlement in Haiti. For example, 
the Haitians in Guantanamo were continually referred to in 
such a manner as to imply that all political refugees were 
denied entry into the U.S.; in fact, they were only
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excluded due to the legal restriction barring HIV infected 
person from immigrating into the United States.
Second, the press continually made President Clinton's 
apparent campaign pledge reversal an icon for refugee 
mistreatment. This was always used to report upon the 
humanitarian aspect of the situation in Haiti. Ultimately 
the reversal was ascribed to potential political fallout 
from South Florida. The humanitarian considerations 
advanced by the Administration were not valid options for 
the press. It was inhumane to keep them out because they 
were being politically oppressed and because candidate- 
Clinton had promised to let them in.
Third, the press constantly asserted that the Haitian 
refugees were political. Any consideration given to their 
economic status was always secondary in importance and 
prominence. This assumption was in part relayed through 
the use of the terms "forced reparation" and forced 
returns." The Administration referred to the returns as 
"direct returns." Too, the press referred to the 
deployment of U.S. ships to interdict fleeing Haitians as a 
"blockade" even when Administration officials continually 
stressed that a blockade was not in effect.
Fourth, the press continually assumed U.S. leadership 
in the negotiation process. This acted to belittle the 
role and legitimacy of the U.N. and OAS. It also acted to 
belittle the role that President Aristide played in the
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negotiation process. The key players in the drama were 
President Aristide, the Haitian coup leaders, the Clinton 
Administration, the U.N. and the OAS. The United States is 
a member state in the OAS and was only facilitating the 
negotiations. Yet the press continued to blame delays in 
action on the lack of resolve of the Clinton 
Administration. This U.S. focus is perhaps best 
illustrated with the media prompting to use U.S. troops to 
restore Aristide every time there was a slowdown in the 
pace of negotiations.
Fifth, the press consistently reported that the OAS 
sponsored embargo was only hurting Haiti's poor.
Sixth, the press consistently maintained that the 
policy of direct returns was illegal. This was predicated 
upon two points. One, candidate-Clinton had denounced the 
policy as illegal while he was running for office. Two, a 
Federal Appeals Court had ruled the policy as illegal. 
Minimized was the important fact that the Administration 
had been granted a stay of the lower court's ruling and 
that the policy was to be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Seventh, the press maintained a point of view that 
upheld the right of any immigrant, for any reason, to enter 
this country. The underlying assumption is that anyone 
wishing to enter the country must be fleeing from political 
oppression. In Haiti, however, the descriptions of 
political oppression are not well documented by the press,
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and two presidential administrations state plainly that 
there is a minimal amount of political oppression.
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CRISIS ERUPTS: ANALYSIS, PART TWO
The Governors Island Agreement: Initial Success 
On 1 July 1993 the White House issued a statement that 
contained details of a $37.5 million economic aid package 
for Haiti that would begin once an agreement returning 
President Aristide to power had been reached. Called the 
Haiti Reconstruction and Reconciliation Fund, it was 
developed to support continued negotiations and a "phased 
political solution" to the restoration of democracy in 
Haiti.1 Furthermore, the aid package was designed to 
"respond to concrete progress toward restoring democracy."'1 
The signing of the Governors Island agreement by President 
Aristide and General Cedras, the military high commander of 
Haiti, who represented the de facto regime occurred on 3 
July 1993. This agreement set the date for restoring 
President Aristide to power: 30 October 1993. The press 
lauded this event and coverage during the early part of 
July focused upon the details of implementation, the 
unusual problems facing Haiti, and the successful return of 
Aristide. The Clinton Administration was
uncharacteristically laconic concerning the signing of the 
accord.
Throughout the period after the signing, the 
Administration stressed its cooperation with the 
international community. On 30 August 1993, a senior 
Administration official reported that the U.S. was working
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with other Caribbean states to insure the proper 
implementation of the Governors Island agreement, and once 
again reiterated the economic rebuilding plan.1 on 30 
September 1993, progress seemed apparent on implementation 
of the accord, so the United Nations, with the cooperation 
of the Clinton Administration, suspended sanctions--but did 
not terminate them. On 12 October 1993, President Clinton 
sent a letter to Congressional leaders that detailed the 
chain of events leading to the signing of the agreement. 
This letter stressed that the United States was continuing 
to work in conjunction with the U.N. and OAS, and that the 
United States government was continuing the state of 
National Emergency until President Aristide was returned 
safely to power. In short, the Administration announced 
its continuing role as a partner within the international 
community. It did not seek recognition as the driving 
force behind the successful signing of the accord. The 
Administration did, however, stress its "leadership role 
with the international community."4 The state of National 
Emergency for the United States was continued, said the 
President, until all conditions of the agreement were met.'1 
Economic Aspects
Following the signing of the Governors Island 
agreement, the New York Times coverage focused increasingly 
upon the economic situation within Haiti; these reports 
contained many specific references to the economic
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component of the agreement. Of course, the paper also
elaborated upon the other components of the agreement, but
the focus upon the economic was in strong contrast to the
near absence of coverage of the Haitian economy prior to
the signing of the agreement. For example, on the day of
the signing, 3 July 1993, Haiti was described by the New
York Times as the "hemisphere's poorest country."6
Following the signing of the Governors Island Agreement,
the New York Times described Haiti as a "desperately
impoverished country" with an "economy near collapse."7
Haiti, in short, was now described as a "desperately poor
country."* Or, in the Washington Post's characteristic
description, an "impoverished Caribbean nation."*'
The New York Times offered an interesting explanation
for Haiti's economic situation:
The most immediate explanation for Haiti's 
current suffering is an international oil embargo 
imposed only last month by the United Nations. 
Although it forced the army to accept a political 
accord providing for Father Aristide's return, it 
has also had a crushing effect on almost 
everyone.11
The Washington Post stressed Haiti's impoverished 
conditions, but did so in a manner that strongly linked it 
to the 1991 military coup: "21 months of military-backed 
rule and economic hardship in the hemisphere's poorest 
nation."11 The Washington Post's description contains 
narrative linkages similar to those of the New York Times's 
account:
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The Haitian economy, poverty-stricken in the best 
of times, has been devastated by the embargo and 
the pariah status of de facto governments since 
the coup. I might add that even as the Haitian 
economy improves, most Haitians are still going 
to aspire to emigrate to the United States and 
Canada.13
Military Training and the Administration's Motives
Following the signing of the accord, the press also 
reported upon those components of the Governors Island 
Agreement which addressed the professionalization of 
Haiti's military and the establishment of a civilian police 
force. Reports about the number and type of U.S. military 
personnel to be involved were misleading, however. For 
instance, it was initially reported that the U.S. did not 
want to "have a large military or police force in Haiti 
because any American military presence in the region is 
politically sensitive."1* Yet as details of the exact 
numbers and types of American military personnel were 
reported, the Hew York Times implied a larger presence of 
military troops as opposed to trainers. For example, it 
was reported that the contingent would consist of U.N. 
forces comprised primarily of "hundreds of experts with 
expertise in police work and military affairs . . . most of
them drawn from French-speaking countries."14 However, 
once the exact number of troops were known, the exact 
composition of the force became ambiguous, and even a 
matter for speculation. For instance, on 22 July 1993, the 
New York Times stated: "The United States has offered to
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send about 350 troops and military engineers to Haiti as 
part of an international force to help retrain Haiti's army 
and work on military constructions projects. . . . ",s
However, in the same story, the U.S. was said to be sending 
”50 to 60 military trainers" to help professionalize the 
army. It was also reported that the U.S. was "also 
prepared to send a separate contingent of about 3 00 Army 
engineers as part of a larger team to work on a number of 
military construction projects. . . . "  On 23 July 1993, 
the New York Times reported that the United States had 
"offered about 350 United States military personal, 
including engineers, to assist in 'modernizing the armed 
forces of Haiti. . . ,'"16 The Washington Post, however,
more accurately described the American contingent: "Army 
engineers or Navy Seabees— perhaps as many as 3 00. . .
Further, it was "understood that the U.S. military team 
'won't be combat troops or peace keepers. . . .'",7
During this time, too, the New York Times ascribes
motives to President Clinton for having worked so
diligently for the restoration of democracy in Haiti:
Embarrassed by his own inaugural about-face on a 
campaign promise to change the way Haitian 
refugees were treated after being intercepted on 
the high seas, Hr. Clinton set out to press for 
the restoration of Haitian democracy and return 
the country's leftist young leader [Aristide] to 
power. ’*
on the question of refugees the Washington Post suggested, 
as of the signing of the agreement, that the U.S. was the
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guarantor of the Governors Island agreement and thus 
“implicitly attests to the fact that life under the present 
regime is unlivable. If that deal collapses, there would 
be no question about Haitians being genuine candidates for 
political asylum.
Crisis Erupts
On 11 October 1993, the U.S.S. Harlan Countv. carrying 
U.S. and Canadian military trainers, was not able to dock 
in Port-au-Prince due to mob activity. The military 
personnel carried within the vessel were military trainers 
and engineers that both President Aristide and the de facto 
regime had requested per the Governors Island agreement.
On 12 October 1993 a senior Administration official 
provided a background briefing to the press on this 
interruption to the Governors Island agreement. During 
this briefing, the Administration official reiterated 
President Clinton's commitment to a negotiated solution and 
the use of sanctions in conjunction with the U.N. and OAS. 
Also stressed was the progress made to this point: a new 
government had begun to be installed and a new Prime 
Minister— Malval— had been sworn into office. Furthermore, 
President Aristide had granted top coup leaders amnesty for 
political crimes.
The Nature of the Mission
The Administration official also explained the nature 
of the U .S .S Harlan Countv's mission. It was a "technical
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assistance mission" to retrain police and military
personnel, and to rebuild Haiti's crumbled infrastructure.
The United States had planned to send approximately 600
military trainers and Seabees to start the retraining and
rebuilding process. The entire affair rested upon the
cooperation of the Haitian authorities; as the
Administration official stressed, this was a "cooperative
mission." According to the Administration, the nature of
the mission was important to consider: "This . . .  is not,
has never been a peacekeeping, peacemaking mission. It is
a technical assistance mission which depends upon an
environment in which that can go forward."71’ During this
briefing the press mentioned the possibility of sending in
U.S. marines to create a stable environment. The senior
Administration official responded in a manner that should
have stopped further speculation:
That [the sending in of U.S. troops] is not 
something that is constitutional within the 
Haitian constitution. It is not something that 
Aristide has ever wanted to happen.
For Aristide to return on the backs of the 
United States, or any other army, is to undermine 
his legitimacy as President. It is not something 
we have discussed.n
Immediately following this briefing, Dee Dee Myers 
held a press briefing about the Haitian situation. During 
this time, she reiterated the Administration's commitment 
to the Governors Island agreement. She pointed out that 5 
of the 10 steps in the agreement had already been 
implemented and that the U.S. was concerned about the
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possibility of another "humanitarian crisis" due to the 
present situation. During this briefing the press raised 
several issues. The first of these revolved around the 
issue of a blockade around Haiti. Myers replied that the 
U.S. was looking to reimpose sanctions only. Myers also 
restated that the President would "not send U.S. forces in 
there unless they're able to protect themselves in the 
environment. But he won't send them into an unsecured 
environment, either."” The press asked about national 
pride: "doesn't it look as though we cut an ran [sic] when 
a couple of thugs made noise on a pier in Haiti?" Myers 
replied with same theme expressed earlier by the senior 
Administration official: "Absolutely not. This was not a 
peacekeeping mission. This is part of an ongoing process. 
Our objective now is to get that process . . . back on
track."”
In a statement issued by the Press Secretary this same 
day, a continuation of the Administration's previous 
utterances was given. In this statement the mission of the 
U.S. the troops was stressed:
The American military's part in this effort is 
to help in the task of professionalizing the 
Haitian military through non-lethal training in 
basic military skills and through humanitarian 
assistance, by means of civic action construction 
programs. The only U.S. military role is in the 
military professionalization and humanitarian 
assistance effort, a non-confrontational role.
The mission of U.S. military personnel is not to 
maintain security in Haiti. This is a technical 
assistance— not a peace-making or peace-keeping- 
-mission.24
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On this same day, 12 October 1993, President Clinton 
made a brief statement as he was leaving the White House. 
The President reasserted that the troops were not peace­
keepers or peace-makers. Moreover, the President stressed 
that the U.S. had been invited to play this role by 
President Aristide and the de facto government. 
Nevertheless, once the U.S. tried to fulfil its commitment, 
it was was not allowed to do so; thus the ship left. The 
press asserted that the Governors Island agreement might 
now be "dead" or "abrogated." The President responded:
(I] do not think it is dead. I still think it 
will come back to life. But right now it has 
been abrogated by people who have decided to 
cling to power for a little bit longer apparently 
once the pressure of the sanctions has been off.
I want the Haitians to know that I am dead 
serious about seeing them honor the agreement 
that they made.2-'
On 13 October 1993, Dee Dee Myers held another press
briefing. At this time she refuted press claims that the
Administration was unprepared for the events on the dock:
It was our expectation and it's still our 
expectation that the [Haitian] military will work 
to secure the environment. Instead they stood by 
and allowed the demonstrators to demonstrate and 
kept the embassy personnel from reaching the 
docks.26
The point was, the Haitian military was expected to secure 
the area and provide a secure environment for U.S. and 
international trainers to work in; that was not the role 
U.S. troops were expected to play. The Clinton 
Administration contended that whether or not they suspected
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trouble or knew about the mob, they still had to try to 
honor the agreement. Myers ended her discussion about 
Haiti by noting the "direct action" that the Administration 
was taking in response to the breaking of the agreement: 
sanctions would be reimposed as soon as possible.
In summary, the Administration's position was that the 
leaders of the de facto government had failed to live up to
their part of the Governors Island agreement. The de facto
leaders had broken their promise to maintain order and 
provide a secure environment for U.S. and Canadian military 
personnel. The Administration stressed the non- 
confrontational role of the military engineers and 
trainers; thus the withdrawal of the ship was not a 
retreat, or a policy crisis, but a prudent decision. If
the agreement was not soon honored, then the Clinton
Administration would call for the immediate reimposition of 
sanctions.
Initial Press Responses
By 14 October 1993, the press was beginning to raise 
the issue of President Clinton's Somalia policy in 
conjunction with events in Haiti. Demonstrators were 
reported in Port-au-Prince as chanting "we will turn this 
into another Somalia." It is true that the President had 
inherited the Bush Administration's policy on Somalia as 
well as Haiti; however, President Clinton refused to accept 
the analogy and thus was quick to point out that Somalia
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was a very different situation: he argued that Somalia was 
a peace-keeping mission, Haiti was not. During a brief 
exchange with reporters the President stated that he "was 
not about to put 200 American Seabees into a potentially 
dangerous situation for which they were neither trained nor 
armed to deal with at that moment."17 For the President, 
it did not matter if the mob on the dock was encouraged by 
events in Somalia, because all they had to do was look at 
how the U.S. and U.N. bolstered their forces there; i.e., 
the sanctions would be reimposed and perhaps strengthened.
The day the U.S.S. Harlan Countv was scheduled to 
reach Port-au-Prince, the Washington Post reported upon 
recent criticism surrounding President Clinton's foreign 
policy. The criticism, according to the Washington Post, 
was due in large part to the recent (early October) fire- 
fight in Somalia in which 18 American soldiers were killed 
and 75 were wounded. These casualties acted as a catalyst 
for Congressional criticism about U.S. military involvement 
in all U.N. missions: Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti. in 
general, it was asked, "to what extent should U.S. troop 
deployment be guided by U.N. decisions?"2* In addition to 
raising the issue of national sovereignty, Congress was 
also concerned that it was not being fully briefed about 
deployment of U.S. troops in U.N. missions.
The explanation for the motivation behind the port-au- 
Prince demonstration and defiance of the U.N. mission was
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ascribed, by the New York Times, to remarks made by 
anonymous diplomats and Haitian analysts: one, the Haitians 
were emboldened by the knowledge that the U.N. force was 
lightly armed and ordered not to intervene; and two, a 
"flurry of opposition in Washington to international 
peacekeeping engagements" left them feeling secure that the 
U.S. would not intervene.29 As the Washington Post 
reported: "U.S. officials acknowledge that the opponents of 
Aristide clearly were encouraged by reaction in this 
country to the killing of Americans in Somalia."10 Again, 
no sources or quotes were given to validate this assertion.
The concern with Somalia was a common theme running 
through the explanations of the press. As the Washington 
Post stated, "Congress, already wary of U.S. involvement in 
the U.N. peace-keeping mission in Somalia, [is] raising 
concerns" about Haiti and future U.S. involvement.11 The 
New York Times reported that Congress was concerned because 
the Administration was not briefing them fully about U.S. 
troop involvement in Haiti. Indeed, the Administration was 
reported, anonymously, as saying that the "decision to 
remove the ship was also influenced by the public and 
Congressional reaction to the death of American soldiers 
serving . . .  in Somalia."12 Although the Administration 
had been extremely clear in stating that the U.S. and 
Canadian forces were not peace-makers or peace-keepers, the 
concern over the safety of the U.S. troops loomed large in
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the press. The New York Times even went so far as to quote 
an anonymous senior Administration official as stating that 
if it were not for the recent event in Somalia that the 
demonstration would not have taken on the importance that 
it did.
The removal of the ship itself caused some concern as 
well. The New York Times reported that "the lack of a 
prompt response to the defiance of the Haitian military has 
brought a mood of despondency to many of the diplomats [in 
Haiti].11 The dateline read "Haiti, Oct. 12— ."
Therefore, less than 24 hours after the U.S.S. Harlan 
County turned back, the New York Times implied that there 
was not a speedy response from the Administration to the 
demonstration. Moreover, the removal of the ship was 
characterized as an American retreat by the press. The New 
York Times reported that the "American troopship was forced 
to retreat in the face of a small mob on a Port-au-Prince 
dock. . . . "  Even though the Administration was reported 
as saying that the demonstration had not caused a threat to 
the safety of U.S. personnel, the image of the "American 
troopship retreat[ing] over the horizon" was given for 
readers to ponder.14 Moreover, it was reported that 
Western diplomats in Haiti "expressed outrage that the 
United States had . . . capitulated in the face of
opposition by the Haitian military. . . . "11 Too, this
"abrupt withdrawal" would hurt efforts at restoring
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democracy and could imperil foreigners living or sojourning 
in Haiti. The Washington Post conveyed similar views. The 
removal of the ship was reported as "infuriating U.N. and 
Haitian officials," but no sources were provided.
The New York Times editorial of 13 October 1993 called 
for a get tough attitude. The Administration was 
importuned to reimpose immediately the sanctions that had 
been lifted in August in accordance with the Governors 
Island agreement. The editorial stated: "It was those 
sanctions— fully supported by Haiti's poor majority, 
despite the pain it caused them— that finally forced the 
recalcitrant military to the bargaining table.
Accordingly, the editorial advised the Administration to 
strengthen the sanctions, even to the point of a naval 
blockade, "in other words, complete isolation from the 
international community."17 In contrast, the Washington 
Post continued its negative comments about sanctions.
Indeed, the paper still decried the initial sanctions as a 
"crippling embargo on Haiti, already the hemisphere's 
poorest nation."1H Despite this criticism, the Washington 
Post seemed to acknowledge their effectiveness for "with 
oil supplies exhausted and the economy grinding to a halt" 
the de facto regime had signed the Governors Island 
agreement. On this same day, however, the Washington Post 
editorially stated that U.S. troops should not fight their
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way into Port-au-Prince, but foreclosed other forms of
intervention as well:
Nor are the alternatives very promising.
Economic sanctions have already destroyed many of 
the legitimate businesses in Haiti, and the 
burden of a renewed blockade would fall most 
heavily on the poor, who strongly support 
President Aristide. 9
The theme was dilemmatic. While the Washington Post did
credit the sanctions with helping to pressure the de facto
regime into signing the accord, it reported horrors that
made the sanctions appear a morally Pyrrhic victory for the
Administration: the "oil embargo caused crippling gasoline
shortages and threatened to bring the economy to a halt."41'
Rarely was it mentioned that the Clinton Administration fed
over 680,000 Haitians a week and provided free basic
medical care to alleviate the impact of the embargo. A
Washington Post "news analysis" story summed up the paper's
position well: "the embargo, while having relatively little
effect on Haiti's military rulers, wrecked what was left of
the island's economy and launched the phenomenon of tens of
thousands of boat people trying to reach the United
States. "41
Press Descriptions
Prom the time of the 11 October 1993 dockside 
demonstrations the press was not consistent in its 
descriptions of the group of Haitians whose demonstrations 
prevented the U.S.S Harlan Countv from to docking. The New 
York Times called them "a small gang of toughs," "angry
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mob," "armed demonstrators," "armed mob, 11 "armed 
civilians," "demonstrators," "Haitians on shore," "raucous 
dockside demonstrat[o r s ]," "several hundred heavily armed 
demonstrators," "small but unruly crowd," "small mob," and 
"thugs." The Washington Post called them "angry mob," 
"angry, armed mob," "armed civilians," "chanting, armed 
civilians," "gang of gun-toting thugs," "gun-waving 
civilians," "Haitians," "mob of armed demonstrators,"
"small gang of toughs," and "the crowd."
Nor was the size and composition of the U.S. and 
Canadian forces consistently reported. The New York Times 
reported several conflicting numbers during the course of 
the four days: "1,300 member force," and "1,600 member
force"; "175 Americans and 25 Canadians," "218 American and 
Canadians," and "194 Americans and 25 Canadians." However, 
the Washington Post reported consistently on this point: 
"1,300 member force" and "193 Americans and 25 Canadians."
President Clinton's Formal Address 
and Its Immediate Response
On 15 October 1993 the President held a press
conference and made his first formal address on the
situation in Haiti. He stressed that the United states had
suffered extreme provocation:
[The U.S.] witnessed a brutal attempt by Haiti's 
military and police authorities to thwart the 
expressed desire of the Haitian people for 
democracy. [U]nruly elements, unrestrained by 
the Haitian military, [had] violently prevented 
American and United Nations personnel from 
carrying out the steps toward that goal.1.
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This address accomplished three goals. First, the 
President stated that U.S. interests were vested in the 
recent Port-au-Prince incident; two, he outlined action 
taken in response to the event; and three, he reiterated 
the purpose of the United States in Haiti. The President 
explained that U.S. interests were most directly involved 
due to the presence of approximately 1,000 U.S. citizens in 
Haiti. There were also the embassy personnel to consider. 
The hemispheric march toward democracy must be continued. 
Finally, a secure environment must be achieved in order to 
prevent Haitians from risking their lives in a risky 
emigration to the U.S. The President stressed that the 
actions taken by his Administration were a continuation of 
actions initiated by the Bush Administration. New actions 
to be taken included reimposition of sanctions, the 
deployment of six United states navy vessels off the coast 
of Haiti to enforce the sanctions, and the placement of a 
company of marines stationed on Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, on 
full alert. The explanation of U.S. interests and new 
actions combined to form the Administration's purpose: "to 
ensure the safety of the Americans in Haiti and to press 
for the restoration of democracy there through the 
strongest possible enforcement of the sanctions."41
The press response to the President's statement 
expressed both continuity and change from its previous 
positions on the situation in Haiti. The emphasis shifted
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to the internal situation within Haiti and the growing
Congressional struggle with the President. The withdrawal
of the U.S.S. Harlan Countv received minor attention after
the President's statement. The issue of the "blockade”
around Haiti also received minor attention, although on 16
October 1993, the New York Times reported that aides to
President Clinton had "encouraged comparisons to the naval
blockade imposed by John F. Kennedy during the Cuban
Missile crisis in 1962.”44 No quotes nor sources were
provided to substantiate this stunning comparison. And on
18 October 1993 a Washington Post editorial stated:
The ships and the blockade are a necessary 
response to the wave of political murders that 
culminated in the shooting of the democratic 
government's minister of justice, Guy Malary.
But economic sanctions alone won't suffice. They 
are a highly indiscriminate instrument and will 
put the heaviest burdens on the poorest and least 
culpable Haitians.4'
The solution to this difficulty is provided by the
Washington Post as well: "Haiti's soldiers must now be
invited— under the duress of these stiff sanctions— to try
again. "4ft
Although the withdrawal of the U.S.S. Harlan County 
slowly faded from concern, prior to making its 
disappearance it was highlighted as a symbol of the 
betrayal of international human rights. The Washington 
Post reported that the "evacuation . . . left the human 
rights monitors and many Haitians who collaborated with 
them feeling angry and abandoned."47 The withdrawal of the
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ship was thus reported as disappointing the human rights 
monitors in Haiti, who had "decided that the dangers [were] 
suddenly too great" so they were leaving as well.4*
Internal Haitian Affairs and the Effects of the Embargo
Most notable following the President's statement was 
the rise in the number of reports that stressed the 
internal situation in Haiti. These reports were linked 
with the sanctions/embargo. For example, the Washington 
Post. on 16 October printed a story that reported that 
Duvalierists were supporting the military to keep President 
Aristide out of Haiti; these actions coincided with the Ton 
Ton Macoutes joining forces with the political attaches who 
were promoting political violence to terrorize poor 
Haitians. Indeed, the Washington Post reported that the 
situation in Haiti was now near anarchy, and that the 
"Haitian rulers" were scrambling to forestall the impending 
U.N. embargo that would further rack the country.4" The 
New York Times reported the new military-backed political 
organizations had "mounted a campaign of intimidation and 
terror, exemplified by the shooting of Justice Minister Guy 
Malary. . . . This deteriorating political situation
was described by the New York Times when it paraphrased 
Haiti's newly appointed Prime Minister, Malval. The Prime 
Minister reportedly had "expressed the fear that Haiti 
would soon fall into total anarchy if there was not a quick 
and peaceful resolution.""1
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The shaky political situation was bolstered by reports 
of the effects of the sanctions/embargo. The New York 
Times reported that the "embargo set to take effect on 
Monday [18 October 1993] will hit a nation so poor that 
more than 850,000 of Haiti's 6.5 million people already 
depend on foreign aid to survive. . . . "s? In addition,
the restorative effects of the sanctions/embargo were 
questioned: "People familiar with Haiti's economy say that 
the international naval blockade that began today may cause 
severe damage but that it is uncertain whether the 
hardships will force the military leaders to restore 
democracy.",1 No sources or quotations were provided for 
this assessment. Later, in the same story, it was reported 
that the effects of the sanctions/embargo would be 
catastrophic, in part because in Haiti's poorest regions 
had women and children "barely holding on to life."
The Washington Post was especially concerned with the 
effects of the sanctions/embargo. It was reported that the 
"military rulers said they would rather fight to the death 
than hand power back to exiled president Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide."M No quotes or sources were provided for this 
statement, however. Additionally, it was asserted that 
during the original sanction period "many of the wealthy 
were able to afford contraband goods, while the poor found 
it difficult to afford even basic foods or cooking fuel. 
Many businesses were forced into bankruptcy, pushing up
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unemployment, which had been above 50 percent."55 On 21 
October 1993, the Washington Post reported upon "growing 
depression and dashed dreams," and the growing resentment 
about "sanctions that are going to make an already 
difficult economic situation impossible for many . . .
[Haitians]."56 This particular article stated, too, that 
many Haitians would suffer from growing food prices and 
lack of money. Indeed, it was reported that workers "said 
almost no one was building boats now, because they had no 
money to pay for the passage, and because there was so 
little hope of getting through the multinational naval 
blockade. ",7
The President's Restatement and the Press Response
On 18 October 1993 during a radio interview President 
Clinton reiterated his stated course of action toward 
Haiti. During this time, too, the President made his first 
formal remarks about the new defense appropriations bill 
that would change the way that the military operated when 
working with NATO and other military allies. Specifically, 
this was a reaction to the concern voiced by members of 
Congress, most notably Senate minority leader, Bob Dole, 
that the President not send in U.S. troops into Bosnia or 
Haiti without Congressional approval. The President 
stated:
[That there] should be no restrictions that would 
undermine the ability of the President to protect 
the Americans on Haiti, that would aggravate the 
likelihood of another mass exodus of Haitians, or
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that would send a green light to the people . . .
[who] broke their word on the Governors Island 
Agreement.58
The President was again asked about the possible use 
of American troops to restore Aristide to power. He 
replied that the Navy ships were to be used to reimpose the 
sanctions only, and that the sanctions would be used 
because they were what produced the original agreement. 
However, the President left open the option of using troops 
in the future if the situation warranted it. In short, he 
would not "rule in or rule out options." The President was 
concerned, however, about the potential for a bill that 
would require him or future Presidents to obtain the 
permission of Congress prior to using troops in either 
Haiti or Bosnia. The President replied: "I want to resist 
and . . .  I urge the Senate not to vote for things which 
unduly infringe on the President's power, and certainly not 
things that are of questionable constitutionality."5' In 
terms of the reports of rising criticism about his foreign 
policy decisions the President stressed that his 
Administration had focused upon the future and was not 
"trying to spend a lot of time establishing partisan blame 
for the past."60 For the President, the "past is past."
On 18 October 1993 the Administration issued a 
statement to the press that basically reiterated the points 
made earlier by the President and his Administration 
officials. On this same date, Dee Dee Myers held a press
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briefing during which she, too, reiterated the 
Administration's position. The President's personal 
statement given on 15 October was now the touch stone from 
which Administration officials conducted affairs. Thus, 
Myers relayed that the President was still concerned, 
restated American interests and recent American actions, 
she also restated that the present course was one of 
reimposition of sanctions, but that the Administration had 
not ruled in or out any other measures, including the use 
of U.S. troops.
The concern over the possible attempt to restrict
Presidential prerogatives was again raised by the press
during a 19 October 1993 press conference. Dee Dee Myers
once again stated that any restriction upon the President's
power would send the signal that the President could not
enforce the sanctions imposed upon Haiti. The obvious
concern was with the arbitrary sending of troops into
battle situations without clear reasons being given to
Congress for their deployment. Also, with the increasing
need for police actions since the demise of the Cold War,
Congress was worried about committing U.S. troops to combat
roles without proper Congressional consultation. Myers
addressed these issues:
I think the President can proactively decide he 
wants to ask Congress's authorization before he 
sends troops, as President Bush did before Desert 
Storm. That is a far cry from restricting the 
President's ability to make that decision. What 
the President objects to is an altering of the
relationship between the Executive and 
Legislative branches and an impingement on his 
constitutional ability to make foreign policy.
[We are] looking for a way to establish a 
working relationship between Congress and the 
President in this post-Cold War world that 
recognizes Congress's concerns but protects the 
President's prerogative to act.ftl
Perhaps to assuage the growing concern in the press
about the possible involvement of U.S. troops, or because
of the growing concern in Congress that could lead to a
showdown over the President's authority to commit U.S.
troops, the President submitted a Letter to Congressional
Leaders on 20 October 1993. In this letter he detailed the
recent actions that his Administration had taken in regard
to Haiti and he ended with a promissory note:
close cooperation between the President and the 
Congress is imperative for effective U.S. foreign 
policy and especially when the United States 
commits our Armed Forces abroad. I remain 
committed to consulting closely with Congress on 
our foreign policy, and I will continue to keep 
Congress fully informed about significant 
deployments of our Nation's Armed Forces.ft2
Haiti. Somalia, and Bosnia
One of the major shifts in the framing of the press
reports involved the linking of the events in Haiti with
those occurring in Somalia and Bosnia. Although the
Washington Post began writing about this prior to the
President's statement, both papers increased their coverage
of this aspect after the address. The New York Times
focused upon Somalia and Bosnia as they relate to the
struggle between Congress and the President over
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Constitutional authority to use U.S. troops. The 
Washington Post did this as well, but took the argument one 
step further by relating it to U.S. foreign policy in a 
post-Cold war world. Either way, the issue of the 
President's Haitian policy was subsumed within a larger 
narrative.
For example, the Hew York Times on 18 October reported 
upon an initiative led by Senator Bob Dole to restrict the 
use of U.S. forces in Haiti. The New York Times wrote that 
this move by Senator Dole "underscores the political price 
that the Clinton Administration is beginning to pay for 
policy stumbles in Somalia and Haiti. They have touched 
off a flood of efforts by a previously passive Congress to 
assert itself on foreign policy."61 The New York Times 
briefly touched upon the larger world concern when it 
reported a quote by an unnamed Senior Administration 
official: "'What is at issue . . .  is not only the 
President's powers, but a more fundamental question of how 
we will remain engaged in the world. The initial 
Congressional reaction on Somalia would have put us in a 
position of hastily retreating from the world.'"64 Reports 
of the next several days focused on a power struggle 
between Congress and the President. President Clinton was 
reported as saying that he would strongly oppose any 
"efforts by members of Congress to restrict his authority 
to commit troops. . . .,|6' Further, doing so would send a
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"green light" to the Haitian leaders to defy the U.N./OAS 
sponsored Governors Island agreement.
Again, some linkage is made with larger than U.S. 
interests. The New York Times stated that Somalia and 
Haiti were "nothing like the Communist threat the country 
grew used to reacting to."66 The new measuring stick 
proposed by the New York Times: "The easiest way to connect 
the dots and draw a coherent foreign policy is to say that 
none of these problems is important enough to risk American 
lives."67 However, these few, and vague, references to a 
larger picture than Congressional/Presidential battling 
over foreign policy is neither exploited nor pursued.
Indeed, the New York Times virtually ignored this aspect 
and instead embraced a partisan political interpretation of 
events. The paper stated editorially that many of the 
Clinton Administration's foreign policy difficulties were 
"inherited by the new Administration" and that the "so- 
called experts" (the Republican Congressional leaders)
"left him a full plate of problems. The least they can do 
now is avoid gratuitous partisan sniping while he wrestles 
with their legacy."611 After only a few days the furor over 
committing U.S. troops died when the Senate forwarded to 
the White House a non-binding resolution that asked the 
President to ask Congress to authorize any troops that the 
President wished to have deployed to Haiti. This 
resolution did not, however, impinge upon the President's
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"broad foreign policy prerogatives as Commander in Chief to 
send in American troops if he deems that it justified [sic] 
by national security interests or that the safety of 
Americans living in Haiti is at stake.,,w
The Washington Post reported this schism between 
Congress and the President in a more cosmic manner. The 
focus was upon a post-Cold War world and the role U.S. 
foreign policy within this brave new world. As early as 14 
October 1993, the Washington Post wrote that the Governors 
Island agreement's collapse "dealt a new blow to President 
Clinton's attempts to demonstrate that he has "a coherent 
foreign policy capable of leading the world community 
toward a post-Cold War era of democracy and stability."7" 
Another article on the same day suggested that in the post- 
Cold War world the U.S. cannot just send the troops in any 
more.71 However, it was maintained that Haiti was not the 
same situation as Somalia; there were U.S. interests and 
well defined policy parameters: the prevention of a new 
flood of boat people to "Florida" and to prevent a 
"humiliating defeat for U.S. commitments."72
On 16 October 1993, the day after the President's 
statement on Haiti, the Washington Post ran a story 
entitled, "Law Makers Seek New Methods to Handle Post-Cold 
War Crises."7’ In this article it was advanced that 
Congress was battling with the President to "change the 
tattered Vietnam-era War Powers Resolution in favor of new
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procedures to deal with post-Cold War foreign policy 
crises."74 The key to what was occurring was the growing 
controversy "over possible or likely military operations in 
Haiti, Bosnia and other trouble spots. . . . [Thus] many
in Congress are concerned that there are not workable 
procedures for prompt and orderly exercise of its war- 
authorizing powers.1,15 The original War Powers Resolution 
required that the President consult with Congress before 
introducing troops into hostile situations and to set a 
deadline for withdrawal if Congress authorized the 
deployment. But with the growing need for multi-national 
deployment of forces for peace-keeping or peace-making 
missions, the Congressional prerogatives of declaring war 
have often been overlooked.
These arguments appear repeatedly in the Washington 
Post's coverage of this issue. In a later story it was 
reported that the trouble in areas such as Bosnia, Somalia, 
and Haiti were actually signs of trouble in the 
Administration's "foreign policy ability and the strength 
of [Clinton's] national security team.,,7ft This article 
faithfully reported the Administration's contentions that 
it had been successful in the larger areas of concern—  
Russia, nuclear arms proliferation, China— but that in 
Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti, where discernable U.S. 
interests were not at stake, there were problems. In 
short, the Washington Post asked, what is America's post-
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Cold War role in the world? The paper even suggested that
there existed a "nostalgia shared by policy makers for the
anti-Soviet framework within which much of the West
operated for four decades."77 The Washington Post
suggested at one point that the Clinton Administration's
foreign policy goal was "the 'enlargement' of democracy
around the world":7*
Despite the sound of things and a vocabulary of 
confrontation that unfailingly recalls the 
intensity of the country's Vietnam agony, we see 
no great crisis unfolding in Washington. There 
is simply a noisy tactical disagreement over what 
is the best mix of economic, political and 
military levers to deal with the rash of post- 
Cold War conflicts, mostly inside particular 
countries, which touch American interests but do 
not touch what people usually mean by vital 
national interests.7’
In short, the problem was a concern with the direction,
coherence, and execution of the Administration's foreign
policy.Hfl This concern with the events in Haiti as
metonymy for the post-Cold War world was continued in the
Washington Post until late October. After the Senate
failed to pass a resolution limiting the President's powers
to wage war, the Washington Post stated:
Democratic [Senate] leaders . . . were preparing
a proposal aimed at coming up with procedures for 
engaging Congress early and often in major 
foreign policy decisions to avoid the kind of 
sudden uproars that arose over Somalia and Haiti. 
They are looking at overhauling the Vietnam-era 
1973 War Powers Resolution to accommodate post- 
Cold War peace-keeping operations.*1
By 26 October 1993 the Washington Post stated that the
concern in Congress was President Clinton's failure to
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"develop a coherent foreign policy, especially for
multinational peace-keeping missions."81
Aristide's Psychological Profile
Around 2 2 October 1993 the press began to make the
contents of a CIA report to Congressional leaders public.
In this report President Aristide was said to have mental
instabilities. The Administration was quick to assert that
the reports may be substantiated or not, but that it did
not really matter. Dee Dee Myers explained the U.S.
position unequivocally:
we have had a lot of dealings with President 
Aristide. He's always appeared in our dealings 
with him responsible [sic]; he's lived up to the 
terms of his commitment; he was elected by the 
people of Haiti. Our interest is in restoring a 
democratically-elected government to that 
country. It is not for us to tell the people of 
Haiti who to elect.83
This issue, however, received thorough coverage from
22 October 1993 through 29 October 1993, particularly from
the Washington Post. Initial reports from the Washington
Post highlighted the Administration's support of President
Aristide: "despite allegations the ousted Haitian leader is
mentally unstable [the Administration said] Aristide's
conduct demonstrated he is fit to govern."M Further, the
Administration was reported as having a stake in the
believability of the CIA reports for it had "expended great
effort trying to restore Aristide to power since the
democratically elected leader was ousted. . . .',8,i
However, the issue soon began to be viewed as a partisan
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concern with the Republicans on one side and the Democratic 
administration on the other. The Washington Post reported 
Vice-President Albert Gore as saying that the "charges are 
'uncorroborated' and are denied by Aristide. . . . 'We
have dealt with [Aristide] for nine months now. He has 
been reliable, he has been very thoughtful, he has been 
persistent in his efforts in behalf on the Haitian people.' 
The charges originated with Aristide's opponents. . . . "**
Later in the same article the Washington Post reported that 
"two prominent Republicans appearing earlier on the same 
program as Gore [had made his statements on] questioned 
Aristide's fitness."*7 By 27 October 1993 the Washington 
Post had solidified its interpretation of the accusations: 
"you can dismiss the CIA's foolish psychologizing [sic]. .
."
The New York Times reached the same conclusion as the 
Washington Post: "It's heartening that Mr. Clinton is 
standing behind Mr. Aristide and has not taken seriously 
that attempt at character assassination by psychobable 
[sic] initiated by some Republican senators during the past 
week. "H'1 The New York Times ran fewer, but similar items 
about Aristide's CIA psychological profile. The Clinton 
Administration was described as at war with itself over its 
Haitian policy, with President Aristide at center stage. 
Congress was described as working with the CIA against the 
State Department and the National Security Council. The
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CIA reports were described as having "spread alarm over
Administration policy on Capital Hill."90 The aspect of
"them vs. us" was further conveyed:
Hr Clinton said the views of Administration 
officials who have worked with Father Aristide to 
help restore him to power carried more weight 
than allegations that officials of the agency 
[CIA] made to members of Congress this week. 1
Imitating the Administration's position that
Aristide's condition is irrelevant because the Haitian
people elected him, the New York Times stated: In Haiti,
"the debate in the United States about the mental health of
their President seems cruelly sterile. After two years of
hardship and violence under military rule, no hope rings
more fervently than for the return of the Rev. Jean-
Bertrand Aristide."92 These reports concerning Aristide's
condition continued sporadically through early November.
On l November 1993 the New York Times reported that
supporters "of Mr. Aristide said that the [CIA] payments
[to Haitian military informants] proved that the C.I.A.'s
primary sources of information in Haiti were Mr. Aristide's
political enemies. "9J Both papers frequently reported the
Administration's defense that President Aristide was
elected by the people of Haiti, so the CIA reports were in
essence, insignificant. By 3 November 1993 the question
was not so much about President Aristide's mental health,
as it was about the CIA's link with Haitian officials:
House and Senate intelligence committees have 
begun probing the CIA's past ties to key Haitian
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political figures, including covert payments to 
Haitian officials for information on local 
politics. . . .
The probes arise from allegations by 
Aristide's congressional supporters that the 
recent unflattering CIA profile of him may have 
been tainted by the CIA's past associations with 
his opponents.
The Internal Situation and the Effects of Sanctions:
The Convergence of Press Framing
Following the President's 15 October 1993 statement, 
the press claimed again that sanctions were hurting poor 
Haitians, and not the de facto government's leaders. The 
President admitted that these types of sanctions always 
hurt the people first, but it was what got the Governors 
Island Agreement in the first place; he also asserted that 
once the "blockade finally hit the regime and the elites .
. . they suffered, too." He also reminded the press that
the embargo was asked for by the Government of Haiti. Yet 
the press had developed its own frame through which it 
advanced its view of the embargo/sanctions. On 22 October 
1993 the Hew York Times reported that Haitians were 
building boats again due to "increasing economic hardship 
and political repression.’*” It was also reported that 
what "is also driving ordinary Haitians to flee is a sense 
that the United Nations embargo against Haiti will hurt 
them the most. In the past, Haitians used to say they were 
fleeing for fear of their lives; now many readily admit 
they will be leaving because of economic hardship.
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On 2 7 October 1993 the New York Times reported on 
possible Administration backing of a French proposal to 
enlarge the sanctions to include all commercial goods.
These sanctions were to be directed, according to the New 
York Times, at "the poor Caribbean nation." Further, the 
"French proposal calls for a blockade against Haiti that 
would prevent virtually all commerce from flowing into and 
out of what is already the poorest country in the Western 
Hemisphere."97 The New York Times called these measures 
"draconian economic measures [that] would further 
impoverish an already desperately poor country."9*
On this same issue the Washington Post reported that 
Prime Minister Malval had said that Aristide's government 
was "'not responsible for the sanctions,' . . .  in an 
attempt to shift responsibility for the hardship to the 
military. 'We have respected all our commitments under the 
agreement, and even gone beyond them.'"99 On this same day 
the U.S. Navy was reported as having interdicted a shipment 
of soy milk and baby cribs. The sanctions are no longer 
credited with having brought the military to the bargaining 
table. Instead, the Washington Post describes 
sanctions/embargoes as "extremely sensitive affairs, since 
they disproportionately hurt the poor, who must get to work 
in order to eat."liw
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The Linking of Internal Situation and Sanctions
Linked closely with the reports on the effects of the 
embargo/sanctions are stories concerned with the internal 
situation in Haiti. Indeed, approximately 25% of the 
stories contained in both papers after Clinton's 15 October 
1993 statement are concerned with this issue. If those 
stories that take as their central focus the effects of the 
embargo/sanctions are included in this count, then a full 
50% of news items are concerned with the internal situation 
in Haiti. In general the papers report upon the continuing 
negotiations between Prime Minister Malval and the army 
leaders. The fear of increased sanctions is generally 
credited with prompting the talks: "Two Sides in Haiti Meet
on Impasse"11"; "Fearful Rural Haitians yearn for 
Aristide's Return"1"’; "After Talks, Haitian Aids Hope for
a Break in the Impasse   and "Haiti's Premier and
General Meet as Drive to Settle Crisis Intensifies."101 
The situation in Haiti was painted as grim: "A proposal by
Haitian legislators to settle [Haiti's] political stalemate 
appeared close to collapse today when gunmen staked out 
Parliament and many deputies, fearing for their lives, 
refused to enter the bu i Id ing . " lil,‘ Contrariwise, the 
situation was at times painted as hopeful: the "11-point 
program put forward by previously anti-Aristide lawmakers 
in Haiti [is] a 'serious effort' to break the deadlock 
caused by the refusal of the [coup leaders] to relinquish
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power. . . . "l(* The New York Times reported that the
Clinton Administration's "biggest problem now is that
Haiti's military leaders . . . apparently think that they
can simply wait the Clinton Administration out until it
losses interest in Haiti, or until it agrees to renegotiate
a new power-sharing accord. "Itn
The Washington Post described Prime Minister Malval's
position in Haiti as "waging war against a de facto regime
in a country he is supposed to be governing."11* The
internal situation with regard to the settlement process
was also highlighted through stories that stressed the
legislative struggle between Aristide's government and the
"military rulers." The Washington Post concluded that a
"political impasse"HW existed. By 26 October 1993, the
Washington Post had developed a standardized version of the
events leading up to the internal struggle:
Aristide, Haiti's first democratically elected 
president, was overthrown in a bloody military 
coup on Sept. 30 1991. Cedras and other military 
officials, under growing international pressure 
and a crippling U.N. oil and arms embargo, agreed 
in July to Aristide's return.
Under an agreement signed July 3 by Aristide 
and Cedras on Governors Island, N.Y., Cedras was 
to resign by Oct. 15, and Aristide was to return 
to Haiti on Oct. 30. . . .
However, Cedras and others refused to resign 
as promised. When the military balked at key 
points in the accord, the United Nations 
reimposed an oil embargo that has virtually 
paralyzed commercial activity and brought the 
already depressed economy to its knees. A 




Reports concerning the possible use of United States 
troops had undergone an interesting transformation. On 2 2 
October 1993 the Washington Post reported Senator Jesse 
Helms as "urging the Clinton administration to abandon its 
plan to send U.S. troops [into Haiti]"; thus implying that 
there were such plans."1 On 2 7 October 199 3 the 
Washington Post suggested that the Clinton Administration 
had only two options: "choose between destroying the 
[Haitian] economy to reimpose democracy or abandoning Haiti 
to its military rulers."111 In the Hew York Times it was 
reported that "American officials have made it clear to 
Father Aristide that there is no possibility of sending
United States troops to Haiti to guarantee his safety in
the event he should return home before a new deal is 
reached. "m
The question of the possibility of using U.S. troops
to restore President Aristide to power is rarely raised
after the end of October. Furthermore, when force is
mentioned, it is dismissed as an option. This is true
despite the fact that President Clinton clearly stated that
he had not ruled out any option. For example, on 6
November 1993 the New York Times mused on the possible
options that the United Nations and the Clinton
Administration possessed to resolve the situation:
[Options] available to the United Nations are
also unattractive. It can strengthen the oil and
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arms embargo imposed on Haiti last month in an 
effort to force the military leaders to leave 
power, or it can explore military actions.
But the embargo has caused more hardship for 
the Haitian people than for its intended victims, 
the military leaders and their supporters. And 
the United States and other key United Nations 
members have shown no inclination to use military 
force."4
On 11 November 1993 the Washington Post reported similar
Administrative inclinations:
The administration, smarting from public and 
congressional criticism of U.S. military 
casualties in Somalia, has said several times it 
has no intention of exposing U.S. soldiers to 
danger in Haiti. Last month, when armed Haitian 
thugs supporting the military threatened to 
attack U.S. military advisors en route to Haiti, 
Clinton ordered the advisor's ship to turn 
around.115
On 25 October 1993 the President responded to a
reporter's question about Bob Dole believing it not worth
one American life to restore Aristide to Haiti. The
President's response is instructive:
[Our] policy is to attempt to restore democracy 
in Haiti, that we are doing it in the way that we 
think is best and that is supported by Aristide 
and Prime Minister Malval. We have ships there, 
and you know what we're doing. And they've never 
asked us to run the country for them.116
Four days later on 29 October 1993, the President issued a
statement on the situation in Haiti. This statement
reiterated the Administration's earlier utterances about
U.S. interests, actions, and purposes in Haiti. It also
stated that President Clinton was firmly committed to
restoration of democracy in Haiti. The New York Times at
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this time reported that the Administration no longer
possessed realistic options:
Administration officials acknowledge that they 
have no good options. They are not prepared to 
use American troops to forcibly reinstall Father 
Aristide. They also have no interest in simply 
turning their backs on the Governors Island 
accord. This leaves them with little choice but 
to step up their rhetorical attacks on the 
Haitian military, tighten economic sanctions and 
wait for the military leaders to cave in.117
By 7 November 1993 the Administration's position
regarding the situation in Haiti had crystallized. When
asked if the embargo on goods entering Haiti should be
strengthened the President agreed. He even suggested that
it could proceed in one of two ways: complete or surgical.
Further, he was again quick to point out that nothing had
been ruled in or out. Even invasion was not ruled out. A
reporter reminded President Clinton that President Bush had
invaded Panama to remove Noriega, so why not invade Haiti
to restore Aristide? The President replied that he did not
want to rule anything in or out, but that both Aristide and
Malval did not want to have U.S. troops invade Haiti.
Sanctions: The Internal Situation in Detail
The end of October saw a continuation of the same
narrative elements that had been used since the President's
15 October 1993 statement. Almost all of the stories
contained in the two papers now focused upon the internal
situation in Haiti and the effects upon Haiti caused by the
embargo/sanctions; in the vast majority of news items the
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stories would combine the two elements. For example, on 30
October 1993 the New York Times, focusing upon a story
about U.N. proposed talks, stated that "tensions are rising
in Haiti, but the military hasn't budged."11* This same
story stated: "The effects of the fuel squeeze can be felt
throughout the country, as electricity has begun to be
tightly rationed and traffic has fallen off sharply. In
addition . . . dead bodies have begun to turn up with
frequency each night in the streets of the capital."11'
This mixing of focus was now common practice and the effect
was to portray the Haitian military leaders as villains.
Commonly, when negotiations were discussed, the conditions
in Haiti brought on by the sanctions/embargo were related
as well. The Washington Post rarely used this same mixing
of genres. For example, on 6 November 1993, the paper drew
a dismal conclusion:
In a clear show of defiance, the Haitian military 
today boycotted high-level talks designed to 
revive the flagging international effort to get 
exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide back into 
office.12(1
The most that is mentioned about the effects of the
sanctions/embargo is this 6 November 1993 example:
The current embargo, enforced by U.S and other 
foreign warships, has ended all sales of gasoline 
and diesel fuel from gas stations here [Port-au- 
Prince, Haiti]. The availability of black-market 
fuel is limited and traffic has slumped to one- 
fifth of its normal level.121
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The New York Times, however, was mixing genres well into
November, and in many instances the reporting of facts and
observations crossed the line into interpretation:
In the three weeks that Haiti has been cut off 
from foreign oil deliveries, this country's 
economy has come to a near halt.
In provincial towns and rural areas, the 
situation is far worse. According to radio 
reports here, Port de Paix, a small city in 
Haiti's grindingly poor northwest, has gone 
without electricity for three weeks.
In the small town of Gantheir . . . suffering
is evident everywhere.
At the town's small medical clinic, the only 
health care center within miles, a white 
ambulance sits idle for lack of gasoline. The 
clinic's pharmacy is almost bare.
[Broadening] the current embargo, which 
President Clinton says he is loath to do, would 
threaten even more Haitians with severe 
malnutrition and disease.
On the other hand, easing up on sanctions 
which now cover oil and arms, would send a signal 
to Haiti's de facto military rulers that after 
two years of diplomacy on Father Aristide's 
behalf, the United Nations and Washington are 
backing away from the goal of restoring him to 
power.122
On 9 November 1993 the questions of the effects of the
sanctions upon the poor of Haiti were once again raised by
the press. The Administration responded with its now
standard response:
The situation in Haiti is . . . quite serious.
The economy there is stalled. But the fault for 
the situation lies with the people there who have 
thwarted the will of the majority, who have 
refused to allow the restoration of democracy, 
who continue to keep that society locked up and 
the economy there disintegrating.121
Furthermore, the Administration acknowledged the hardship
that sanctions placed upon the people of Haiti. It was
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clearly stated that "sanctions Impose a hardship." But the 
Administration also asserted that it provided "massive 
humanitarian assistance" in the form of feeding over 
680,000 people a day, and that it provided medical 
services. Even with this knowledge, the press still asked, 
does the end justify the means?1”
This issue concerning the harm that the sanctions were 
causing, especially to the children in Haiti was 
continually raised by the press. During one news 
conference, the President stated that "the people of Haiti 
need to know that the reason this embargo occurred is 
because of the police chief, Mr. Francois; and because of 
General Cedras; and because they welshed on the Governors 
Island agreement."1”
To answer the attack upon his foreign policy team 
President Clinton asserted the his Administration had been 
"dealing with the central, large, strategic issues of this 
time, dealing with the former Soviet Union, working on 
bringing down the nuclear threat, working on stemming 
nuclear proliferation, working on peace in the Middle East, 
working on putting economics at the forefront of . . .
foreign policy."12*1 On 4 November 1993, Secretary of 
State, Warren Christopher announced the Clinton 
Administration's new six priorities in its foreign policy. 
Notably absent were Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. Instead, 
the Administration choose to focus upon the conditions of
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the post-Cold War world in general: economic security, 
reform in Russia, new framework for NATO, trade relations 
with the Far East, Middle Eastern affairs, and nuclear 
nonproli ferat ion.
The issue of foreign policy was continually stressed
by both papers, although it was relegated to a position of
secondary importance after the effects of the
embargo/sanctions and Haitian internal affairs. The news
items continued the trend toward analyzing the Clinton
Administration's foreign policy approach, but also began to
examine individual players within the Administration's
foreign policy team. For example, on 31 October 1993 the
New York Times printed a story on W. Anthony Lake,
Clinton's national security advisor. In this story Lake
was described as having attempted to explain Clinton's
foreign policy:
The Clinton administration . . .  is the first 
since the Truman administration era that in 
foreign policy 'has not had a single defining 
issue against which it could define itself.' All 
every other Administration had to do, and it was 
not always easy, he said, "was to answer the 
central question: what form will containment of 
the Soviet Union and Communism take?'"127
The same story ends with the New York Times speculating on
the Clinton Administration's role in the world:
The Clintonites do not want to rely on a 
merciless balance-of-power view of the world 
because it is too cynical for Mr. Clinton, but 
they also do not want a foreign policy of rampant 
moralism because they know it can lead to 
crusades they cannot win. So often in places 
like Bosnia or Somalia or Haiti they seem to be
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searching for some third way— between sending 
American troops and doing nothing at all. But 
often there is not third way.15*
A New York Times editorial remarked that "everyone is
groping for a new framework" because no one had "yet
devised a set of guiding principles to guide American
conduct in a radically transformed world. . . . Since
early October 1993 the Washington Post had made the link
with the post-Cold War foreign policy and maintained this
connection; however, increasingly their stories focused
upon key players in the Administration's foreign policy
team: 5 November 1993, Secretary of State Warren
Christopher was reported describing the Administration's
new foreign policy goals; 9 November 1993, Clifton R.
Wharton was profiled after he resigned his post as Deputy
Secretary of State; 10 November 1993, another story which
highlighted Wharton's reason for resigning his post; 10
November 1993, an editorial focused upon Wharton's
resignation; 14 November 1993, a story highlighted
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's style as "hesitant by
design." By the middle of November the situation in Haiti
was not a major foreign policy concern, but part of a
larger foreign policy picture painted by the
Administration:
Taking Haiti off the policy front burner is 
consistent with the administration's recent 
efforts to back off from the troublesome high- 
visibility issues that have brought so much grief 
and to emphasize instead the long-term objectives 
on which senior officials believe their record is
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stronger, such as strengthening democracy in 
Russia.110
Official fault for the failure of the Governors Island 
agreement was given in a 13 November 1993 Letter to 
Congressional Leaders on Haiti. In this letter, President 
Clinton presented a brief history of U.S. involvement with 
Haiti since the 1991 coup and then detailed U.S. 
involvement since the U.S.S. Harlan Countv was turned back 
on 11 October 1993. Fault was laid at the feet of the de 
facto regime: "the Haitian military and police failed to 
maintain order necessary for the deployment of U.S. and 
other forces participating. . . ."ni
As the crisis entered it seventh week in early
December, the Administration was once again echoing its
statements of support for Aristide's return. In press
conferences Administration officials were relating that the
President was optimistic about possible outcomes to the
situation and was dedicated to the continuation of work to
restore Aristide. Further, it was stated that those most
hurt by the sanctions— Haitian poor— were receiving the
most help. By the middle of December 1993 the crisis
situation with Haiti was almost a non-issue, and prompted
an almost jocular tone from the President:
So we're going to take another run at it and see 
if we can do something on it. And it's going to 
require some flexibility on all sides. It just 
is. And we'll just have to see if we can get 
there. We're going to try, hard.1’2
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Summary
The period after the signing of the Governors island 
agreement was a successful one for the Clinton 
Administration. The press lauded the agreement, and the 
international community awaited its implementation. On 11 
October 1993, however, the de facto government failed to 
provide a safe environment for the military trainers and 
engineers to disembark, ultimately forcing the U.5.S .
Harlan County to withdraw. The mob activity that forced 
the ship back was a serious blow to the integrity and 
credibility of the Clinton Administration. A foreign 
policy crisis had erupted, and the Administration acted 
quickly to manage the situation.
The initial utterances of the Administration were of 
an explanatory nature. The cooperative nature of the U.S. 
led, U.N./OAS mission was stressed. It was stated clearly 
and repeatedly by Administration officials that the Haitian 
authorities did not do what they had said they would do;
i.e., provide a secure environment for the deployment of 
U.S. and Canadian military engineers and trainers. At this 
early stage the Administration stressed the "non- 
confrontational" role of the mission; these troops were not 
on a peacekeeping or peacemaking mission. Thus it was 
within the mission's parameters to leave due to the lack of 
a secure environment. At this time as well the 
Administration reiterated its commitment to the Governors
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Island agreement; it stated that it expected the de facto 
government to honor the agreement. Furthermore, the 
Administration would seek to reimpose sanctions upon the de 
facto government as soon as possible.
On 15 October 1993 President Clinton read a short 
statement concerning the situation in Haiti. This 
statement and subsequent press question and answer session 
served as his first and only public and formal reply to the 
incident. Through this address the President sought to 
accomplish three broad goals: one, convey to the American 
public the U.S. interests in Haiti; two, explain the new 
actions the Administration had ordered as a response to the 
incident; and three, explain American's purpose for being 
in Haiti. The primary U.S. interest in Haiti was 
approximately 1,000 U.S. citizens. Their protection and 
safety was paramount in the President's mind. Too, there 
was the hemispheric march toward democracy and the 
humanitarian considerations inside of Haiti to consider.
The President had taken certain actions in response to the 
incident and these were explained as well. New actions to 
be taken included reimposition of sanctions, the deployment 
of six United States Naval vessels off the coast of Haiti 
to enforce the sanctions, and the placement of a company of 
marines stationed on Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, on full alert. 
The explanation of U.S. interests and new actions combined 
to form the Administration's purpose: "to ensure the safety
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of the Americans in Haiti and to press for the restoration 
of democracy there through the strongest possible 
enforcement of the sanctions.1,133
Shortly after this statement, the Clinton 
Administration found itself embroiled in a battle with 
Congress over management of foreign policy. At stake was 
the manner in which the President could command U.S. 
troops. President Clinton stressed that his Administration 
was looking for ways to work more closely with Congress in 
the new post-Cold War world. The new relationship must 
recognize Congress's concerns but also protect the 
President's prerogative to act. The President further 
stressed that better cooperation between the executive 
branch and Congress was critical for effective U.S. foreign 
policy. The President reiterated his commitment to 
consulting with Congress on foreign policy, and pledged to 
continue to keep Congress fully informed about significant 
deployments of the Nation's Armed Forces. The President 
had stressed as well that any restrictions placed upon him 
could send the wrong signal to the de facto government in 
Haiti, and could also hinder his effectiveness in enforcing 
sanctions and protecting American lives.
The question of sanctions was also continually 
stressed throughout the aftermath of the incident. The 
Clinton Administration emphasized that it only planned to 
use sanctions to begin with; however, publicly it never
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ruled out the use of U.S. troops. As the President stated, 
he was not going to rule anything in or out. And on this 
point he and his officials were consistent throughout the 
incident.
Another issue that received considerable attention 
from the press and Congress during this period concerned 
President Aristide's CIA generated psychological profile. 
Again, the Clinton Administration spoke with a unified 
voice: President Aristide's competence is not at issue; he 
was the legally elected President of Haiti. It was not for 
the United states to judge who the Haitian people could or 
could not have as their President.
On the questions of sanctions the Administration was 
consistent as well. The President and his officials 
continually stressed that the sanctions achieved the 
initial Governors Island agreement; thus, they were an 
effective tool to employ to force the de facto government 
to the bargaining table. The Administration frankly 
admitted that they did hurt the poor, but that eventually 
they force the leaders to talk. Stressed during these 
types of comments were the Administration's humanitarian 
assistance to the Haitian poor: food and medical supplies 
to over 680,000 Haitian a day.
The response of the press may be broadly divided into 
two framing devices: one, sanctions and internal Haitian 
affairs; and two, the battle between Congress and the
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President over foreign affairs. With regard to sanctions 
the press generally framed its coverage in such a manner as 
to suggest that they hurt only the Haitian poor; were an 
ineffective weapon against the county's rich leaders; and 
that, in conjunction with the political impasse, and the 
effects of sanctions, had thrown the country into near 
anarchy.
After the initial success of the Governors Island 
agreement, the press maintained that the abysmal Haitian 
economy was a direct result of the sanctions imposed in 
1991, but especially as a result of the additional 
sanctions imposed by President Clinton in June 1993. Once 
the crisis erupted in Haiti, both the New York Times and 
the Washington Post called for the return of sanctions.
Even though calling for the reimposition of sanctions, the 
Washington Post stressed that they would only hurt the poor 
while having negligible effects upon the country's leaders. 
The answer was to invite the leaders to negotiate once 
again. After the President's 15 October 1993 address, the 
press still supported the reimposition, but stressed even 
more strongly the effects such sanctions have upon the 
poor. The internal situation was described as near 
anarchy, with the sanctions having a crippling effect.
Both papers reported that the sanctions might not return 
the de facto government to the bargaining table. Both 
papers reported that the wealthy could afford to wait out
2 04
the sanctions and that the poor were the real sufferers.
As the weeks passed, both papers increased coverage on the 
effects of the sanctions. The Haitian people were reported 
as beginning to resent the sanctions, and the internal 
situation was depicted as grim. The press stated that both 
sides were talking, but that the army leaders were stalling 
as the economy crumbled. The situation was, in short, 
economic collapse and political stalemate.
The broad framing device I call Congress vs. the 
President contains three general elements: one, use of U.S. 
troops; two, the President's foreign policy in general; and 
three, Aristide's CIA psychological profile. Although the 
press reported that President Clinton had not ruled in or 
ruled out any options for responding to the incident, they 
continuously reported that the Administration did not 
intend to use U.S. troops to restore order and reimpose 
Aristide. Moreover, the Hew York Times reported misleading 
numbers concerning the initial deployment of military 
engineers and trainers; these misrepresentation continued, 
with the paper reporting varied numbers and composition of 
U.S. troops initially sailing to Port-au-Prince. The 
withdrawal of the U.S.S Harlan Countv was described as a 
retreat, and was later used to symbolize the 
Administrations' broken promise to the Haitian people.
The President's foreign policy received mixed 
emphasis. At one point the New York Times described
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President Clinton's motivation for being in Haiti as 
embarrassment over his broken campaign promise to stop 
direct returns. Once the crisis erupted, foreign policy 
evolved differently for each paper. The New York Times 
described foreign policy as a partisan battle between 
Congress and the President. At issue were U.S. troop 
involvement in foreign trouble spots: Somalia, Bosnia, and 
Haiti. A partisan interpretation was given to this issue. 
The New York Times described the discussions as "gratuitous 
partisan sniping" and suggested that the Republicans left 
the President with all of the problems. The Washington 
Post also described the battle between the President and 
Congress, but although it, too, described this battle as 
partisan "sniping," it also raised it to a question of U.S. 
policy in a post-Cold War world. The paper was actively 
exploring America's role in the post-cold War world, and 
the running Presidential/Congressional battle was reported 
in a manner that attempted to explore this role.
The battle between Congress and the President died 
when the Senate passed a non-binding resolution that 
requested the President to keep Congress informed about the 
use of U.S. troops in U.N. missions. The concern with 
foreign policy did not die out, however. Instead, there 
was a shift in emphasis from the Presidential/Congressional 
partisan struggle to the composition of the President's 
foreign policy team. In short, the issue of the
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Administrations foreign policy evolved into personality 
sketches. This was particularly true of the New York 
Times, which reported on this issue at a 2:1 ratio over the 
Washington Post after the compromise resolution was 
forwarded to the President.
Although not of major importance in terms of space 
provided, the issue of Aristide's competence does merit 
mention as a framing device due to the consistency of press 
coverage. Both papers described the question of the CIA's 
psychological profile as partisan bickering and an attempt 
at character assassination. Both papers advanced the 
Clinton Administration's claim that it did not matter what 
the CIA said, that the people of Haiti had elected him and 
he was their best hope for the restoration of democracy.
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CONCLUSION
This study was conceived as a beginning in previously 
unexamined territory. The task of analyzing presidential 
crisis rhetoric within a post-Cold War world has begun. 
Specifically, this study examined the Clinton 
Administration's discursive response to the situation in 
Haiti during 1993. in addition, this study has examined 
the Administration's discourse as part of a larger 
discourse presented by the national press to the American 
people. The central concern has been with presidential and 
press framing of the situation in Haiti. Accordingly, this 
study sought to answer three specific questions: one, how 
did the Clinton Administration frame the situation in 
Haiti; two, how did the press, responding to President 
Clinton, frame the situation; and three, at what time, if 
at all, did these frames converge to present a unified 
contextual whole? In this chapter I provide an overview of 
the framing analysis performed in this study; in addition,
I answer the three specific research questions asked by 
this study. Finally, I provide an overview of the 
implications and theoretical contributions of this study.
Overview of Framing Analysis 
The formal statements made by President Clinton and 
his officials have been called the administrative text in 
this study. This text was subjected to a frame analysis. 
Moreover, the news items printed in the Washington Post and
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the New York Times concerning Haiti were also subjected to 
a frame analysis. These two frames were then compared. 
Framing acts to make some elements of a situation or text 
more salient than others. Frames (1) define problems, (2) 
diagnose causes, (3) make moral judgments, and (4) suggest 
remedies. Pan and Kosicki suggested that news stories have 
a unifying frame and that this frame determines how a given 
news story will be interpreted. The work by Entman 
corroborates this assertion, and has demonstrated that 
frames reside within news narratives and encourage certain 
ways of thinking about them. Keywords, metaphors, 
concepts, and symbols take on especial importance as 
components of a frame.
Entman called the elements that comprise a frame 
"event-specific schema." Once established, event-specific 
schema make it difficult to modify or replace a particular 
frame. As Entman stated: "for those stories in which a 
single f rame thoroughly pervades the text, stray contrary 
opinions . . . are likely to possess such low salience as
to be of little practical use to most audience members."1 
When developing new event-specific schema, however, 
political elites and the President have great influence in 
establishing the frames used. During a crisis situation, 
then, the President should have enormous potential 
influence over how the event is to be framed. This study 
examined a crisis situation over a period of one year:
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January 1993 to December 1993. During this year the 
Clinton Administration worked within an already established 
frame— event-specific schema— and worked within a crisis 
atmosphere— new event-specific schema. Thus this study 
analyzed both the President's ability to affect already 
established frames, and his ability to enact frames in 
order to structure action and belief in a post-Cold War 
setting.
Research Questions
One: How did the Clinton Administration Frame the Situation 
in Haiti?
Period One: January 1993 through June 1993
The Clinton Administration inherited a situation that 
had already developed a well articulated frame. That is to 
say, the event-specific schema was already entrenched. The 
Bush Administration had framed the situation in several 
important ways. First, it had stressed the United States 
as a cooperative partner, with the U.N./OAS as the leaders, 
in restoring democracy to Haiti. Second, the Bush 
Administration had stressed that the policy of direct 
returns was a humanitarian policy aimed at preventing the 
deaths of thousands of Haitian boat-people. Finally, the 
Bush Administration had repeatedly stressed that the 
Haitian refugees were primarily economic, not political.
Just prior to taking office. President-elect Clinton 
announced his policy toward Haiti. This policy remained 
consistent throughout 1993. The policy was constrained by
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the prior Bush Administration frames, but also announced 
new changes aimed at making the policy Clinton's own. In 
this respect, the Clinton Administration was constrained by 
the initial event-specific schema. The situation— Haiti—  
was itself not new, although Clinton was a new President. 
Even though candidate-Clinton had promised sweeping changes 
in the Bush Administration policy, once elected, he found 
himself constrained by both material conditions {the 
possibility of 100,000 or more Haitian refugees) and the 
Bush Administration's prior frame. Thus President-elect 
Clinton's early announcement is a combination of prior Bush 
policy and Clinton's own attempt at change.
In his first formal statement as President-elect, 
Clinton announced three broad goals. First, his 
Administration was committed to restoring democracy to 
Haiti. This included the return of President Aristide.
The restoration of democracy was to be accomplished through 
cooperation with the U.N./OAS. Furthermore, it was to be 
accomplished through negotiation and the early deployment 
of human rights monitors to ensure some sort of political 
stability within Haiti. Second, the President was 
committed to saving human lives. In this case, the policy 
of direct returns was to be continued. This action was 
clearly announced as humanitarian in motive. Finally, the 
President announced his own policy changes. He was 
committed to fair treatment for asylum seekers in Haiti.
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The President ordered accelerated refugee processing and 
expanded facilities in Haiti. This was especially 
important for maintaining the humanitarian aspect of the 
Administration's policy.2
The problem defined by the Administration was simple. 
President Aristide was Haiti's first democratically elected 
President. A coup d'6tat in September of 1991 forced him 
to flee the country. Since that time the de facto regime 
had exploited the country and severe economic depression 
had ensued causing tens-of-thousands to seek better 
conditions in the United States. The international 
community could not sit idly by, because this would send a 
message to other leaders in the Western hemisphere that 
such thwarting of democratic will would go unpunished. 
Therefore the solution to these problems was the return of 
President Aristide and the restoration of democracy. For 
the President this was a foreign policy issue, one in which 
his authority as President should not be questioned nor 
debated.
Period Two: July through December
After the signing of the Governors Island agreement on 
3 July 1993, the Clinton Administration commented 
relatively little on the situation in Haiti. On 11 October 
1993, however, the U.S.S. Harlan Countv was prevented from 
docking in Port-au-Prince by demonstrators. On 12 October 
1993 the Administration began to respond to this crisis.
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The initial administrative text was explanatory in nature. 
Administration officials explained that the leaders of the 
de facto government had failed to live up to their part of 
the Governors Island agreement; in short, they had broken 
their promise to maintain order and provide a secure 
environment for U.S. and Canadian military personnel. The 
Administration stressed the non-confrontational role of the 
military engineers and trainers; thus the withdrawal of the 
ship was not a retreat, or a policy crisis, but a prudent 
decision.
President Clinton formally responded to the situation 
on 15 October 1993. His statement obtained three goals. 
First, he announced U.S. interests: the safety of 1,000 
American citizens living in Haiti; the maintenance of the 
hemispheric march toward democracy; and the continuing 
humanitarian concerns. Second, he explained new U.S. 
actions: the reimposition of sanctions; the deployment of 
six navy vessels to enforce sanctions; and the placement of 
a marine company in Guantanamo Bay Naval base on full 
alert. Finally, he explained the U.S. purpose of these 
actions: to ensure the safety of American lives, and to 
press for the restoration of President Aristide and 
democracy.
Following the Port-au-Prince incident, a battle 
between the President and Congress erupted over the 
possible use of U.S. troops in several U.N. missions:
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Haiti, Bosnia, and Somalia. During this time the 
Administration focused upon its major foreign policy 
accomplishments— Russia and nuclear containment--and 
stressed the difference between vital U.S. interests and 
those areas where U.S. interests were less obvious: Haiti, 
Bosnia, and Somalia. The Clinton Administration stressed 
that there should be more cooperation between Congress and 
the President in this new era of post-Cold War relations.
Two other policy considerations were part of the 
Administration's overall frame for this period: the 
questions of sanctions and Aristide's CIA psychological 
profile. On the question of sanctions the Administration 
maintained the same framing elements as it had before the 
Port-au-Prince incident. They were what forced the de 
facto government to the bargaining table in the first 
place. The Administration was committed, however, to 
maintaining humanitarian assistance programs in the form of 
food and medical supplies to over 680,000 Haitians a day.
On the question of President Aristide's mental stability 
the Administration presented a simple argument. The people 
of Haiti elected him, and the U.S. had no business telling 
the people of Haiti who they may have as President.
During this period the Administration framed its 
response in such a manner as to define the problem as one 
of foreign policy. Thus, blame for the situation in Haiti 
was laid squarely at the feet of the leaders of the de
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facto government. Further, the problem was one of 
perception. Haiti was only a small event that would not 
have risen to such importance if there had not recently 
been the fire fight in Somalia that resulted in 18 American 
dead. The larger foreign policy issues were being well 
managed; notwithstanding, those issues where U.S. interests 
were less well defined, but more dramatic, were receiving 
the largest share of the attention. The remedies suggested 
by the Administration were simple and a continuation of the 
earliest Administrative utterances on the Haitian 
situation. The U.N./OAS should continue sanctions until 
the leaders of the de facto government restore President 
Aristide and democracy.
Two: How did the Press. Responding to President Clinton, 
Frame the Situation?
Period One: January 1993 through June 1993
The press did report what the Clinton Administration 
said about Haiti. However, as this study progressed, it 
became increasingly clear that what was being reported was 
framed in such a manner as to indicate the presence of a 
fully articulated counter policy. The press frame had 
seven distinct components. One, difficulties in reaching a 
settlement were continually stressed. Two, President 
Clinton's campaign pledge reversal was highlighted as an 
icon for the callous denial of refugee rights. Three, 
refugees were assumed to be political, not economic. Four, 
it was assumed that the U.S. was the leader in the
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international negotiations. Five, the embargo/sanctions 
were reported as only hurting Haiti's poor. Six, the 
policy of direct returns was stressed as illegal. Seven, 
it was assumed by the press that any immigrant had a right 
to enter this country.
The press frame was essentially a domestic one, with 
all seven elements rooted in a domestic focus. The 
problems highlighted by this domestic frame were different 
than those highlighted by the Administration's frame. The 
root causes of the problems can be ascribed to one major 
issue: the continuation of the Bush policy toward Haiti. 
Direct returns was touted by the press as being illegal and 
immoral. The inherent immorality is linked to three 
general ethical violations. One, Clinton broke his word 
about abolishing the policy of direct returns. Two, the 
policy of direct returns violates Haitians' rights to enter 
this country to settle. Three, the embargo/sanctions only 
hurts the poor in Haiti. Although the press did not openly 
suggest any remedies to the problems associated with Haiti, 
the frame itself suggests that all would be well if 
President Clinton followed through with his campaign 
pledge. The frame also suggested that the
embargo/sanctions were responsible for the continuation of 
abysmal economic conditions in Haiti; therefore, if they 
were removed, the conditions would improve. The press 
focus is clearly upon those aspects of Administrative
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policy that are of a domestic nature: the legality of the 
policy and the President's character as it pertains to a 
reversal of a campaign pledge.
Period Two: July 1993 through December 1993
After the signing of the Governors Island agreement 
the press, like the Clinton Administration, reported little 
about Haiti. All was assumed to be going according to 
plan. Once the Port-au-Prince incident occurred, however, 
reporting upon the situation began again in earnest. The 
press frame during this time evolved into two distinct 
frames. The first focused upon the internal workings of 
Haiti; it was a foreign affairs frame. In this frame were 
details of the effects of the newly imposed sanctions, and 
the near anarchic state of the country. It was reported 
that the Clinton Administration's imposition of sanctions 
was the primary culprit for this. Although the press urged 
the Administration to reimpose sanctions, it was strongly 
assertive that they would only hurt the poor. The issue of 
direct returns was almost ignored during the aftermath of 
the demonstration in Port-au-Prince.
The second frame focused upon the domestic affairs of 
America. The Port-au-Prince incident prompted a 
Congressional battle with the Clinton Administration over 
the use of U.S. troops in U.N. missions. Although this 
issue had to do with foreign policy, it was eventually 
reduced to a partisan political battle. Even after the
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congressional concern abated, the press continued to report 
issues of Clinton's foreign policy and America's post-Cold 
War role as domestic concerns revolving around the 
composition of Clinton's foreign policy team.
The CIA psychological profile of President Aristide 
was also a major concern in the press. However, this issue 
was also filtered through a domestic lens, ultimately being 
interpreted as part of a larger partisan political battle 
between Republicans and the President.
Three: Did These Frames Converge to Present a Unified 
Contextual Whole?
During the period of January through June the press 
operated from a very different frame from that of the 
Clinton Administration. Simply put, the press presented 
the situation as a domestic issue, and the Administration 
presented it as a foreign policy issue. Although the press 
did report what the Administration said, the substance of 
the Administrative text was challenged by the presence of 
the press frame. This is to say, the context surrounding 
the administrative text was modified by the frame of the 
press. This changed the meaning of the Administration's 
comments; the Administration was seen as responding to 
press challenges of its own policies.
As time progressed, the disparities between the press 
frame and the Administration's frame grew. By the end of 
June, each was a fully articulated policy. The Clinton 
Administration stressed a foreign policy that had as its
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focus the return of democracy and the aversion of a massive 
humanitarian tragedy. The press frame stressed a domestic 
focus that highlighted its perception of an inhumane 
Administrative policy of direct returns. Restoration of 
democracy was not the focus, but the domestic, legal issue 
of the Administration's policy. In such a setting the 
Administration was presented, not as a source of news, but 
as one side of a partisan battle. When the Clinton 
Administration would make a statement on the situation in 
Haiti, the press would bring in critics of the 
Administration's position. These so-called critics 
invariably articulated the very counter-policy that the 
press was advancing.
After the Port-au-Prince incident the frames of the 
Clinton Administration and the press still did not 
converge. Only on two issues did the two touch, the 
question of Aristide's CIA psychological profile, and the 
reimposition of sanctions. However, reimposing sanctions 
was still presented as hurting only the Haitian poor. Yet 
the press did back the President in several ways. First, 
they virtually stopped reporting on the policy of direct 
returns, even though the policy was continually enforced by 
U.S. Coast Guard and Navy vessels. Second, the effect of 
the sanctions were now framed as a foreign policy issue.
The stories on this issue were linked with the internal 
political discussion in Haiti. However, the effects of the
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sanctions were ascribed to the original sanctions and 
especially the oil embargo President Clinton enacted in 
June 1993. Thus, while the press supported the 
Administration's reimposition of sanctions, it also 
reported that the effects of sanctions were horrible. The 
press consistently maintained that sanctions would do 
little good, even though the same sanctions initially 
compelled the de facto government to sign the Governors 
Island agreement.
Implications and Theoretical Discussion 
This section is composed of three parts: first, I 
discuss the theoretical assumptions of agenda- 
setting/extension literature as it relates to the results 
of this study; two, I discuss the theoretical assumptions 
of crisis rhetoric literature as it relates to the results 
of this study; finally, I discuss implication for future 
studies in the area of presidential crisis rhetoric. 
Agenda-Setting and Agenda-Extension
Agenda-setting theory in essence postulates that the 
press tells us what to think about, but not what to think. 
Furthermore, we learn about an issue in direct proportion 
to press coverage of that issue. The research reviewed in 
this study have concluded that the relationship between 
press and President is a reciprocal one. The President 
affects press content, and the press affects Presidential 
message content as well. This study did not find press
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coverage of particular issues pertaining to Haiti reflected 
in subsequent Administrative utterances. However, this 
study did find that while the content of presidential 
messages was being reported, the context in which the 
message was originally uttered was not always conveyed.
Agenda-extension moves beyond agenda-setting theory by 
postulating an evaluative component to media coverage of 
issues and events. In short, the press not only tells us 
what to think about (agenda-setting), but it also tells us 
how to think about it (agenda-extension). This evaluative 
component has been called priming and framing by various 
communication and political science researchers. Priming, 
however, refers specifically to the contextual cues 
embedded within a news story that would be used by the 
public to evaluate the subject matter at hand. For 
presidential studies this would imply that the public would 
be primed to evaluate that President by how well he handled 
certain issues in relation to the evaluative cues provided 
by the media. This study focused upon the different frames 
used by the Administration and the press, not upon the 
public's evaluation of the President based upon media 
coverage. Thus, this study makes no attempt at 
ascertaining the effects of priming upon the public.
This study did, however, focus upon contending frames 
used to describe the situation in Haiti during 1993.
Frames are central organizing ideas within a narrative
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account of an issue or event. Frames provide the 
interpretive cues for neutral facts. This study has 
demonstrated that the press constructed a frame in 
opposition to that which the Administration used in 
describing the Haiti situation. This acted to enervate the 
Clinton Administration's attempt at explaining the 
situation to the American public. Unless the reader had 
first hand access to transcripts of the Clinton 
Administration's utterances, all information was filtered 
through the frame of the press. Thus the context through 
which the Administration's utterances were understood 
changed, thereby changing the meaning of the message.
In this manner the Administration was not treated as a 
news source, providing informative utterances about the 
situation, but rather it was forced into an oppositional 
role to that of the press. The President and his officials 
were presented as one side, articulating one definition of 
the situation. The press introduced so-called critics of 
the Administration who took an oppositional view which 
almost always duplicated that of the press. Thus this 
study found evidence that supports recent research into the 
effects of framing.
Crisis Rhetoric
With the loss of the Cold War meta-narrative,
President Clinton was unable to draw upon the inventional 
resources used by Presidents since 1947 to define crises
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situations. The cold War was, in a very significant sense, 
a contest of words in which a prevailing image of the enemy 
was conveyed to Americans. These common images were an 
inventional resource that a President might use when 
advancing a particular foreign policy action. The enemy 
was often characterized as a "moral threat to freedom," "a 
barbarian," or part of "an evil empire." Precedent and 
tradition strongly constrained a President's utterances 
about foreign affairs. Formally descriptions of the enemy 
often called upon Americans' public knowledge about the 
enemy, thereby justifying action. However, President 
Clinton was unable to call upon such knowledge to justify 
action in Haiti. For example, the names used by both the 
Administration and the press to describe the de facto 
government in Haiti suggest no prevailing image of the 
enemy. Those thwarting the restoration of President 
Aristide and democracy are vague, mostly neutral entities. 
Tables 1 through 6 illustrate the use of descriptive terms 
employed by the Administration and the press.
Table 1
White House Descriptive Terms Used to Describe the De Facto 
Government (January-June 1993)
9 junta
7 de facto regime
4 all sides





{Table C o n 'd .)
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New York Times Descriptive Terms Used to Describe the De 
Facto Government (January-June 1993)
8 officials
6 authorities










1 people at the top
Table 3
Washington Post Descriptive Terms Used to Describe the De 
Facto Government (January-June 1993)
7 the military
5 de facto government
4 Haitian authorities
4 military backed government 
2 army leaders





1 de facto civilian government
1 de facto army backed government
1 de facto authorities
1 de facto rulers
1 Haiti's present rulers
1 Haiti's political leaders
1 Haiti's military backed leaders
1 Haitian military
(Table C o n 'd .)
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1 military rulers
1 military and civilian leaders
l military authorities
1 military-backed, de facto government
1 military-installed regime
l new regime
1 political and military leaders
1 regime
1 the government
1 those in power
Table 4
White House Descriptive Terms Used to Describe the De Facto 
Government (July-December 1993)
21 de facto regime
8 government of Haiti





2 Haitian military authorities 








Hew York Times Descriptive Terms Used to Describe the De 












1 army and police leaders
1 army officials
1 economic elite
1 Haitian high command
(Table C o n 'd .)
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1 military coup leaders
l military elite





Washinaton Post Descriptive Terms Used to Describe the De





1 de facto leaders
1 de facto military rulers





As these tables indicate, there were no "barbaric" or 
"irrational" descriptions employed. Indeed, even after the 
11 October 1993 Port-au-Prince incident no significant 
change in terminology was undertaken. The results indicate 
that the only centralized descriptive label used involved 
the term "military." The Clinton Administration's most 
often employed the following three descriptions: "de facto 
regime" (28 times), "junta" (9 times), and "government of 
Haiti" (8 times). These terms are, at worst, neutral, and 
may even imply legitimacy. Given the Clinton 
Administration's notable attempts at diplomacy, it seems 
reasonable not to negatively name those with whom you are 
negotiating. The New York Times most often used the 
following three descriptions: "Haitian military" (16 
times), "military leaders" (14 times), and "authorities" (8
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times). The Washinaton Post most often employed the 
following three descriptions: "the military” (15 times), 
"military leaders” (14 times), and "military rulers" (9 
times). As with the Administration's descriptions, there 
is a notable lack of negative labels used. Considering 
that the United States maintains relations with many 
military ruled countries across the world, this label does 
not necessarily represent a villainization of the "enemy."
Theodore Windt advanced a conception of crisis 
rhetoric which contends that a President making a crisis 
speech will ask support for, and not discussion about, a 
particular plan of action.1 As mentioned earlier, Windt 
has convincingly argued that a presidential crisis speech 
will consist of an obligatory statement of facts, an 
establishment of a melodrama between good and evil, and 
that the policy enacted will be framed as a moral act.
This study initially suggested that this model for 
Presidential crisis speeches would not hold true for 
President Clinton due to the loss of the Cold War meta­
narrative. This assumption proved to be correct.
Throughout 1993, President Clinton spoke many times on 
the situation in Haiti, but only one brief speech, that 
given of 15 October 1993 may be considered a speech 
responding to a perception of crisis. In this speech, the 
President did make a statement of the facts surrounding the 
new situation for the United States. This included a 
discussion of the action taken by the President in response 
to the new situation. However, there was no establishment
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of a melodrama between good and evil. No attempt to 
establish the actions in Haiti to a larger world picture 
was made. The possible exception came when President 
Clinton asserted that part of the U.S. interest in the area 
was to maintain the hemispheric march toward democracy. 
Furthermore, the President did not frame his newly 
announced actions as a moral act. Instead it was simply 
announced as a continuation of the same policy that had 
been in place prior to the Port-au-Prince incident.
Although this policy did contain specific humanitarian 
underpinnings, the overall focus was upon the breaking of 
the Governors Island agreement itself. This is to say, the 
U.N./OAS and the United States were partners in a signed 
agreement that had been abrogated. The U.S. was simply 
calling for the honoring of the contract.
Although the Administration had called the incident at 
Port-au-Prince "a brutal attempt by Haiti's military and 
police authorities to thwart the expressed desire of the 
Haitian people for democracy,M it was the only such 
exhortative statement.4 Moreover, the overall frame of the 
Administration vitiated the potential injurious effect such 
a comment could have. In short, the frame used by the 
Administration for the past ten months reduced the saliency 
of the comment. For the past 10 months the Administration 
had been stressing diplomacy and a negotiated solution. 
Terms used to describe the de facto government were 
generally neutral. Even in the crisis atmosphere the one 
demonizing comment by the Administration seemed oddly out
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of place, almost a flair of temper instead of a consistent 
manner of conduct. The Administration had no previous 
negative characterizations to draw upon. The Cold War 
meta-narrative was inoperative; the Administration's own 
utterances in the past acted to impair any effective use of 
inflammatory discourse.
Crisis rhetoric is about the creation of stable 
contextual frames through which to view the event and 
justify any action taken in response to the event. As an 
interanimation of text and context occur, the situational 
elements combine to either effect a stable frame, or to 
modify the frame in some way. As a frame stabilizes the 
President will find increased freedom to pursue his present 
course of action and increased limits upon choices for new 
action. President Clinton had a stable frame through which 
to view the event, this was his initial foreign policy 
frame. Indeed, when President Clinton took office in 
January 1993, he initially responded to what many perceived 
to be a pre-existing crisis. In this manner he acted in 
the role of manager of that crisis. He had a well 
developed and articulated frame through which to understand 
the situation in Haiti. Unfortunately for the President, 
the press frame did not match his own. Instead the press 
developed a fully articulated counter-policy. In the 
opinion of this author, the mixing of frames acts to 
exacerbate the perception of crisis because there is no 
stable frame through which to view the event.
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The President's 15 October 199 3 speech has provided us 
with the opportunity to examine the effects of a 
presidential crisis speech upon already established frames. 
Blair and Houck have suggested that many crisis rhetoric 
scholars differentiate between a President constructing the 
perception of a crisis and a President's response to an 
event already perceived as a crisis. Blair and Houck state 
that such a distinction is unprovable and unimportant. 
President Clinton's reply to the Port-au-Prince situation 
provides insight that belies these scholars' assertions, 
however. First, President Clinton responded after several 
days of news coverage. This coverage reflected a wide 
array of coverage. The only consistent response to the 
incident was that of the Administration. When President 
Clinton spoke, he was speaking within a situation 
possessing an unstable context. His comments might have 
precipitated the situation into a full-blown crisis 
situation; however, drawing upon his Administration's 
already established frame, the President maintained a 
course of action commensurate with his prior utterances.
The Administrative text had now interacted with the 
context.
Bonnie Dow argued that if the President is responding 
to an event already perceived as a crisis situation, then 
he will enact an epideictic response which will function to 
prevent disparate interpretations of the situation and to 
"promote continuity, restore communal feeling, and . . .
reconcile the audience to a new situation."'' In short, the
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President's response is designed to manage and stabilize 
the already existing perception of crisis. However, 
President Clinton's speech did act to modify the perception 
of crisis. While the press was initially raising the 
question of U.S. troop involvement, the President spoke so 
as to retain a sense of control over the situation. He 
recast the terms of the debate to stress a negotiated 
solution. In this manner the President was arguing that 
his policy was reasonable and that there was no immediate 
danger to U.S. interests. In short, to use Dow's 
phraseology, he was using a deliberative approach. 
Deliberative strategies are those used to demonstrate that 
the policy being enacted in response to a crisis is 
"expedient, reasoned and prudent.’*6 Thus we have an 
example of a crisis speech that is an example of the 
blurring of, according to Dow, two distinct Presidential 
crisis speeches.
Although this study has been a comparative framing 
analysis, it has made a significant contribution in the 
area of post-Cold War crisis rhetoric theory.
Specifically, this study allows us to begin to answer what 
inventional resources a President has today to use when 
framing a crisis. The Cold War meta-narrative was a part 
of this country's collective consciousness; it was public 
knowledge. The public and its knowledge serve to authorize 
discourse emanating from rhetors acting as spokespersons 
for the public; in our case, the President. Presidents 
must build certain images of the enemy when speaking about
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crises, and these images must make links to values and 
images embedded in American culture. However, it is now 
difficult for Presidents to do this. Public knowledge for 
the past forty-five years has privileged those images 
drawing upon the Cold War meta-narrative. National values 
and interests were relatively easy to determine.
However, today it is difficult to know what National 
interests are at any given time; this weakens the 
parameters of the rhetorical situation because the context 
is more dubious and there exists conflicting public 
perception over what should be done. This leaves a 
President with few inventional resources from which to draw 
upon when creating/responding to crises. For President 
Clinton this problem was particularly acute since any 
utterance he or his officials made were cast into a counter 
frame advanced by the press. However, this study 
demonstrated that the President may draw upon his own 
frame, as President Clinton did in responding to the crisis 
situation in Haiti. Moreover, a President might draw upon 
other values embedded in American culture: Patriotism, Fair 
Play, Honor, and the like. Other options were available, 
but were not used by President Clinton.
Martin Medhurst has argued that a President's crisis 
response should be considered part of his rhetorical 
biography. That is to say, a President's personal style 
may have a significant impact upon how he handles a crisis 
situation. This study supports this assertion. By 
examining the Clinton Administration's responses over time-
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-one year--this study was able to note the consistent 
aspects of the proffered discourse. Most studies of crisis 
rhetoric focus upon one speech, or upon several different 
Presidents giving one speech on similar crises. This study 
found that the style employed by the Clinton Administration 
was remarkably consistent over time. The style stressed 
cooperation, negotiation, and dignity for all parties. The 
strength of this frame established by the Clinton 
Administration was so strong that it pervaded President 
Clinton's formal reply to the Port-au-Prince incident.
Thus the President's strategy for dealing with a crisis 
appears to be remarkably similar to his day to day style of 
operation: slow deliberation stressing a negotiated, 
compromised, and non-confrontational solution.
President Clinton used those resources that were 
available from his Administration's initial (January) 
framing of the Haitian situation. Thus his crisis speech 
was constrained by this frame. He could not villainize the 
coup leaders, at least not immediately. To do so would be 
to undermine ten months of his own framing. He could not 
immediately justify extreme action in the form of military 
intervention, for to do so would also counter act ten 
months of his own framing. He was constrained by his 
previous utterances: cooperation, and a negotiated 
solution. President Clinton could not even draw upon the 
inventional resources that the press frame offered, for it 
was oppositional to his own and had stressed a counter 
policy. In my opinion, a President today must fund his own
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inventional resources. Until this country finds a new role 
for itself in the post-cold War world, there will be 
conflicting frames presented for any international crisis 
situation.
Indeed, it seems that contending frames were 
suppressed by the enacting of the Cold War meta-narrative. 
The "rally-*round-the-president" phenomenon found by Nacos 
did not materialize for Clinton, and the situation never 
evolved to closure.7 The press did stop criticizing the 
policy of direct returns, however, and this lends some 
support to previous studies that suggest that during times 
of crises the benefit of the doubt is given to the 
President. But the press also focused increasingly upon 
the effects sanctions had on the Haitian poor.
Consequently, the one policy option available to the 
President besides direct military intervention was openly 
deplored by the press.
Furthermore, as the situation progressed, the press 
began to assert that military action was not an option; 
this was in direct conflict with the Presidents comments. 
Moreover, while the President was attempting to articulate 
his Administration's post-cold War foreign policy, 
including Haiti, the press reported administrative policy 
as part of an on-going partisan political battle. In 
short, even during a time of crisis the press continued to 
advance its own oppositional frame.
As of this writing, public knowledge about America's 
foreign policy role in the world remains in flux, and no
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single frame has come to dominate public consciousness. In 
the past the press may not have agreed with what the 
President was doing, but executive actions could be 
consistently framed drawing upon public knowledge held in 
common, the Cold War meta-narrative for example. No such 
common knowledge exists today, so it is very likely that 
other crisis situations will exhibit contending 
President/press frames.
Future Studies
This study suggests several possible areas for future 
studies. In the area of priming researchers might explore 
the relationship between public opinion polls and frame 
content. For example, one might compare public opinion 
polls on a specific crisis issue with the frames used by 
the President and the press. It would be important to 
consider which criteria emerge to evaluate the President's 
performance.
One might also explore the bibliographic thesis put 
forth by James W. Pratt and also by Martin J. Medhurst.
For instance, a future study might employ a comparative 
frame analysis between the President and the press that 
focused upon one of several foreign policy crises 
experienced by the Clinton Administration: Somalia or North 
Korea, for example. In so doing, researchers might provide 
further insights into post-Cold War crisis rhetoric, and by 
this means better explore Clinton's particular rhetorical 
signature. Such studies would further help future
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researchers to discriminate better between situational 
dynamics and the particular style of a single President.
This study has shed light upon the development of 
crises in the post-Cold War world. Future studies may 
benefit from employing a comparative frame analysis upon 
classic examples of foreign policy crises; for example, the 
shootdown of KAL 007, the invasion of Grenada, the Kavaauez 
affair, or the Cuban missile crisis. With such comparative 
studies, researchers might begin to better understand the 
similarities and differences in the nature of 
President/press interaction during Cold War and post-Cold 
War crisis situations.
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